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ABSTRACT
THE ORTHOGENETIC PRINCIPLE AS AN ETHICAL DEFINITION OF
DEVELOPMENT
FEBRUARY, 1990
NATHANIEL BENJAMIN NEEDLE, B.A., WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY
Ed. M., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor S. Philip Eddy

The author defines development, or growth, as the ethically
desirable direction of change. Is there a principle which can
express what all developmental changes have in common, and
what makes them desirable?
The orthogenetic principle defines development as change
towards increasing INTEGRATION with complementary
DIFFERENTIATION of people with respect to their environment.
Heinz Werner and Bernard Kaplan first articulated this idea. It
characterizes the portrayal of development by Jean Piaget,
Lawrence Kohlberg, and John Dewey. None of these authors,
however, Justify orthogenesis as an ethical definition of
development across a global range of experience. The author
attempts this here, giving educators a tool for criticizing or
justifying education having development as its aim.
The author analyzes Integration and differentiation into
three aspects: CO-ORDINATION of DISTINGUISHED elements in the
environment; AUTONOMOUS choice from a DE-CENTERED or
IV

objective perspective; IMMUNITY from environmental vicissitudes
alongside an OPENING of and openness to the environment.
Advancing these qualities is justified as ethically desirable in two
ways. It overcomes the problem of egocentrism and habitattachment which gives meaning to the notion of development
across human experience. It also meets formal ethical criteria of
universalizability, universality, and prescriptivity.
Educators can use the orthogenetic principle to examine
assumptions about development within psychological theories to
see how these might themselves influence development. This
enables educators to make eclectic use of psychologies within an
ethical framework. The principle is also used to generate
guidelines for thorough and objective inquiry into what is most
growthful for a particular person at a particular time. The
author argues that the principle cannot prescribe any educational
course in advance of such inquiry into unique situations.
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CHAPTER I
PURPOSE AND NATURE OF THE THESIS

A. Origin and Function of the Orthogenesis Concept
The concept of orthogenesis is defined as change in an
organism in the direction of increasing differentiation and
hierarchic integration (Werner, 1957). It has gained currency
within developmental psychology as a definition of
development, [l] Functioning as "an heuristic principle. . .itself not
subject to empirical test" (p.126), the concept has been used to
distinguish changes which are developmental from those which
are not.
The orthogenesis idea has its roots within the "organismic
stream of developmental psychology. [2] The two dominant
theories within this stream are those of Heinz Werner (who, with
Bernard Kaplan, first used the term "orthogenesis"), and Jean
Piaget. [3]
Organicism, as typified by these authors, explains the
development of human perception, consciousness, cognition,
personality, and moral judgement in terms which evoke the
BIOLOGICAL heritage and context of these phenomena. Such terms
(e.g., adaptation, regulation) are analogous to those used for
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describing non-intelligent change in biological systems, including
both the evolution of species (phylogenesis) and the life-span of
individual organisms (ontogenesis). Organismic models do this
without in any way reducing the properties of intelligent systems
to non-intelligent ones. They do this by positing a hierarchy of
discrete systems. These may have common FUNCTIONAL features:
e.g., the first fish crawling upon land, a baby’s attempts at
language, and Einstein's theory of relativity all represent the
organism's effort to expand its environment. Nonetheless, they
have different STRUCTURES with distinct sets of rules. The system
of intelligence is hierarchically superior to, for example, the
system of instinct used by bees, or the systems of homeostasis
within the human body.
A core theoretical question for organismic developmental
psychology is "what are the criteria for judging some systems to
be hierarchically superior to others?" Now, organismic psychology
analyzes structures with an eye to their origin and function
(Piaget, 1975,p.83). It seeks to explain the structural features of
existing systems by examining how they came into being
(genesis), and also the purposes towards which these changes are
"directed" (Werner, 1963, pp. 133-136). Hierarchically superior
systems are considered to have evolved from inferior systems,
largely as a result of the very functioning of the lower systems
(Piaget, 1971, 1978, 1980). Therefore, organismic psychologists are
interested in plotting the "functional continuity" between systems
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having different structures: between, for example, the thought of
the child and that of the adult. The adult’s thought structure is
held to carry out the same fundamental functions as the child’s,
but in a superior way. Since this function is continuous and
invariable, organismic psychologists are interested not only in a
static structural comparison of different systems, but also in
defining the common properties which characterize the ongoing
DIRECTION of movement (what Piaget calls the VECTOR, 1965,
p.386) from lower to higher systems.
Finally, the radical changes accompanying the development
of new systems are considered to grow out of the incremental
changes that take place within existing systems.

Thus organismic

theorists also ask: "what characterizes the direction of ALL
change deemed to be from 'lower' to 'higher', whether intrasystemic or trans-systemic?" It is the function of the concept of
orthogenesis to provide a standard for assessing hierarchies of
change, whether change is described as a vector or as a series of
discrete states.

fi

Preliminary

Statement of

the

Thesis

I propose that the orthogenetic principle is susceptible of
being transformed from a principle whose only value is held to be
its value for scientific inquiry, into an ethical principle which can
serve as a definition of development as the aim of education.
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As a component of a psychological theory, orthogenesis is
associated with a series of explanatory assumptions regarding the
mechanisms by which change occurs, as well as other
assumptions associated with the organismic world-view. An
ethical theory of development, however, is concerned with
justifying certain changes as being "for the better", ultimately in
terms of their consequences for human welfare. I propose that
the core conceptual features of orthogenesis can be abstracted
from their organismic psychological-theory setting, and put to
work in the construction of an ethical theory. This theory may
borrow additional notions from the organismic view which are
congenial to its internal ethical logic. It may, on the other hand,
omit other organismic notions which are irrelevant or
uncongenial to the justification of such a theory. Such selective
abstraction is possible because the aims of a valid and useful
theory of explanation are not identical to those of a valid and
useful theory of justification. I propose that the orthogenesis idea
can endure such a transplantation without distortion of its
essential features.

c

Definition of Terms

EDUCATION is defined as the intentional art of promoting
development in oneself and others. Dewey

uses a "persuasive

definition" of this term (Stevenson, 1944, pp.210-217; 1963, pp.3254), when he says that in order "to be worthy of the name
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EDUCATION", the activity must be one of growth (Dewey, 1938a,
p.90). I use the term in the same spirit, except to say that while
all education promotes growth, not all growth is a result of
education. 1 wish to preserve a distinction for education as a
consciously refined practice, while allowing for the notion that
growth may occur as a result of experiences which are unplanned
and unpromoted. EDUCATORS are people who hold the practice of
education to be their primary purpose or function with regard to
some particular activity or context.
I do not wish to construe education as being restricted to
specific institutional contexts (e.g., schools) nor do 1 wish to
assume that education is what is going on in those contexts.
Likewise, people can act as educators without having specific
social roles (e.g., as professors or schoolteachers), and I do not
assume that people holding those roles are necessarily educators.
I do wish to construe education as aiming at a relatively
global development of others or oneself, as opposed to TRAINING
(for skill) or TEACHING (for knowledge), which might refer to
action having a more narrow aim. For example, someone who
teaches a sport with an eye to a student’s personality
development, and to the contribution made to society by people
adept at co-operative teamwork, is more of an educator than
someone whose teaching interest is limited to the development of
physical skill. An educator sees his contribution to a particular
developmental path against the background of the student’s
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overall development, which is his fundamental interest. The term
STUDENT is used loosely to define the object of an educator's
practice; it is not meant to be age- or context-specific.
DEVELOPMENT is defined as the consistent direction of
psychological change (the term PSYCHOLOGICAL being used in its
broadest possible sense of incorporating all mental life) held to be
of supreme value, synonomous in this respect with Dewey's
notion of GROWTH. While "development", in Kohlberg’s work is
limited to definition in terms of cognitive-structural stage
advance, my meaning is rather synonomous with Dewey's
broader view of "growth". In this thesis, development is assumed
to be the sole aim of education. It is argued in this thesis that
development or growth ought to be defined as being characterized
by ORTHOGENESIS.
ORTHOGENESIS is defined as complementary INTEGRATION
and DIFFERENTIATION of an ORGANISM with respect to its
ENVIRONMENT. The term refers to an abstract principle as well as
a material psychological process. Phrases such as "orthogenetic
principle", "orthogenesis idea", or "orthogenesis concept" will be
used when clear reference to a formal abstraction is desired. The
term "development" will be used when clear reference to a
psychological process is desired.
ORGANISM and ENVIRONMENT are mutually defining
abstractions which represent poles of a systemic, interactive, and
mutually fashioning relationship between the subject of
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development and everything with respect to which this subject
can be said to develop.
ENVIRONMENT is used here in keeping with Werner's
concept of "Umwelt" (l%3, p.133). Environment is a field of
interaction which includes the physical/geographical world, as
well as the social, cultural, and historical context (especially
flesh-and-blood others). It also refers to thoughts, feelings,
imagination, ego, "self-concepts", and physico-chemical body
states. The term INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT will be used when
specific reference to this latter category of environment is
desired.
Environment is defined by its impingement and influence
upon changes in the organism. It is also defined by the potential
objects of the organism’s attention, concern, thought, or action.
Thus it is referred to as "the organism's environment". To the
extent that something is far removed from both the organism's
concern, imagination, or action, AND any actual influence upon
change in the organism, it can be said to simply not be part of
that organism's environment. A faraway star, unless one believes
in astrology, is not part of an infant's environment, while it may
be a major aspect of an astronomer's environment. A war which
makes it impossible for an infant to receive food is, to an
objective observer, part of the infant's environment even if the
infant has no idea of the war.
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Further clarification of what is meant by internal
environment seems prudent. People can influence, and be
influenced by, their thoughts and feelings. They can also
potentially influence, detach from, and otherwise change ego,
self-concept, and habits. Hormones and body organs affect
change, and can in turn be affected by actions as diverse as
taking drugs and perfecting yogic practice. In defining
environment as an abstraction, it is not necessary to reserve
some fixed "core” self which, when everything else is abstracted
out, is "left" to be the organism.
ORGANISM refers to whomever is being considered the
subject of development, the one who is developing, in a particular
discussion. It is not necessary or possible for this to be defined in
some fixed way. Organism is not "self” when the discussion
revolves around "construction of a self (or selves)"; in that case
self is a feature of the environment. On other occasions, various
habits or thought patterns, which might otherwise be examined
qua environment, may be momentarily collapsed into what is
considered to be organism when the discussion focuses upon some
other feature of the environment.
The term organism conjures up the image of an amoeba
rather than a human being. Therefore, the terms INDIVIDUAL or
PERSON will be used in speaking of the organism most of the
time. However, it is possible for an actual individual to be
considered now the organism, now an aspect of the environment.
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All actual individuals are in fact both organism and someone
else's environment. The term organism refers to the one who is
our immediate subject of developmental concern, in contrast with
any named aspect of the universe which either impinges upon
the organism, or can be affected by the organism, or both, and
which therefore is the organism’s environment. I think that
context and specifying remarks should render it obvious whether
individuals are being discussed qua organism or qua environment.
Strictly speaking, I consider development to be an attribute
of the organism only, evaluated ultimately in terms of individual
EXPERIENCE (see below). Therefore, if I speak of the
"development" of the environment or social context, this is
shorthand for "consistent direction of change in the environment
which promotes the development of the organism”. This is not to
be construed as an inversion whereby the "development" of
history,

culture, species, society, or some other idea is seen as

the purpose of individual development.
INTEGRATION of the organism with respect to the
environment combines three qualities. First, there is CO¬
ORDINATION, whereby differentiated elements are linked and
unified within a more stable yet flexible plan of thought, action,
etc. A concept is an example of an integrative act, co-ordinating
birches, elms, etc., under the notion of "tree". Integration is
referred to as "hierarchic" (Werner, 1948, p.44) because the
integrated system confers co-ordinative power over the
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differentiated elements within that system. Our concept of tree
enables us to see what birches and elms have in common, as well
as to perceive better what makes a birch unique. Second, the
notion of power through co-ordination implies the notion of
AUTONOMY or independent self-direction. Example: for Piaget,
(1965, pp. 163-173) to decide not to lie because you hold the same
respect for others that you would like them to have for you, is
morally more autonomous than refraining from lying because
mommy said not to. Third, the idea of IMMUNITY or INTEGRITY
follows from this; even if mommy told you that you could or
should lie, the more integrated your morals, the more immune
you would be from such environmental contingencies.
Now we might imagine a person becoming increasingly selfdirected, adept at co-ordinating or controlling his environment,
and immune from all kinds of influences. Certainly this is a
dangerously incomplete vision of development; it might describe a
heartless megalomaniac!
DIFFERENTIATION complements the integrative aspect of
development. Three qualities of differentiation complement the
integrative qualities just described. First, there is the notion of
DISTINGUISHING elements out of a previously more diffuse and
global environment. Werner (1948, p.87) charts the process
whereby infants gradually develop from manifesting two or three
diffuse emotions to having the rich palette of emotional shades of
which most adults are capable. In the moral realm, the
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developing individual becomes more able to distinguish intention
from behavior; in judging the "badness” of breaking cups, the
number of cups broken becomes less important than whether the
cups were broken on purpose. Distinguishing complements co¬
ordination in development. For example, developing moral
principles allow not only for the increasing distinguishing of
intention from behavior, but also the increasing co-ordination of
the two, both functions being mutually reinforcing.
Second, the concept of autonomy is complemented by that
of DE-CENTERING (Piaget, 1950, p.72; 1967, p.66). To de-center
means to break free of a distorting "centrism" caused by some
sort of attachment to anything ranging from a sensory perception
to an "ethnocentric" world-view. A child who knows a ball is
under a chair even when he can’t see it has de-centered from his
immediate perceptual experience. A person who does not lie
because he does not wish to hurt others has de-centered so as to
be able to adopt another's perspective. The perceptually decentered child gains autonomy; he can direct his own actions
towards finding the ball instead of depending upon its physical
presence. The morally de-centered person gains autonomy both
by not being dependent upon external authority, and by not
being driven by immediate selfish desires (internal environment).
Third, differentiation implies an OPENING, or an expansionextension of the environment. To differentiate-distinguish a new
concept and field of knowledge, such as "history", out of a more

12

diffuse notion of the past, and to further be able to adopt the
perspective of people who lived in other times, (a de-centering
from one’s embeddedness in the historical present) involves a
consequent enlarging of one’s environment. The opening-quality
of differentiation and the immunizing-quality of integration
complement one another in a developmental process. Thus, an
experience that is "opening" for one person may be overwhelming
(disintegrating) for another who cannot control or co-ordinate the
changes forced upon him by the experience. Conversely,
immunity from fear of death permitted Gandhi to engage in a
path of non-violent resistance wherein he was prepared to open
himself to mortal danger before he would hurt another.
Repeated examples and analyses throughout the thesis will
flesh out the bare outline given above. The terms integration and
differentiation should each be considered as a synthesis of their
triune qualities; when I wish to emphasize a particular quality,
and context will not provide clear definition, I will refer
synecdochically to the quality, or use a hyphenated term, e g.,
integration-autonomy.
ADAPTATION is defined as a value-neutral term which
includes any kind of behavior directed at the resolution of
problems within organism-environment interaction. It includes
Dewey’s notion that there is not only adaptation in terms of
internal organismic change in response to environmental
pressures, but also active adaptation of the environment by the
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organism to suit its needs (1916, p.47). Such adaptation is not
necessarily developmental; development is defined here as the
PROGRESSIVE form of adaptation, the form which resolves
problems by increasingly transcending or overcoming their basic
terms or context. This would be opposed to REGRESSIVE
adaptation, where the terms of the problem are increasingly
succumbed to or reinforced, or STATIC adaptation, where there is
no change in the problematic nature of the relationship.
Example: If a man has a phobia of leaving his house, a
static adaptation might involve having all his food delivered to his
door, this "solves" the problem of his obtaining food. A progressive
adaptation would be to overcome his fear, thereby actually
transcending the very terms of the problem.
While both EVOLUTION and development are defined as
examples of progressive adaptation, the term evolution will be
herein restricted to its phylogenetic meaning, leaving ontogenetic
progressive adaptation, my sole interest here, to be described by
the term development.
UNIVERSALITY and PRESCRIPT1VITY are used as analogues of
integration and differentiation (following Kohlberg, 1971, p.184)
when applied to the formal analysis of ethical principles such as
orthogenesis (As such, they are tools for asking whether
orthogenesis qua formal principle meets its own standards of
integration and differentiation). For Kohlberg, universality is a
formal map of integration. As one's justice reasoning develops, a
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wider range of objects becomes co-ordinated within one moral
scheme. Example: extending the right to life first to one's loved
ones, then to one's countrymen, then to all humanity represents
increased universality. The more universal scheme also has more
integrity; it is more immune to self-contradiction and thus more
self-consistent. Prescriptivity is a map of differentiation in that
the autonomous "ought" becomes, with development, more
distinguished from the heteronomous "is". Example: to decide that
one has a duty to save a person's life even if one doesn't Know
him, then even if one hates him, then even if everyone hates
him, and finally even if one might be in turn disliked, ostracized,
or put to death for saving him, represents increasing
prescriptivity, and an increasing distinguishing of what one ought
to do from circumstances which are increasingly held to be
irrelevant to the moral issue.
It should be clear from the above examples that
universality and prescriptivity are as intertwined as are
integration and differentiation. Integration could just as well map
into prescriptivity, since the more prescriptive the judgement,
the more integrated-autonomous-immune it is with respect to
the environment, including both external circumstances and
inner emotions. The more universal the judgement, the more
differentiated-de-centered-open it is (we expand
more people as we can adopt their perspective).

rights to include
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ETHICAL prescriptivity refers to statements about what is
right or good in a general sense, and is to be distinguished from
HEURISTIC prescriptivity, which refers to rules laid down with
regard for their value to inquiry only. [4] Thus, my definitions of
evolution and adaptation are heuristically prescriptive. It serves
inquiry to limit the number of synonyms for development, and
to make distinctions between different kinds of change. My
definition of development as orthogenesis is meant to be ethically
prescriptive. People ought to use it as a guide for what is
generally desirable.
The term FORMAL, used here, refers to conceptual
abstractions judged by criteria such as logical self-consistency
Formal concepts are held to have a natural origin and function as
"maps" of EMPIRICAL reality, (although some mathematical
models may be so formal as to attenuate this function) where
empirical is defined in its broadest sense as being founded on
experience and verifiable through shared experience or
observation.
EXPERIENCE as defined here hews closely to the Deweyan
view (1938a, Ch.3). Experience represents not merely the content
of thoughts, feelings, memories, etc., but the most inclusive
context within which all these play a part. It is that which
represents the continuity of the subject, since it is a
characteristic of experience that it grows out of past experiences
and prepares the ground for future experiences. At the same
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time, it is not a fixed entity, but a "moving force" representing
the moment-to-moment point of interaction between organism
and environment. Experience might best be seen as the medium
of development.

]L_Qrth.Qgenesls and Values: Werner. Piaget.
Kohlberg. and Dewev
The question of the value presuppositions within
orthogenesis has been an abiding source of confusion for the
organismic view. Both Werner and Piaget have displayed an
almost painful ambiguity on this subject. On the one hand, they
both firmly and repeatedly disavow the presence of any view of
the "good" implied by this direction of change. Werner asserts
that orthogenesis is "not value bound because the theoretical
requirement is for objective rather than evaluative means of
assessing change and stability" (Langer, 1970, p.745). Piaget
wrestles with "the problem of setting up such degrees of
organization as will enable us to establish some objective and
independent hierarchy, untainted by any value judgement"
(1971, p.122). While Werner is content to speak of "progressive

as

opposed to "regressive" development (Langer, ibid.), Piaget, in his
desire to "avoid this ambiguous word 'progress'", opts to use the
phrase "evolutive vection" (p.123), which simply gives us the no
less ambiguous word "evolution"!
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Yet Werner links orthogenesis to Goethe’s idea of "perfection"
(Werner, 1948, pp. 40-41, also Kaplan, 1986, p.94), while Piaget
makes numerous prescriptions for education (1965, pp. 404-405,
1973, pp.90-91, 111-112, pp. 131-139) based on conformity with
this "vector", which he sees as "implying the existence of ideal
norms immanent in the human spirit" (1965, p.397).

Both men

strive mightily to project a scientist's neutrality regarding
orthogenesis. Both are aware of the fallacy of deriving ethical
precepts from a psychological phenomenon on the basis of its
"immanence" or "naturalness". Being scientists, they see their
role as the explanation of facts, and neither man attempts to
provide a separate justification for orthogenesis as an ethical
principle. Still, it is hard to escape the conclusion that they had
faith in its desirability as a guide for human "progress".It
remained for Lawrence Kohlberg to address the ethical
implications within the orthogenetic vector, specifically as
embodied in Piaget’s "cognitive-structural" order of stages.
(Piaget, 1950, Ch.5; 1967, Ch.l). He attempted to make explicit
how development, defined as a progression through an invariant
order of stages or cognitive structures, could, and ought to, serve
as the aim of education (Kohlberg, 1972). Kohlberg recognized that
in order to prescribe an order of stages as the aim of education,
he would have to provide separate ethical justification for the
vector implied by this sequence: "the justification of education as
development requires a philosophical statement explaining why a
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higher stage is a better or more adequate stage- (p.167). Such a
statement could not be derived or deduced from any facts about
development; to do this would be to commit the “naturalistic
fallacy" by using psychological explanations to justify ethical
prescriptions. At the same time, since development is conceived
of as a psychological process, it requires expression in
psychological terms: "before one can define a set of educational
goals based on a philosophical statement of ethical, scientific, or
logical principles one must be able to translate it into a statement
about psychological stages of development" (p.167).
Kohlberg holds educational practice based upon
psychologically-defined developmental goals, justified by a
progressive ethical framework, to be more logically consistent,
potentially effective, and morally superior to the other
educational models. [5] This view, which I accept, provides a
launching point for my thesis. There is, I believe, room for
improvement in Kohlberg's definition of development which will
render it more useful to educators in a practical context. Not
only can such improvement be undertaken without deviation
from the view expressed in the first sentence of this paragraph,
but it can be undertaken while remaining true to Kohlberg's
"internal standard of adequacy", which is that of orthogenesis.
Kohlberg invokes the orthogenetic principle in his definition
of what constitutes development: "development is not just any
behavior change, but a change toward greater differentiation.
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integration, and adaptation”. (1972, p.157) Unlike Werner and
Piaget, Kohlberg is quite clear that orthogenesis is a desirable
direction: "Implied in the term ’development' is the notion that a
more developed psychological state is more valuable or adequate
than a less developed state" (p.151).
Yet manifestly unlike Werner, who applies the notion of
orthogenesis to the widest possible range of aspects of mental life:
personality, creativity, relation to one's culture, etc., Kohlberg
frames his view of development strictly in terms of Piaget’s
invariant cognitive stage sequence (1972, pp. 131-2). Now,
Kohlberg’s particular interest in the development of justice
reasoning is perhaps well served by this cognitive-structural
psychology. But I question whether framing orthogenesis solely in
terms of this model either fully exploits the potential applications
of the concept, or creates a sufficiently comprehensive set of goals
for education (See Rationale, below).
Within the realm of justice reasoning, Kohlberg takes great
pains to provide independent ethical justification for why
orthogenesis constitutes change for the better. His method of
doing this is to appeal to a formalist analysis, arguing that an
increase, with each successive stage, in psychological integration
and differentiation can be justified as better in terms of the
increasingly universalizable and prescriptive nature of the moral
judgements produced at that stage (1971, pp. 184-185).
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Eddy (1986) surmises that Kohlberg's reliance on formalism
is an effort to avoid the naturalistic fallacy, yet he points out
that the price of this effort is a failure to ultimately justify moral
norms in terms of their "adaptive consequences", their "impact
on human welfare", which can only be judged by "a kind of
inquiry which is in principle empirical" (p.75). The need for
justification in these terms becomes obvious when we consider
that "the natural origin and function" (ibid.) of moral norms is
their regulation of what goes on in the material world. I accept
Eddy's position, and will attempt a justification of orthogenesis
which rests upon a genetic-functional view, yet which is also
checked against a formal analysis. [6]
In trying to justify orthogenesis as a suitable definition for
development as the aim of education, the need for such an
approach becomes all the more urgent. Like Kohlberg's reliance
upon cognitive-structural psychology, his reliance upon formalist
philosophy may be somewhat appropriate when dealing with the
analysis of judgement itself. As Eddy notes, (p.76), "Conceptual
tools at the level of abstraction that Kohlberg and Piaget focus on
are almost by definition formal". Yet most of us would wish to
judge education in terms of its effect upon individual experience
and social behavior, and not merely upon the formal adequacy of
cognitive structures, "moral" or otherwise. Kohlberg does not
even address the justification of orthogenesis in the areas of
personality, social context, attitudes towards learning, or other
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areas of arguable concern for education having development as its
aim (See Rationale, below).
Although Kohlberg claims to adhere to John Dewey's
philosophy of development, (1972, p.128) 1 question whether an
interpretation of increasing integration and differentiation which
is limited to an analysis of the formal adequacy of cognitive
structures generates a definition of development in keeping with
the spirit of the Deweyan ideal.
Dewey's notion of "growth", like Kohlberg's notion of
"development", is unequivocally ethically prescriptive. In fact, it
is Dewey's ultimate moral principle. He does not attempt to define
growth in terms of a specific set of organized abstractions, in the
way Werner does. Nonetheless, although he does not appeal to
orthogenesis as a formal definition of growth, its presence is felt
strongly in many of his references to growth.
For example, Gouinlock (1976) interprets Dewey as follows:
"growth is the process by which the individual is increasingly able
to engage his energies with his environment in a manner that
creates consummatory experience" (p.90). If we relate this to
Dewey's statement that "with every differentiation of structure
the environment expands" (1938b, p.25), we obtain a portrait of a
process wherein the organism, with increasing differentiation,
gains an expanded environment with which he is capable of
interacting while preserving his autonomous capacity to solve
problems and attain goals. Integration, which for Dewey is "an
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achievement”, involves the co-ordination, or "unification" of
diverse habits, thoughts, and feelings (in Gouinlock, pp. 100-101).
Yet such integration is only growthful against a background of
"discord" which "induces reflection", thereby setting up a
"rhythm of loss of integration with environment and recovery of
union".
Three distinctive features of Dewey's conception of growth
are of particular importance to an ethical interpretation of
orthogenesis. They are:
1) the co-extensiveness of the growth-material with that of
ALL experience.
2) the inextricability of individual growth from "the larger
growth-process", (see Green, 1976) i.e., the socio-historic context,
including "all political institutions and industrial arrangements",
which are judged according to "the contribution they make to the
all-around growth of every member of society" (Dewey, 1950,
P 147).
3) the rejection of any notion of a "final end" or "highest
stage" of growth (Dewey, 1916, p.50). Growth is an open-ended
process, where each new step creates new conditions which
frame the next step.
Green (1976,p.360) argues that Dewey eschews a formal
definition of growth, preferring to rely upon bountiful examples
and general guidelines, so as not to denigrate this key principle to
"a set of rules to be applied like drugstore prescriptions or
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cookbook recipes”. Furthermore, since Dewey viewed growth as
"inextricably contextual" (p.361), he was concerned that a more
precise definition would limit its universality, making it culturally
and historically bound.
Green argues further that the lack of a formal elaboration
does not render Dewey's conception of growth vague or trivial,
that it is sufficient as a guide to conduct and education. I am
inclined to agree only to the extent that if one takes the time to
glean Dewey's definition of growth from a careful contextual
reading of the various writings throughout which it is dispersed,
a rich and unambiguous picture emerges. Yet I believe that a
more compact and precise definition of development than is
provided by Dewey would be of greater use to educators, and that
such a model is not necessarily pernicious as long as it: 1) can do
relative justice to the full range of individual experience, 2) is
sensitive to context as shaping and being shaped by both growth
itself as well as our ideas about what growth is, and 3) avoids
defining growth in terms of a fixed end.
In summary, neither Werner nor Piaget provide an ethical
justification for orthogenesis. Kohlberg does, but it is limited to
what he defines as the realm of moral judgement, and it lacks a
well-elaborated genetic-functional rationale even within that
realm. Dewey justifies growth as a moral aim, using essentially
orthogenetic criteria to define growth, but he does not provide a
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precise, explicit, well-organized gathering of many varieties of
growth under a single integrating orthogenetic concept.

E„ Final Statement

of the Thesis and its Rationale

My thesis is that the orthogenetic principle is worthy of
preference as an ethically prescriptive definition of development
where development is construed to be the aim of education. It is
worthy of preference because: l) it can command both a formal
and a genetic-functional justification; 2) it furthers educational
inquiry by taking a wide range of experiential factors into
account as both subject to and influencing growth, 3) it can
ethically co-ordinate the use of a variety of psychological models.
Let us briefly examine these criteria in turn. In speaking of
a formal justification, 1 am adhering to Kohlberg’s basic idea. To
justify a principle formally means to demonstrate its logical selfconsistency in terms of its universalizability, universality, and
prescriptivity.
Now Kohlberg is trying to justify a structural hierarchy of
justice judgements, while I am justifying a DIRECTION of
development across ALL experience. So my criteria should be
defined so as to match this task. 1 aim to justify orthogenesis, as
a standard for what kinds of changes constitute developmental
ones, as universalizable for all humans in all cultures,

over a

wide range of aspects of experience-in-context. I aim to justify it
as prescriptive in the sense of being distinguished from, and
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independent of: 1) evidence of the percentage or number of people
who manifest a certain course or degree of orthogenetic
movement, or level of orthogenetic "attainment"; 2) what
changes people in a given culture do in fact value; and 3)
scientific debate over the validity or heuristic worth of a
particular explanatory model. [7]
Formal ethical models are useful in education because they
increase the precision, clarity, and consistency of our aims. Any
formal abstraction requires justification in terms of formal, nonempirical criteria. Yet these criteria as well as the models they
judge can be best seen as problem-solving "maps", generated by
thought in its adaptive search for a resolution to material
conflicts. To finally justify an ethical principle, then, we must
seek, out its GENESIS through an analysis of the basic conflict
which generated it, and examine the thoroughness with which it
does, in fact, fulfill its FUNCTION of addressing this conflict in a
progressively adaptational way. This is what I mean by a
"genetic-functional" justification. Our formal maps are ultimately
justified by the extent to which they reflect this empirical
reality.
To address our second criterion, a definition of development
ought to enable educators to speak of growth with respect to
affective attachments, inclinations and impulses, the co-existence
of a variety of cognitive/affective habits or structures within an
individual (Werner, 1963, p.137), the structure of the social
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context, and the nature of the educator-student relationship, for
a start. It should enable educators to consider the influence of
each of these factors upon the others.
It should do this because, in the absence of incontrovertible
evidence to the contrary, it is prudent to assume that these
aspects do interact with one another to influence an individual’s
overall experience and behavior. We might be tempted to simplify
things by limiting our definition to the development of cognitive
structures, and assuming that once a person is capable of
reasoning in a certain way in a particular situation, that this will
suffice to bring all experience and action "in line" with this
reasoning. But before we assume that no other forces play a key
role in shaping experience and action in all situations, we'd better
be sure it's so, or else we risk pretending to have achieved
something we haven't. Even if we found that securing a cognitive
structure is the best way to ensure growthful experience in
general, we'd need to be sure that growth in other ways played a
minimal role in the securing of that structure. [8] Finally, we’d
have to be sure that securing that structure was not only
necessary, but also sufficient, to advance all the paths of growth
we might value, such as imagination, creativity, practical skill,
aesthetics, and compassion, to name a few.
Unless all our practical and experimental experience
convinces us otherwise, a definition of development that puts all
its eggs in one basket is of limited use to education. A more
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differentiated and integrated definition, on the other hand,
permits educators to hold distinct aims for different "growthpaths”, yet see connections between them, and co-ordinate them
within a unified educational plan.
Finally, a useful definition of development ought to be able
to make use of a variety of psychological frameworks, and co*

ordinate their various conceptions of change within a unified
ethical framework. This follows from the previous point, if one
observes that different psychological models pay more or less
attention to different aspects of experience. Psychological theorists
have the luxury of selecting the angle from which they wish to
study humanity; educators are confronted with a global array of
goals, situations, and complexities. A cognitive-structural model
may be the best tool for explaining why students reason in
certain ways in democratic school meetings, why adults and
teenagers don’t reason the same way, or why a science program
based on concrete experiments works best for 7th graders. But it
may be a cumbersome or simply inadequate tool when it comes
to explaining why positive reinforcement helps students to make
use of any reasoning structure at all instead of their fists.
Artificial intelligence models, psycho-therapeutic models,
and ecological models are all of potential use to educators in
specific circumstances. No matter what model one uses, however,
one is still left with having to justify changes explained by these
models as serving developmental ends. An overarching ethic
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enables us to make use of a mechanistic model, for example,
without thereby raising the specter of treating people like
machines.
The two preceding points have emphasized the need for
universalizability in a definition of development useful to
educators. It is worth making a final point about the need for
prescriptivity in such a principle. In pursuing an agenda for
education at great variance with that which is usually pursued in
one's culture, it is easy to allow, if only from force of habit, the
encroachment into one's work of all kinds of practices that
contribute little to development, or that detract from it. A
strongly prescriptive definition of development not only provides
justification for practice that may oppose cultural trends, but
permits a solid critique of practices that cannot enlist such
justification. Perhaps most importantly, educators are faced with
a host of individual and social realities which frequently represent
regression or stagnation rather than progression. To retain a
vision of an autonomous ideal process which can be expressed not
just as a far-off goal, but as an immediate next step in that
goal's direction, cannot but exert an inspiring influence.

F. Limits of the Inquiry
1. I will not undertake a defense of the position that
development, as opposed to transmission of the culture,

or

preparation for adult life, or some other idea, ought to be the
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aim of education. I will consider this defense to have been
adequately presented by Kohlberg (1972) and Dewey (1916, 1938a).
I will limit myself to the defense of a particular way of defining
what constitutes "development".
2. I accept Kohlberg's position rejecting value-relativism and
value-neutrality as educational philosophies (1972, pp. 138139,144; 1971, pp. 156-163). I also accept his definition of a
"formalist" defense of an ethical position.
3. I will make no case for a particular set of explanatory
mechanisms or cause-and-effect relationships regarding how or
why development happens or doesn’t happen ("theories", following
Reese and Overton, 1970, p.124). To the extent that my ethical
theory rests upon concepts borrowed from psychological "models"
(again following Reese and Overton’s definition, p.117), 1 will
attempt to provide an ethical rationale for their use.
4. I will make no case for a particular educational model or
set of educational practices. To determine precisely what sort of
educational intervention will be most developmental for a
particular individual or group, within a particular culture, at a
specific historical moment, requires the weighing of many
factors, including who the educators are. 1 shall show how my
definition of development in fact leads one to reject the usual
habit of deciding what our practice will be in advance of weighing
all these factors.
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5.

I will not make a case for orthogenesis as a path of

spiritual development sui generis. To the extent that spiritual
development is immanent in the development of all realms of
human experience, it will be served by a discussion of those
realms. To the extent that spiritual growth alludes to that which
transcends ideas, feelings, time, or change, it would not be well
served, in my view, by a conceptual treatment here.
6. It is not my intent to make a case for orthogenesis as
relevant to a wide range of human experience by compiling a
comprehensive encyclopedia of the varieties of such experience.
Rather, 1 will provide examples of aspects of experience which are
of sufficent number and contrast so as to illustrate my point.
Those aspects will be emphasized which have the most pressing
ethical significance within education. Therefore, the development
of sensori-motor perception, for example, will not be referred to
extensively, except by way of analogy.

G. Strategy of the Inquiry
The dissertation is presented in five chapters, of which this
is the first.
The second chapter is an analysis and interpretation of the
orthogenetic idea as found in the works of Heinz Werner, Jean
Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, and John Dewey. Many concrete
examples of orthogenetic change, taken from the works of
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Werner, Piaget, Kohlberg, and Dewey,

are provided in this

chapter.
The third chapter begins with my own summary of the
orthogenetic principle, and a summary of the claims which I
make and do not make for it. I then proceed to a justification of
orthogenesis on both genetic-functional and formal grounds, with
an explanation of the relationship between the two modes of
justification.
The fourth chapter explores how the orthogenetic principle
may aid in the formulation educational problems and their
solutions. In the first part of this chapter I construct,
extrapolating from the orthogenetic principle, a partial
framework of ethical assumptions which the educator ought to
make or refrain from making about the nature of development. I
argue that such a framework can be employed by educators to
ethically co-ordinate the eclectic use of a variety of
developmental theories. In the second part of the chapter I
introduce a partial set of considerations, also deduced from the
orthogenetic principle, which educators can use to further the
development of their inquiry into the nature of educational
problems and solutions.
The fifth chapter sets forth recommendations for further
research and action. In particular, I make a plea for a more
developed relationship between developmental science and
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education, and for the creation of more educational enterprises
conceived of as "developmental contexts."
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Notes
1.

This Holds Tor models tnat make a clear theoretical distinction
between change" and "development". Some authors define
development" through a more tenuous theoretical "screen".
Spiker (1966), for example, defines it as "those changes in
behavior which normally occur with an increase in the
chronological age of the child"; "...the term ‘developmental’,
used in this way, is no more or less abstract or theoretical
than the terms ‘behavior’ or ‘chronological age'." (p.41)

2.

For analyses of the organismic paradigm, with comparisons of
it to other paradigms, see Dixon and Lerner, 1984; Hayes,
1985; Reese and Overton, 1970, and Overton and Reese, 1973.
Dixon and Lerner separate developmental psychology into five
genealogical branches, all descending from Darwin: *
organismic, psychoanalytic, mechanistic, contextual, and
dialectic.

3.

In keeping with Dixon and Lerner's typology, I have
distinguished the organicism of Werner and Piaget from the
maturationism of psychologists such as Gesell, and also from
the psychoanalytic theories of Freud and Erikson. While
Piaget does not make use of the term "orthogenesis" per se,
his use of integration and differentiation as defining terms of
development is virtually identical to Werner's (Piaget, 1971,
p.72, p.356).

4.

Thus Lerner and Kauffman (1985), in seeking a possible
integration of organismic and contextual developmental
psychology, argue for "prescriptive" (p.324) definitions of
development of use to both paradigms. They cite the
orthogenetic principle as one example of such a definition
(p.317). Yet they hold such a prescription to be of heuristic
value only. They explicitly disavow any larger ethical
implication in such a prescription: "our intent is to be
neutral here in regard to the issue of the role of ideal
progressions or categories in defining development" (p.319).

5.

l will not recapitulate Kohlberg's argument for preferring
progressivism as an educational ideology over cultural
transmissionism, industrial psychology, or romanticism
(1972). The notion at the heart of progressivism is that the
search for progressive adaptation to problems in experience
defines the essence of both ethics and education.
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6.

As Eddy points out (personal communication), Kohlberg does
make use of a genetic-functional (or adaptational) argument
when he argues for universal and prescriptive principles as
promoting the process of "coming to agreement" among
people. This may be what Eddy is referring to as the "germ"
of a genetic-functional Justification which "lies dormant" in
Kohlberg’s theory, but which "for various reasons..is never
allowed to grow" (1986, p.75). It is this aspect that will
receive clarification and strengthening in this thesis.

7.

For example, research might discredit the notion that people
move through an invariant sequence of stages, without
discrediting the standard by which a sequence was deemed
developmental.

8.

Certainly Kohlberg acknowledges the influence of historical
context (1971, p.178), empathy (p.220), and the structure of
the immediate social environment (p.190) in shaping
cognitive experience and development.

CHAPTER II
THE IDEA OF ORTHOGENESIS IN THE WORKS OF HEINZ WERNER,
JEAN PIAGET, LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, AND JOHN DEWEY

A. Heinz Werner's Concept of Orthogenesis

1. Introduction
My aim in this section is to summarize the notion of
orthogenesis as originated by Heinz Werner and his principal
collaborator, Bernard Kaplan. Kaplan and Werner co-author a
number of the texts cited (1956; 1963a,b,c,d), and are assumed to
share the views therein.
Werner uses orthogenesis as a "formal regulative
principle.. .not designed to predict developmental courses in their
specificity" (1957, p.130). It is an abstraction designed to allow us
to compare developmental processes in their "manifold
manifestations" (p.125) across the widest possible variety of
domains. Within developmental psychology, it provides a
"conceptual framework" for perceiving "characteristics common to
any kind of mental activity in the process of progression or
regression" (p.126). It is a standard by which we can judge
change as progressive or regressive.
It is not clear whether Werner intends orthogenesis to be an

ethical idea, prescribing the direction of desirable change. Werner
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certainly provides no philosophical justification for orthogenesis.
In his later, independent work, Kaplan asserts that "development,
as distinct from change, has been and ought to be an axiological
and normative notion" (1983a, p.204). Yet Kaplan makes no
claims for the orthogenetic principle as an ethically prescriptive
definition of development.

2. The Form of Orthogenesis
a. Four Descriptive Concept-Pairs
Werner uses four bi-polar opposites to explicate the form
taken by increasing differentiation and integration. Orthogenesis
involves movement from the SYNCRETIC to the DISCRETE, from
the DIFFUSE to the ARTICULATE, from the RIGID to the FLEXIBLE,
and from the LABILE to the STABLE.
The differentiation side of orthogenesis is reflected in the
syncretic-discrete and diffuse-articulate pairs. On the functional
side, as individuals develop, they move from modes of thought,
action, feeling, and perception which are fused with one another,
to modes in which the various functions and purposes of the
organism can be separated out at will. For example, in dreams,
which represent a return to a less developed mode, people who in
waking life would be perceived as separate may be lumped
together into a single person. A child's mind will not separate out
various sensory impressions, giving rise to statements such as
"the leaf smells green”. A developing person would cease to
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confuse his own feelings with those he imagines to be held by
other people, or by God. A child can actually consider (as opposed
to the way an adult would poetically imagine it) a "few wisps of
straw to be a doll or a bit of wood to be a horse" because "the
affective and motor behavior of the child impresses itself upon
the world and fashions it" (1948, p.65). There is no distinction
made between the imagined world and a more "factual" reality.
The syncretic-discrete pair is used to describe the content, the
"acts and meanings" (p.54) of the individual as they appear to
him.
The diffuse-articulate pair refers to a formal assessment of
the whole structure being employed. While the process of
becoming more discrete involves the distinguishing of a single
function from the fused, syncretic whole, the concept of
articulation looks at the degree to which a structure is divided up
into component parts. The first pair focuses on the "singling out"
of the one, the second on the "dividing up" of the whole.
Therefore, a notion of music which includes distinguishable notes,
harmonies, etc. is more articulated than one which consists of
diffuse "sliding tonal movements" (p.54). Generally, a child is less
able to distinguish nuances (p.98) of tone, color, emotion, and so
on, than is an adult. Syncretic-discrete and diffuse-articulate
appear to be two angles from which the same basic phenomena
are described by Werner's model.
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Linking the two concept-pairs associated with differentiation
to the two associated with integration are the notions of
"HIERARCHIZATION" and “SUBORDINATION*' (p.55). It is not merely
the separating out of individual functions from others, nor the
division of an overall structure into distinguishable parts, but the
control of some functions by others, and the co-ordination of
articulated parts by a centralization within the "gestalt”, that
denotes development. For example, one becomes able to separate
the aesthetic experience of "ugly" from the ethical experience of
"bad" as one’s conceptual schema are able to override aesthetic
reactions: "just because he's ugly doesn't mean he's bad".
The pairs rigid-flexible and labile-stable are used to
characterize the movement toward increasingly integrated
systems of thought, emotion, and so forth. Rigidity and lability
are seen as interdependent attributes of less developed systems.
This is because the rigidity of the system is related to the
syncretic and uncontrollable (not subordinated) attachment of
aspects that would be distinguishable in a higher system. As one
aspect changes, the other is forced to change also. There is no
freedom of movement, no independence. Thus rigidity, rather
than promoting stability, is associated with instability or lability.
Werner gives the example of the "all-or-nothing schema of
young children, who see a whole series of ritualized (rigid) action
related to getting fed, or getting dressed, or going to bed, as an
inseparable whole, and will go into hysterics (become unstable) if
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there is any deviation from the pattern (pp.206-7). He further
gives the example of the boy whose idea of someone’s personality
was attached to their clothes; if his father appeared in unusual
attire (e.g., a tuxedo), he thought that his father had become his
grandfather! (p.445)
Movement in the direction of increased stability, on the
other hand, involves increased flexibility; it means that one can
distinguish essentials from non-essentials, and not allow the latter
to influence one's attitude toward the former. To overcome
racism, for example, is to attain to stability of respect for
personality without being thrown off by the color of someone's
skin, one is simultaneously freed from the rigidity of stereotypes
based on race, and can flexibly deal with each person as an
individual (this is an example of my own invention).
Flexibility implies "the use of one rather than another of
several potential means" based on either "free voluntary choice"
or on a response to a situation where "the normally preferred
means for the attainment of an end is blocked" (1963a, p.135). It
also implies the ability to make use of and directly experience
earlier stages even though they are subordinated under later ones
(see p.6 above). Associated with stability and flexibility are the
notions of FIXITY and MOBILITY of developmental level. Increasing
stability involves an increasing fixity of mental operations, a
tendency to routinize various patterns, and to extend, or
differentiate "horizontally" (1957, p.138) the routines of a given
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stage of development across a variety of interactions. In order for
this necessary movement towards "automatization of response” to
avoid becoming "rigidity of behavior", it must be
"counterbalanced by the polar principle of mobility" (p.138). This
involves the increasing ability of the organism to employ a
greater vertical" differentiation, or the application of a wider
variety of developmental levels, primitive as well as advanced, to
a particular situation. This idea is intimately connected with the
underlying assumption of spirality, whereby "one has to regress
in order to progress" (p.139). An example of fixity and mobility
acting harmoniously might be found in any creative work, which
relies upon automatic habits of skill and thought, yet where
original and fresh vision also depend upon an ability to "de¬
differentiate" those very constructions. Mobility is not the same
as lability, since it is intentionally co-ordinated by the individual,
and contributes to an even larger stability by providing a range
of options for problem-solving and expression.
A key assumption connected with flexibility, and integration
in general, is "autonomization" (1963b, p.487), which involves
autonomous control and choice. Werner gives many examples of
"synaesthesia", (1948, Ch.2) wherein children, adults in primitive
cultures, schizophrenics, or people under the influence of drugs
"hear" colors, "feel" sounds or shapes drawn on paper, and so
forth. What characterizes the less developed state is the
CONSTRAINT due to an INABILITY to make any distinction
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between color and form; the example is given of the
schizophrenic who could use the alphabet only by means of an
accompanying color and personal association (with an object or
place) (p.91). As development progesses, one gains the ability to
make such distinctions, gaining greater stability and flexibility.
One of the problems of increased fixity at the level of
symbolic thought is that one pays a price; one loses the ability
to experience the world synaesthetically. This accurately describes
the condition of most adults in Western society. It would
constitute further development to be able to make fuller use of
synaesthesia for artistic or other purposes, yet not be at its
mercy. In keeping with Werner’s dialectical model, such further
development would represent a spiral synthesis of the original
synaesthetic mode and the more developed, yet antithetical,
"geometric-technical" or rational-logical mode.

b. The Concept of Prlmltlvltv
Werner studies development within a bi-polar framework
which compares an "original state" to a "final state". Primitivity
represents the "original state". The term refers to a complex of
thought, feeling, behavior, and perceptual schema which are
characterized by syncretism, diffusion, rigidity, and lability in
comparison with functionally analogous schema which are more
discrete, articulated, flexible, and stable.
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Werner (1956, pp. 88-94) takes great pains to avoid "five
closely interwoven confusions" regarding his use of the concept of
primitivity. First, Werner does not attach any "moralistic and
normative connotation to the word. Leaving aside Werner's
putative claim that orthogenesis, or development, itself has no
value-implications, primitivity as a force may help as well as
hinder overall development: "instrumentally, primitivity may
function now to prevent the organism from achieving certain
ends, or again to enable the organism to achieve other ends"
(p.89). This is in keeping with the previous discussion of stable
flexibility and spirality. Werner makes a point of acknowledging
"the instrumental necessity of primitive processes for certain
highly valued activities of Western man" (p.93).
Second, primitivity, like orthogenesis, is not time-bound.
While, empirically speaking, the passage of time generally brings
movement from primitive to less primitive schema, it is
orthogenesis, and not time, which defines the movement as
progressive.
Third, the word primitivity may be used in its capacity as
"an ideal construct", or it may be used to describe "the typical
mode of functioning" of an actual individual or culture. When it
is used to describe actual occurrences, it is strictly because the
phenomena conform to the concept, not because one has an idea
in advance that certain people or groups are "primitive .
Further, by giving examples of cultures in which most people

43

think and act in a primitive manner, Werner does not assume in
advance that all individuals in that culture would be incapable of
further development.
Fourth, the concept does not imply any statements in
advance of empirical inquiry about the conditions which give rise
to or maintain primitivity. It is not assumed in advance of
inquiry, for example, that a society which uses less sophisticated
technology will exhibit general primitivity in their mental life.
Nor is this assumed of, for example, a preliterate society.
These would be hypotheses subject to empirical test.
Finally, it is not assumed that there are two "types of
mentality", primitive and non-primitive. Primitivity as a term
may be applied to specific features of mentality, leaving open the
possibility that someone who exhibits primitivity in some respects
may not in others. Also, it leaves open the possibility that
primitive schemata operate in individuals at all ages, in all
cultures. A "primitive culture" would be one in which most
people operated "homogeneously on a primitive level" (p.93) over
the range of mental life. In Western culture, "the mentality of
members. . .is more likely to be stratified, and to show a wider
range of forms of thought" (ibid.), including primitive forms.
Werner draws formal parallels between primitivity as
characterizing the dominant schemes employed by adults in
primitive cultures, children in advanced cultures, mentally ill
adults in advanced cultures, and normal adults in advanced
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cultures when under the influence of drugs such as mescaline or
LSD. Parallels are drawn further between these schemes and the
primitivity of auxiliary schemes employed by adults in advanced
cultures, which of course may either reflect a holdover from
childhood or a belief persisting in the culture (for example,
otherwise rational adults may hold to pet superstitions, especially
in times of stress).
Werner is careful, however, to remind us of key differences
between these various categories of people as regards primitivity.
It is by no means his intention to equate the healthy adult of
primitive culture with the children or mentally ill of our own
culture. Children in our culture are changing and developing
within the context of "an alien world of adults" which they will
someday join. Primitive adults have arrived at a relatively fixed
level of development within a world similarly fixed by tradition
which is their own. (1948, p.26).
Further, the primitive adult "lives in a world to which he is
admirably adjusted", (p.34) while the mentally ill person in
advanced culture suffers within a world to which he has become
maladjusted. Also, the mentally ill person, having "retrogressed"
from previous developmental gains, will show "signs of the higher
level" which remain. Werner’s example here is the comparison of
the primitive man and the aphasia sufferer who have no ability
to use the concept of "knife". In the primitive man's case, the
notion of "knife" is completely bound up with the specific kind of
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knife, and perhaps the specific thing to be done with it, or
material upon which it is to be used. He may have dozens of
words instead of one, or a word for each single concrete object.
The aphasiac, on the other hand, has experienced a loss of
language, and may use a substitution, such as "something-tocut-with” plus a gesture, to compensate for the loss, while
retaining certain traces of the abstract thinking from which (he)
has degenerated" (p.35). The mentally healthy child who has no
such concept is of course surrounded by those who do, and
through interaction with his world will construct his own concept
in the normal course of events. In the following examples,
comparisons may be made between these various "sources" of
primitivity, so it is important for Werner's distinctions to be kept
in mind.

3. The Content of Primitivity

cl .Strategy..of.. Presentation..
Werner's strategy for describing the content of orthogenesis
was to present examples of primitivity within children,
psychopaths, and primitive adults, and contrast these with more
developed modes. (This is in contrast with the approach of
Kohlberg, for example, who would show orthogenesis through the
life span of a given individual.) It will therefore be most efficient,
as well as most evocative of Werner's method, to adopt a
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comparable strategy here. Examples of primltivity will be
presented, followed by examples of how development out of
primitivity represents movement in the direction of increasing
integration and differentiation.
b. Examples of Prlmltlvitv

i. Primitive thought
Primitive language and thought is seen as highly syncretic,
diffuse, labile, and rigid in a number of ways, as compared to
advance language and thought:
For the primitive Trobrianders, there is one word for a
"good gardener", one for a "bad gardener"; each concept is "selfcontained", (1956, p.96) incapable of being further modified (e.g.,
by adjectives) without changing the entire concept. There is also
no way to connect two states of the same object in time by
means of a co-ordinating concept which posits the object as
having an independent temporal existence; a yam that changes
to a different state of ripeness is called something else, and is
considered an entirely different object.
This is linked to a style of thought in which objects are not
differentiated from their contexts. A concept refers to an entire
"tableau", wherein the object, the use of the object, the person
using the object, etc. are all collapsed into the same concept. The
Navaho, for example, has one idea of "give" for giving things that
are bundled up, and one for giving things that are bulky and
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round, etc. (1956, p.103). The idea of a hypothetical or
representative concept apart from concrete reality is absent. A
primitive adult asked to translate the phrase "the white man
shot six bears in one day” was simply unable to do so because, as
he explained, a white man could not possibly shoot six bears in
one day!
Primitive language, or the language used by children or the
mentally ill, is less differentiated from other modes of
communication or experience. Gesture and tone cannot be
divorced from the meaning of the word, as it is in advanced
written language. Written language among primitive people or
the mentally ill is closely bound up with a pictorial or physically
suggestive representation. The symbols (for primitive adults) or
letters (for the patient) are closer to being expressions of
emotionally-charged physical acts.
Drawing to a large extent upon Piaget's work, Werner shows
how primitive thought is incapable of conceiving of objects in
anything but an immediate concrete fashion, and how it is
incapable of co-ordinating two ideas within a subordinating
symbolic concept, as shown by children's responses to "double
relationship" problems:
'"Edith is lighter than Suzanne; Edith is darker than Lily.
Which is the darkest - Edith, Suzanne, or Lily?' These are
typical answers: Fo (9:4), 'You can't tell because it says
that Edith is the lightest and the darkest.' Gu (13:9),
"Once Suzanne is the darkest and once Edith is, so
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Suzanne is the same as Edith, and Lily is the lightest
(1948, p.317)
The diffuse, concrete mode of thought" (ibid.) involves a
one-track, relationship": the child focuses on one aspect of the
problem, and ignores others. This leads to a lability, or
inconsistency, regarding solutions to problems. If the problem
given above were re-worded, without in the least changing the
facts, the child would be likely to come up with a different
answer.

ii. Primitive aesthetic and sensory experience
Werner gives the label of PHYSIOGNOMIC PERCEPTION to
ways of seeing the world which impute color, emotion, sound,
tactile sensation, movement, and even taste or smell to thoughts
or external objects which do not emanate those properties
perceived from a "matter-of-fact", objective, "geometrictechnical" perspective. (1948, p.69) Such perception, while present
in some adults of advanced cultures, is dominant in primitive
adults, children, and some of the mentally ill. It also can come to
the fore under the influence of drugs:
* A picture of a parallelogram is perceived by a child as
being "cruel". Another child sees a cup lying on its side, and says,
"poor, tired, cup!" (p.73)
* A schizophrenic looks fearfully at some swinging doors
and exclaims, "That door is devouring me!" (p.8l).
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* An experimental subject under the influence of mescaline
sees one tree as "showering down" and another as "striving
upwards . Baudelaire, under the influence of hashish, comments
that that which in the brain of the poet would be only a
completely natural simile becomes a fact. In the tree one’s
passions, longing, or melancholy come to life; its sighs and
tremblings become one's own, and soon one is the tree itself." Of
course, the advanced adult under intoxication is in the peculiar
position of being able to comment rationally on an experience
after or even during it. Werner's point is that what is being
experienced is a reversion to an earlier mode of seeing the world.

iii. Primitive emotions
Primitive emotions are themselves less articulated from one
another. The small child begins with a tiny and diffuse repertoire
of emotions, consisting of distress, delight, and undifferentiated
excitement. The wide variety of shades of emotion comes only
with development. As mentioned above, the same principle holds
for the articulation of sensory and motor abilities and
experiences.
Emotion and physical experience are closer knit in
primitive thought. Melanesians express shame by saying "my
forehead is biting me"; "her bowels long for it

is an expression

following loss for the Australian Arandas. Werner makes the point
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that for these people, these are not merely idioms, but actual
experiences.

iv. Primitive action
Primitive action is characterized by the rigid and labile "allor-nothing" schema previously mentioned: "Many aborigines are
unable to begin their songs at any point in the text, but always
have to commemce anew at the very beginning or fail
completely". Such rigid schema are also bound up in a magical
view of the world: "ritualistic activities are known as
indissoluable totalities.... any disruption of the form... a
stumbling, a stuttering, or even a pause - often occasions a
magical inadequacy". This applies to the rites of primitive tribes
steeped in ancient tradition as well as to the idiosyncratic rites of
children associated with meals, bedtime, etc.
In children and the mentally ill, as well as primitive adults,
objects are frequently seen and described as "things-of-action"
(1948, p.59). An infant given a round rattle instead of his
customary square one "tried in vain to find and bite the 'corners'
of the round rattle" (p.65) since his perception of the rattle was
not so much optical or tactile, but bound up in the action
performed with it. The rattle is a "something-to-be-bitten", non¬
existent as a thing outside that "motor-affective" schema. A
schizophrenic patient was unable to "recognize a key presented to
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him as an isolated object", yet recognized it as soon it was used
to turn a lock.
In very young children, motivation is limited to responses
to "vital drives", or "concrete signals of the milieu"; there are no
"genuinely personal motives" (p.194). It is only as a result of
development that a child begins to exercise choice independently
of such forces, and "experience a desire to solve some particular
task confronting him" (p.195). Similarly, the more primitive the
thought, the less there is any kind of involvement with external
objects in any purposeful way. At first, infants are unable to
execute movements specifically organized with the intent of, for
example, removing a cloth from the face. As children mature,
their next actions are limited to objects in their immediate
presence. Only with further development are children able to use
planning to execute a foreseen end, such as building a tower of
blocks. The inability of primitive thought to engage in planning
has to do with inability to differentiate self from object, as well
as an inability to integrate (or co-ordinate) a notion of something
not immediately present in time and space with the concrete
reality.

v. Primitive relationship to Nature (the physical
universe)
Perhaps the core attribute of primitivity is the fusion of
subject and object. "The world is separated only slightly from the

52

ego, it is predominately configurated in terms of the emotional
needs of the self (egomorphism). But, conversely, the ego, seen
from the opposite angle, is highly susceptible to the emotional
stimulation from the milieu” (1948, p.361).
The view of the world that is fashioned by a primitive mind
which cannot distinguish that world from its own needs and
impulses is labeled MAGICAL by Werner. This view manifests itself
in a variety of ways, which are all characterized by: 1) a
syncretic fusion of the individual’s cognitive-affective-sensorymotor needs and the properties of the world; 2) a diffuse or
unarticulated view of the world's laws of functioning (e.g.,
causation); 3) a labile conception of the world and objects,
wherein these change according to the needs of the subject; and
4) a rigid adherence to a traditional, superstitious, or
idiosyncratic formula for interacting with the world:
* ANIMISM and PERSONIFICATION are aspects of the magical
world. These are to be distinguished from the "genuine realistic
personifications" (p.77) of the poet or even the average advanced
person. (Lots of people give their cars or computers personal
names, but fundamentally know that they are inanimate
objects). "A 5-year old girl is asked by her mother during a
thunderstorm: 'What does the thunder look like?' The child
replies: "He has a head, but no eyes and no nose or mouth.'
'Then how does he look?' 'Oh, he looks like this...' and the child
makes an angry face and draws her brows together" (ibid.).
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* The anthropomorphization of nature is coupled with the
naturalization of the personality” (p.353) in magical thinking A
medicine man, in order to bring rain, "transforms himself into
nature , in this case, the thunder and lightning, performing
actions to simulate their activity (ibid.); "the need for the magic
control of natural events may lead to an anthropomorphic
presentation of nature, or,... man himself stands for nature,
actually becomes it" (p.354).
* "The sphere of a fictitious, POETIC reality appears to be
less differentiated from the reality of everyday life in the case of
the child" (p.394, emphasis in original). Children may actually
believe in "a far-off fairyland", for example. As they develop,
children may still believe in such things, but begin to distinguish
them from the everyday reality: "Is that just in fairyland, or is
it really where we are?" (ibid.)
* "We again encounter the DIFFUSENESS of the
schizophrenic thought process in the psychotic conception of
causality. As in the case of primitive man, differentiation
according to cause and effect, according to condition and
consequence, is supplanted by.. .THINKING IN TERMS OF FATE"
(p.335, emphases in original). The mentally ill will perceive
happenings in the world as omens, or signs of personal destiny.
Such a scheme "precludes any self-contained single things and
events within a causal complex". It is impossible for the primitive
mind to separate single events from the "global quality-of-fate"
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(p.336). Someone who believes that evil is pursuing him, for
example, will see signs of this pursuit within all manner of
events.
* The obverse side of this fusion of ego and world is the
notion that one s own actions affect everything. Werner refers to
this as "achievement magic" or "creative magic", which is a
'magic by analogy" (p.365). Sacrifices, oracles, and magic
talismans or amulets are all examples of an individual believing
that a particular act or achievement, or failure to perform such,
will have larger consequences. Werner stresses that this does not
"entail the use of any sort of remote symbolism": the catatonic
patient who "keeps the 'wheel of the world' in motion by circular
movements of his own body" is living a "concrete reality",
influenced by a "real magical event, one stripped of the
metaphorical" (p.372).
* Magic objects, as in voodoo, have the power to influence
faraway events. The individual may also be influenced by being
close to magical objects. Werner gives the example of the 2-yearold child who believes that by combing himself with a black comb
that he will get "nice black hair" (p.366). Objects from a magical
perspective are labile in that they conform themselves to the
subject's wishes and fears. Werner gives the example of the
mentally disturbed who sees an advertisement in the newspaper,
and twists its meaning to conform to his compulsion for selfdestruction, taking it to be an instruction to kill himself. Lability
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and rigidity go hand in hand, since the "fixed magical ideas" are
what force the objects to conform.
Werner is careful to distinguish the magical world-view
from that of the religious MYSTIC in advanced culture (p.352).
The attitude of the mystic is precisely to consider mysterious and
outside the scope of ordinary knowledge a supernatural or
spiritual realm as distinct from the realm of everyday
occurrence. For the primitive mind, magical events are not
something mysterious, but the simple facts of life. A religious
person may offer prayers to a supernatural deity, believing that
this deity has the power and discretion to hear these prayers and
influence earthly events in accordance with them. But this is a
developmental step up from the primitive person who directly
and completely confuses his own needs and actions with unrelated
objects and events in the material world.

vi. Primitive relationship to others and society
Primitive personality, as well as primitive ideas about the
self and others, is also marked by syncretism, diffusion, rigidity,
lability, and lack of hierarchization. The individual is not
separated from the world, from the social order, or from a set of
visible, concrete characteristics.
Primitive tribes characterize members of other tribes as
having a single attribute. For example, if a tribe practices
cannibalism, they are considered to be descended from jaguars,
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and the personality trait of "jaguar" is all that is necessary or
admissible for their designation. (1948, p.419) STEREOTYPY of
personality, or labeling of a person by a single trait, is dominant
even within one’s own tribe.
Personality is not differentiated from magic objects. A
part of someone can be considered to reside within an object
associated with that person in a magic rite, for example.
Personality may also reside in a person’s property as well as in
the person’s body: "if a tree is uprooted by a gale of wind, its
owner will fall sick" (p.423). Werner uses the term "EGO-HALO" to
refer to the diffusion of the individual's ego among family
members, property, clothing, animals, etc. Voodoo depends on
the idea that body excretions, nails, hair, etc. are all vital
aspects of the personality.
Personality is considered dependent upon social ceremonies.
In primitive cultures, there is no gradual transition, through
adolescence, from childhood to adulthood. At a certain age, there
is a ceremony, and the personality is considered completely
transformed from the child-being to the adult-being at that
moment, (p.421) The lability of the personality is also manifested
by the fact that a change of name is considered to affect it. For
example, a small child asked its parents to change his sister’s
name so that she could become a little boy (p.446).
Primitive views of life after death highlight the way in
which the personality is considered to be inseparable from the
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entire social and physical environment. In the "happy hunting
ground of some Native Americans, for example, people will
essentially continue the same activities that occupied them in
life.

Paradise is a projection of earthly existence", since "only in

his proper environment may the person be preserved in his
totality" (p.423).
There is little differentiation between intention and action.
Werner appeals to Piaget's research to show how children consider
the objective consequences of an act (eg., how big an ink blot is
made on the tablecloth) as more important than whether the act
was done purposefully, or with "good intentions", or by accident
(p.444). The notion of intention as an essential aspect of right and
wrong action is simply not differentiated out from the global,
concrete quality of the act. Similarly, the example is given of the
woman in a primitive culture whose son's life was demanded in
recompense when the child of another family was burned to
death in a fire that the woman had built outdoors to heat water.
The fact that the woman had not the slightest intent to cause
harm made no difference, (p.426)
There is little differentiation between the physical and
psychological or spiritual aspects of the individual. This is why,
for example, in primitive cultures, washing oneself is considered
to cleanse away evil qualities, not in a symbolic sense, but in a
concretely real sense. Similarly, eating the flesh of a courageous
animal is thought to impart courage. The purpose of "scalping" a

58

human enemy is to gain the bravery inherent in it. (pp. 427-433)
It is crucial to distinguish the actual primitive conception from
the recent trend in our culture to perceive interconnections
between mind and body. The mystically-oriented American who
participates in a "sweat-lodge" ritual may do so believing that the
process of sweating and chanting will have an effect on his
psychic life, but he does not believe that his psychic life is
actually contained in his sweat droplets.
The fact that personality is not distinguished from concrete
action and physical substance makes it a "logical consequence"
that people are not distinguished from animals, except perhaps as
a "primus inter pares" (pp. 426-427). Animals certainly commit
concrete actions and possess physical attributes; since this is all
that is required for personality, animals are considered to have
language like humans, as well as "personality"; "in the (primitive
Brazilian Indian's) eyes the animal is as much a person as he is
himself" (ibid.). This makes it quite plausible that an unpleasant
person, for example, might actually be half human and half
shark, or be a human by day and a wolf by night, etc.
There is little INDIVIDUATION in the primitive personality,
in that the person is not differentiated from his social milieu, or
from concrete others. If a person gets sick, his relatives as well
as he are expected to undergo a cure (p.433). A primitive man
may actually fall sick because his wife is sick (p.434). Werner
points out that waking life exhibits the same characteristics as

59

dreams, wherein people do not have stable identities, but are
interchangeable with various "alter egos". In some African tribes,
a child is not considered to have a personality separate from his
father's until the rite of circumcision is performed.
The syncretic structure formed by the unity of personality
and milieu may refer to a relation not only between individual
and individual, but also between individual and SUPERORDINATED
SOCIAL UNITIES" (p.436, emphasis in original). Practically all of a
primitive individual's actions are governed by the "powers of the
social group", and not in the form of an distinct individual in
contrast with a "superior social organism", but in a thoroughly
"fused" way. Personal inclination or intimate bonds are not as
important in determining behavior and thought as the fixed
customs of the entire group. Obversely, the individual is
considered to contain the totality: punishment for a crime
committed by one person may be visited upon an entire clan.
Marriage agreements bind not individuals, but entire families
(p 437).
The most important thing to the primitive individual is his
status within the structure of custom, his PRESTIGE. His very
personality is completely defined by this. Again, this is to be
ditinguished from the egoistic or insecure individual in advanced
culture whose sense of well-being is tied up in cultural approval.
Even this person would have a notion that someone could, for
example, "be a good person" yet not have a lot of social status.
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There would also be a notion of oneself as a private individual
standing in distinction from a superior social order. The primitive
hunger for prestige, according to Werner, is Ma token of
EGOCENTRISM , i.e., of a low degree of differentiation between
individual and society, between the private and specifically social
goal (p.440).
Related to this view is the lack of any conception that the
social order is changeable. "Where there is a rigid, immutable
social pattern into which the individual is born and in which he
must live without conflict or prospect of change, a true
contradistinction between individual and social ends resulting in
specific individuation is greatly hindered" (p.440).
Werner (like Piaget) rejects the idea (epitomized, as it is for
Piaget, by Durkheim's work) that the social order is the actual
source of personality, and that the individual personality,
through development, "emerges" from it, embodying the views of
that order. To the extent that the primitive personality is
"socialized", the social order is "personalized": it is not seen as
something separate onto which personal desires are "projected".
Rather, as with all egocentrism, the social milieu is "blurred"; it
does not stand out as something with its own life any more than
individuals stand out as having "rights" apart from the
maintenance of custom. All is simply fused or collapsed into the
person’s own desires and activity. With development, BOTH the
individual and society "emerge" as reciprocal and polar elements.
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through contradistinctive processes of differentiation"
Characteristics of primitive personality formally similar to those
seen in adults of primitive cultures can also be seen in children:
the ego-halo , the lack of physical and psychical differentiation,
the attachment of the personality to the action and feelings of
family members, especially the mother, the egocentric "blurring"
of the social milieu, and the rigid and labile view of rules, based
on fear of punishment and pronouncements by authority.
Further, in cases of psychopathology, particularly schizophrenia,
there is analogous confusion of the self with others, with parts of
the body, etc.
As a transitional step up from the lowest primitive forms,
higher primitive cultures, as well as developing children, manifest
the notion of a "split" personality, wherein a "good" or “higher"
self is distinguished from a "bad" or "lower" self. In certain tribes,
for example, the belly is perceived as the seat of desire, while the
eye or the chest give rise to "nobler feelings" (p.431). A small
child may have a "naughty self", who he admonishes to be good,
and blames for doing naughty things. A child might thereby talk
"of himself, so to speak, simultaneously in the first and thrid
person" (p.451). This initial differentiation, of course, does not
entail a complete integration of the personality as would be
achieved by further development, but it does entail an initial
"centralization" of personality, a preliminary sort of integration
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still based on ’magical" rules, whereby there is potential to bring
the "bad self" under the domination of the "good self".
The primitive personality, as defined by the individual's
intentionality, self-perception, and view of others, goes hand-inhand with the primitive view of the physical and social world.
The central term used to describe the primitive personality is
EGOCENTRISM. This term, like primitivity itself, has a highly
specific meaning, developed and shared by European
developmentalists like Werner and Piaget. In egocentrism, the
views of "society", as conveyed by persons closest to the
egocentric individual, are intimately bound up within the ego; at
the same time, "the ego is the vividly dominant element standing
out against a more or less blurred social background" (p.453). The
egocentric individual cannot conceive of a world beyond that
which immediately impinges upon his vital needs; at the same
time, he is incapable of formulating a set of rules or standards
apart from those given by the intimate authorities in control of
his life, who are themselves only gradually perceived as existing
independently.
Egocentrism is not to be confused with egoism, which
involves a "strongly individualized response that characteristically
overrides the demands of the personal surroundings". The egoistic
person is perfectly capable of understanding that there is a world
and others apart from himself, and that there are things he
wants which are separate from the wants of others or the
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demands of the overall social situation. For Werner, "such a
response is anything but childlike" (p.452).
Werner points to certain "crises" in the development of the
child which serve to increase the differentiation between ego and
world. When the infant is weaned, an intimate link is severed
which renders the world less immediately accommodating to the
infant s impulses. During ages 2-3, the tendency of the world to
exhibit an irreconcilable solidity" in the face of these impulses
(based on gradual ego-world differentiation), "reaches its peak". It
is the tension between more articulated and discrete ego-impulses
and a reality which does not "magically" conform to these that
provokes so much of the turmoil associated with this period. It is
in this period that the child adapts by creating a code of "blind
obedience" to authority, which remains egocentric in the sense
that it is governed by the desire to promote personal pleasure and
avoid pain and punishment (p.453).
The egocentric personality becomes somewhat more
sophisticated during childhood, as the individual needs become
increasingly articulated. Identification with heroes, boasting, and
approval of or affection for people based on instrumental ("what
they can do for me") attitudes, come to the fore. But further
development out of egocentrism is somewhat dependent upon the
nature of the social milieu itself. In primitive culture, where the
role of authority is immutable, egocentrism remains the rule
throughout life. In cultures where authority is progressively
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relaxed, children build upon co-operative experiences they have
with their peers to elaborate a sense of the world which is more
individuated, more uniquely "personal property".
This provokes the third crisis, that of puberty or
adolescence.

The crisis is expressed as overt or secret mutiny

against old authorities, a severing of the intimate bonds linking
the child with the family, a withdrawal into a personal, secret
life

(p.456). Werner, rather than seeing this as entirely

negative, perceives this crisis as "a preliminary for the
establishment of a new relation between personality and society."
However, the "expanding consciousness of personal responsibility"
is what causes "the eternal conflict of generations within our own
culture" (ibid.).

4. Aspects of advanced mental life and the direction of
orthogenesis

a. The general character of orthogenetic movement.
With increasing integration and differentiation, mental
activities become increasingly DISCRETE. That is, they become
distinguished from each other. Thought is distinguished from
emotion, thought and emotion from perception, different modes
of perception from each other, one's own thoughts and feelings
from one's interpretation of another's, etc. Mental activities
become increasingly ARTICULATED, i.e, capable of making finer
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shades of distinction because they are possessed of more actual
components. Examples are the greater variety of emotions,
perspectives, symbolic categories, etc. Mental activities become
more STABLE, i.e., more immune to the vicissitudes of
environmental change, more autonomously motivated, and more
centralized or co-ordinated. At the same time they become
increasingly FLEXIBLE. They are more able to adjust to
environmental changes without disintegration or uncontrolled
regression, more capable of interacting with a extended range of
environmental possibilities, and more autonomous from rigid
internal habits of thought, emotion, etc.
As a result of orthogenesis, the individual is more capable of
making distinctions yet able to co-ordinate those distinctions
objectively. What is essential is distinguished from what is nonessential. He is more autonomous, individuated, and self-directed
yet more open to and able to incorporate a variety of
perspectives. He can more easily and completely maintain
integrity in the face of a greater variety of internal and external
changes, yet also flexibly engage in a wider range of interactions
with both the internal and external environment. In Werner's
words:
"... increasing subject-object differentiation involves the
corollary that the organism becomes increasingly less
dominated by the immediate concrete situation, the person
is less stimulus-bound and less impelled by his own
affective states. A consequence of this freedom is the
clearer understanding of goals, the possibility of employing
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substitutive means and alternative ends. There is hence a
greater capacity for delay and planned action. The person
is better able to exercise choice and willfully rearrange a
situation. In short, he can manipulate the environment
rather than passively respond to the environment. This
freedom from the domination of the immediate situation
also permits a more accurate assessment of others. The
adult is more able than the child to distinguish between
the motivational dynamics and the overt behavior of
personalities. At developmentally higher levels, therefore,
there is less of a tendency for the world to be interpreted
solely in terms of one's own needs and an increasing
appreciation of the needs of others and of group goals "
(1957, p.127)
In describing the state of primltivity, Werner outlines the
requirements of primitivity as a formal, abstract concept, and
then proceeds to give examples of actual individuals whose
patterns of thought and action closely conform to those
requirements. In speaking of a "primitive" culture, Werner uses
the guideline that the preponderance of the thought of most
people in the culture be primitive in nature. Overall, a fairly
clear picture emerges of what Werner is using as the "original"
pole of his comparative framework, both in theory and in
actuality.
Werner does not depict "advanced" mentality as a
structurally uniform whole to the extent that he does in
describing primitivity. This is because Werner sees earlier,
primitive characteristics as being retained even as more advanced
ones develop. For example, an otherwise rational person may
retain a superstition about knocking on wood after saying
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something hopeful. The existence of several developmental levels
operating at once within an individual or culture is called "genetic
stratification" or "developmental heterogeneity" (1957, p.145; cf
Flavell, 1966, p.28, and Kaplan, 1966, p.37: "genetic levels"). In
any case, my interest in orthogenesis as a direction does not
depend on seeing it as a series of structurally—whole "stages”.
Thus the following examples will usually be couched in terms of
INCREASING qualities, rather than in terms of static
characteristics.
The label "advanced" follows the same restrictions as the
label "primitive": it is a comparative term, with the basis for
comparison adhering strictly to the "formal co-ordinates"
(Langer, p.746) of orthogenesis. It is not assumed that advanced
people are better than primitive people, or that we can
determine in advance of inquiry the nature of someone's thought
just because he is from a certain culture, or that people in
adavnced cultures operate uniformly in an advanced way. It is,
on the contrary, held to be likely that in more advanced
cultures, the relationship between developmental levels within
each person will vary from individual to individual.
b. Examples of orthogenesis

i. Symbolic thought
At the heart of orthogenesis in thought and langauge is the
formation of SYMBOLS. A symbol, in Werner's definition, is a
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VEHICLE for representing an object or REFERENT by means of an
intentionally established correspondence or analogy. For Werner,
the distinctly human organismic end or goal is Knowing, and
symbols are our vehicles for Knowing. Now, Werner’s
constructivist view of Knowing involves the idea that "the human
world cannot claim to reflect an independent 'reality per se1", but
is, rather, a man-specific... representation of 'what there is' by
means available to the human being" (1963b, p.472).
Werner uses the terms "symbol" and "symbolic vehicle"
interchangeably, but the latter term is meant to place more
emphasis on the actual symbolic medium employed, the "sounds,
lines, body movements, etc." (p.474)
Werner distinguishes symbols from signs or signals. A sign
or signal can elicit or inhibit behavior by anticipating an event,
or substituting for it. But a symbol involves an intentional
cognitive act which "implies some awareness, however vague,
that vehicle and referential object are not identical but are, in
substance and form, two totally different entities." (p.475) Thus a
bell may be a SIGNAL which, by substituting for food, maKes a
dog salivate, but the bell is not a SYMBOL for food. Throwing up
one’s hands as a "simple and direct expression" (ibid.) of anger
may be a SIGN of anger, but it cannot be properly called
SYMBOLIC. The content of dreams, while symbolic for the
psychoanalyst who consciously finds interpretative meanings
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within them, are not symbolic for the dreamer because they are
simply "taken as such".
The orthogenetic power of the symbol lies in its "dynamic
schematizing activity , which refers to the idea that symbols,
including language, are not simply static "products" which exist
as isolated units in a fixed world, but constitute an organizing,
structuring ACTION,
process (p.476)

a "directive, regulative, form-building

by which the organism creates and shapes a

meaningful and changeable world. Symbols transcend the
immediate expressive qualities of "sensory, postural, affective,
and imaginal components of the organismic state" by creating a
cognitive structure which "intertwines" and contains (integrates)
these qualities yet remains flexibly independent of them, and in
fact "shapes" them. For example, the word "contains" in the
previous sentence draws upon certain motor-perceptual
antecedents but can be used in a metaphoric sense which does
not imply that anything substantial is actually "contained”.
Symbols transform the human world from one of "thingsof-action" (in primitive life) to one of "objects-of-contemplation".
The symbolizing process involves an orthogenetic shift towards
"polarization" of subject and object: the child comes to know
objects as being outside himself, as having their own
characteristics; he similarly comes to see his thoughts and
feelings as being inside himself. The "expressive qualities" in
objects are co-ordinated by the symbol in such a way that the
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person can construct a notion of similarities between objects.
Fires in general are hot; stoves, like fires, are hot; the sun is like
a big fire or stove, etc. This integrative function is complemented
by a differentiative one; only by means of symbolic thought can
one distinguish between the metaphoric and the concrete. To the
primitive mind, the ritual fire does not SYMBOLIZE the sun, they
are one and the same. By using similes, metaphors, and and
analogies, a person comes to reflect upon the world, rather than
be completely bound up in it. Orthogenesis within symbolic
thought "rests on twin form-building processes" (p.481). Not only
are the referents (objects) increasingly organized in a meaningful
way, but the vehicles (symbols) are increasingly organized within
language, "the symbolic form par excellence" (p.482). Increasing
integration and differentiation in symbolic thought are described
in terms of a progressive "autonomization" and complementary
"distancing" which occurs along four dimensions.
First, there is the distancing between the person and the
object, which has already been discussed. Symbolic thought shifts
the person’s perception of the object from being dependent on its
immediate external form or presence to being something that can
be grasped by means of an "internalized cognitive schema" (1963c,
p.492). The paradoxical yet logical result of this is that the person
can conceive of both object and subject as having their own
autonomous existence and qualities (A child’s ability to conceive
of his mother as an autonomous being that comes and goes
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depends on his ability to form a symbolic image of his mother
when she is not there. At a more advanced level, one might
consider as an example my mother's comment when I was a
teenager that 1 would treat her more kindly if I "simply thought
of her as a human being”).
Second, there is progressive distancing between the person
and the symbolic vehicle. Regarding the external form of the
vehicle, the person becomes more able to use forms such as
writing and speech which are more removed from immediate
affective and sensori-motor levels, whereas earlier symbolic
formswould include images and movements which are more
closely tied to a highly personal, direct pragmatic action upon
something. The person-independence" of forms such as speech
make them suitable for social intercourse, for the "handing over"
of meaning from one person to another (p.493). Regarding the
internal form of the vehicle, meanings become less "private and
idiosyncratic", which again means that communication becomes
more possible, since symbols increasingly "serve to represent
relatively the same content for the communicants" (p.494).
Third, there is progressive distancing between the symbolic
vehicle and its referential object. Whereas in primitive thought,
words are considered to have a magical identity with the things
they represent, development entails a separation of vehicles from
their "thinglike" status. With regard to their external form,
symbols lose their tendency to be drawn or spoken so as to
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pictorially or onomatopoeically look or sound like the thing they
represent. A more primitive symbol for "tree" would have to look
more like an actual tree, whereas the word "tree" is independent
of such a function. Similarly, the inner meaning of the symbol
becomes less dependent upon a sensorially observable
manifestation of the symbolic vehicle. Werner is careful to point
out, however, that the connection between words and their
synaesthetic, physiognomic associations are not completely
severed. There are many examples of onomatopoeia in language,
and when one learns a foreign language, it is precisely when one
begins to feel at home within the motor-affective associations of
words that one is approaching true fluency. It is the work of a
poet to be hypersensitive to such associations. Here again we have
an example of higher development entailing not a disjunction
from prior forms, but a "distancing" WITH retained access.
Finally, there is a progressive distancing between the
"adressor" and the potential "addressee", in the sense that the
developing symbolic structures enable communication with an
"audience" further and further removed physically and in terms
of common experience from the "speaker". This developmental
aspect is closely interwoven with the previously mentioned notion
that as symbolic vehicles develop, they become "more communal
and less egocentric, idiosyncratic, and contextualized" (p.498).
Werner recognizes that with people who are close to one another
emotionally and otherwise, a highly personalized mode of
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communication may be "adequate” (and presumably enriching),
and that an identity of connotations between communicants
becomes less likely with increasing psychological distance between
them. With development, the individual will possess more
flexibility to make use of both highly personal and highly
universal forms, in an "integration of individual and
transpersonal expressiveness" (p.500). With those further
removed, the goal is to achieve a "consensus" of meaning
whereby "the connotations evoked in both addressor and
addressee occupy a COMPARABLE POSITION within each
individual's PERSONAL network of meanings" (p.499, emphasis in
original).
As can be seen by the above examples, Werner's use of the
terms "distancing" or "polarization" does not mean that with
development, people are bound to become more distant and
polarized from one another, or individuals from society, in the
common-langauge meanings of those terms which imply mutual
alienation. [1] The distancing and polarization that is referred to
here is comparative or relative to an egocentric state in which
other individuals and social institutions are not recognized as
having their own existence whose effect upon the subject can be
reflected upon, and upon which the subject sees himself as
capable of acting. Within this frame of reference, increasing
"distancing" is necessary for there to be true communication or
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sharing of mutual experience BETWEEN individuals as opposed to
the mere collapsing of others into the subject's "ego-halo-.

ii. Aesthetic and sensory experience
With orthogenesis, involuntary synaesthesia gives way to
an increasing ability to differentiate between the senses, as well
as a greater articulation within each sense. Older children can
distinguish more colors and tones than younger ones (1948, p.98).
It is also true, however, that in advanced cultures, symbols
tend to supplant functions which, in primitive cultures, are
fulfilled more directly by sensory experience. In one sense, the
person brought up in a primitive culture has more "developed”
sensory powers than the person from the higher culture. The
more eidetic memory of certain primitive peoples permit them to
draw excellent likenesses of animals and other familiar things in
their world, as long as they follow a particular traditional
drawing system (pp. 147-48). Eskimos can make unerring maps of
long stretches of coastline by a similar process. The visual and
olfactory tracking abilities of Bushmen are also, purely as sensory
powers, far beyond what the average Westerner can achieve.
Werner’s point is that such abilities are generally bound up in the
specific milieu within which they are developed. They represent a
"too perfect adjustment" of the individual to his surroundings, so
that there is no "flexibility and freedom in unceasing attempt to
readjust, which is the very life and essence of higher, advanced

cultures" (p.19). These "superior" sensory abilities of primitive
peoples represent a specialization on a more primitive level" as
opposed to a continued development of "new means" (p.18).
Werner wants us to consider the mental PROCESS behind an
achievement , as well as the outer form of the achievement
itself.
People in advanced cultures lose some of the striking powers
associated with such primitive specialization, but the symbolic
means which replace them are less context-dependent and more
flexible. Nonetheless, it would presumably constitute further
development for a person in an advanced culture to cultivate
these kinds of powers, and achieve a greater mobility of level.
(This partially explains the attraction of the "Tarzan" myth, the
man capable of the "best of both worlds"!).
Werner uses the example of great artists like Kandinsky
(p. 71) to point to a more mobile and integrated level of aesthetic
development beyond the stage that most people in advanced
culture achieve. Kandinsky could and did experience things
synaesthetically, yet he could make use of language to convey his
experiences "rationally" in words. In other artists, of course, such
as the dramatist Strindberg (p.462), greater synaesthetic insight
was accompanied by schizophrenia and a breakdown of rational
thought. Orthogenesis in aesthetics, therefore, entails an
increasing ability to be mobile between lower and higher ways of
perceiving the world, accompanied by an increasing co-ordination

76

of the lower by the higher. The expressive metaphor, as

conveyed by language and art, provides a vehicle lor
communicating an integrated experience which can evoke a
response at a variety of levels (intellectually, emotionally,
sensorially, etc.) from a wide audience.

iii. Emotions
Orthogenesis in the emotional realm involves the increasing
perception of emotions as being generated internally, and not as
being inherent in the properties of external objects. Also, emotion
is differentiated from the senses, so that, for example, the
expression, "a sour person" is understood to be metaphor rather
than an actual fusion of taste and affect. How one feels about
someone becomes less dependent on how they look (1948, pp.8385). Emotions become more articulated; an infant can only
manifest a global "distress", a slightly older child adds fear and
anger to this repertoire, and these are subsequently refined to
include shame, anxiety, jealousy, disappointment, etc. (pp.8687).
Emotions also come increasingly under the co-ordination of
the intellect (p.56b), and so the individual gains the ability to
delay, moderate, or even abandon an emotional response as a
result of reflection. Autonomy with respect to one's emotions is
therefore a hallmark of development. One's bodily sensations that
accompany emotion do not lead as much to "blind.
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uncoordinated, momentary outbursts" (p,479), as in tantrums.
The child develops more integrated and purposeful means of
adapting to unpleasant situations (running away, hiding the (ace,
argument, etc.).
Emotions are also less attached to immediate and concrete
events. One thereby becomes more emotionally open and
receptive to images, imaginations, events far removed in time
and space, etc. This, of course, creates its own new problems. As
children grow, they are, for example, less afraid of loud sudden
noises, but more afraid of dreams and "imaginary creatures"
(p.480). Presumably, with further orthogenesis, the individual is
progressively able to distance himself from emotional impulses
even when these are connected to complex cognitive schemes.
Werner does not spell out the nature of such a higher stage,
however.

iv. Action
With orthogenesis, action becomes more INTENTIONAL and
SPONTANEOUS compared to primitive forms, which are more
automatic, rigid, and determined by the environment. The
developing individual becomes increasingly directed by his own
intentions as flexibly and voluntarily chosen from among an
increasing number of possibilities. The ability to see one's society
as distinct from oneself is a prerequisite of the ability to act more
flexibly with respect to authority and tradition. The development
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of symbolic abstraction, as in grouping operations, allows the
subject to "shift his point of view during a deliberate grouping” so
that he is "no longer passively subject to the forces of sensory
stimulation" (1937, p.358). An older child, confronted with a
group of shapes, is able to group them differently according to
size, shape, or color, whereas a younger child cannot see how a
piece might belong to more than one group
One way to interpret the relationship between intentionality
and integration-differentiation might be as follows: intentionality
involves a differentiation between the individual’s internally
integrated cognitive schema of "possibilities” and the immediate
"given" quality of the physical or social environment. The
integrative power of this schema lies in its ability to "dominate”
and change the given external environment while simultaneously
taking it into account". Thus the intentions, and their behavioral
manifestations, do not stem from purely egoistic fantasies. Such
fantasies, rooted in idiosyncratic internal attachments, are
themselves differentiated from an intentional schema based upon
a wider, more interactive, more objective set of environmental
associations. This is an example of orthogenesis transforming the
relationship of the organism to both the internal and external
environment, so as to achieve a unity between inner and outer
"results".
Faced with a constantly shifting internal and external
environment, intentionality allows the organism to maintain its
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course despite emotional or cultural vicissitudes. Intellectually,
diverse stimuli can be co-ordinated within a larger plan of action:
"Decrease of immediacy of action signals a development through
which the organism gains greater freedom of movement". This
freedom is due to "the rising ability of the child to master the
environment by indirect action; this involves the use of circuitous
routes, instruments, and the ability to delay and to plan" (1948,
p.486).
Increasing spontaneity brings increasing ability to initiate
action without depending upon some particular stimulus from the
environment. It brings an increasing ability to respond in a
variety of ways to a particular environmental situation, ways
which are less fixed by immutable routine.
Orthogenesis brings increasing OPENNESS to and IMMUNITY
from the environment. The individual is "able to differentiate his
organism from his objective environment". This leads to a
"growing spontaneity of action" in which, generally speaking,
there is a "change from object-negative to positive reactions"
since the individual's integrity is less threatened by
environmental stimulation and change. For example, "strong
stimuli of sound and light at first cannot be mastered by the
organism: hence, he reacts negatively to these stimuli by crying,
turning away, etc. Later, at about six months, the
predominantly negative responses change to predominantly
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positive reactions; this is an indication that the child organism
has learned to digest’ intense stimulation" (1948, p.487)

v. Relationship to Nature (the physical universe)
With respect to the human relationship to the physical
world, orthogenesis is characterized by the following:
* Increasing differentiation between physical and
psychological causation. The notion that things are caused by a
personalized force within all objects, (or by an "immanent Thou"
which decrees what things happen, 1956, p.92) is replaced by
ideas based on sheer observation and the positing of nonpsychological natural laws.
* The idea that nature has only physical, and not
psychological qualities, transforms the human relationship to
nature from one of "mutuality" and "unity" to one of
"exploitation” and being "separate” from nature. Nature becomes
something "upon which (man) may work his will" (ibid.) [2]
* Moral and sacred qualities are differentiated from the
physical world, and lodged in a more encompassing supernatural
or spiritual domain. The worship of deities replaces the worship of
animals or totems. Moral guidance is not sought from the
physical world, except symbolically. The world relinquishes the
role of moral agent: unrelated events are not seen as punishing
the individual for his sins.
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vi. Relationship to Others and Society
With respect to the individual's relationship to others,
orthogenesis involves movement from egocentrism to
PERSPECTIVISM (Langer, 1970, p.743). Perspectivism permits "an
interaction of personality with an outer discrete world, both polar
elements being relatively self-subsistent" (Werner, 1948, p.191)
The individual becomes increasingly able to "sympathize with,
empathize with, and adopt the perspectives of others as well as
his own; and he can increasingly integrate all these to form a
coherent basis for his own conduct" (Langer, p.744)
The developing individual does not simply absorb and act
upon the views of others wholesale, nor does he become
confirmed in a purely personal perspective. Rather, BY VIRTUE
OF an increasingly integrated personality, increasingly
differentiated from the environment and its demands, the
individual becomes MORE capable of self-modification in the face
of new perspectives. He can permit GREATER interaction with and
openness to other human beings.
"Increasing individuation is the counterpart of increasing
socialization" (1948, p.452). As the individual moves from
egocentrism to perspectivism, his relations to groups of people,
and to society as a whole, become progressively less based upon
unquestioned authority. They rely more upon co-operation,
reciprocity, and dialogue. There is also an increasing
"equalitarianism" which is "tempered by a consideration of the
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inner and outer circumstance conditioning the individual". As
opposed to a more rigid "everybody should be treated equally"
view, this view can include, for example, the justice of giving a
6 year old playing a game with 11-year-olds "an extra chance".
The crisis of adolescence in advanced culture is a
preliminary for the establishment of a new relation between
personality and society" (p.456). Such a crisis is only possible in a
society which has advanced past the primitive stage of "rigid,
indurated authority , a society which is itself sufficiently
differentiated to allow for individual differences and a wide
variety of social roles and possibilities. The adolescent individual
in advanced culture becomes able to conceive of "objective social
goals". This is one thing that makes his rebellion different from
that of the egocentric 2-year-old. It is the social structure that
ceases to be authoritative: "there is a marked growth in the
understanding of individual differentiation in a differentiated
society, in the desire for self-determination with respect to the
social role and the authority chosen” (ibid.).
With further development, the individual comes to the
notion of RESPONSIBILITY: "when this sense of a personal freedom
of choice exists, the individual acquires a new sense of
responsibility, however limited, in relation to the society in which
he lives and carries on his personal struggle" (ibid.). The
responsible individual is capable both of differentiating himself

83

from society and of integrating objective social goals into his own
personal goals.
Development of responsibility and perspectivism unite in
particular within the development of leadership. Werner's
comments here are brief, but he indicates that leadership based
on sheer domination is related to rigidity and egocentrism,
whereas with development, the leader is more able to adopt a
stance in which he "spontaneously and flexibly responds to
differences in other persons" (p.504).
With respect to the behavior of groups, development entails
increasingly integrated and differentiated interactions between
people, which Werner links empirically with increase in age. With
small children, interaction is limited to two people at a time. The
spontaneous organization of larger groups, in a game, for
example, is only possible at about age four or five. In large
groups of younger children, play tends to be "associative".
Children may work on a diffusely "common" activity (e g.,
building a castle), but each is really in his own world. Only later
does "co-operative" play emerge, where there is an integration of
individual goals around a well-articulated group project. Finally,
groups only become stable, with clear "in-group" and "out-group"
attachments, as in boys' and girls' "clubs", with advancing age.
Again, Werner does not pursue the notion of a higher level of
development which would transcend the propensity of "advanced"
culture to divide people into exclusive groups.
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It seems, however, that increasing perspective would
imply such further development.

3S

QL Development in t.hf wnrk of ,iPan Piage>t
1. Introduction

While Piaget does not use the term "orthogenesis" to
describe the direction of development, his description of what
constitutes this direction, or "vector" (1965, p.386, Cf. "vection",
1971, pp. 123, 356) is virtually identical with Werner's. In this
review, I shall limit myself to a demonstration of this identity,
focusing on those aspects of the developmental vector that have
been amplified by Piaget. This is not a review of Piaget's position
in general, which would properly focus on the mechanisms of
development,

the functional invariance between biological and

cognitive structures, and the Iorico-mathematical interpretation
of successive thought structures (1970). This review is limited to
illustrating another important theme in Piaget's work, the
invariant characteristics of the vector of development. References
to explanatory mechanisms are held to the minimum necessary
to support such illustration
Like Werner, Piaget claims a value-neutrality for his notion
of the direction of development which belies the spirit of his
work. Piaget's aim regarding the expression of the developmental
vector is "to establish some objective and independent hierarchy,
untainted by any value judgement" (1971, p 122). Even when
discussing the development of moral judgement itself, Piaget
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claims that "this is a psychological work, and it is not for us to
take up a moral standpoint" (1965, p.294). He attempts to chart
the development of social interactions in general "without
attempting to evaluate this 'vector', and limiting ourselves to the
mere description of psychological facts" (p.397). Piaget seems to
regard values as external to his conclusions, as "subjective"
elements which can only "taint" inquiry. This is the classic
value-neutral
committing the

scientific position, and Piaget is wary of
naturalistic fallacy" of deriving values from

facts, or of distorting facts to conform with presupposed values.
Yet all of Piaget's work is drenched in the presupposition
that the process of development is desirable and valuable. For.
example, despite Piaget's insistence that "the role of the
psychologist is... to give the facts the pedagogue can use and not
to put oneself in his place and give him advice" (Bringuier, 1980,
p. 131), Piaget cannot resist prescribing educational approaches
which "best correspond with our psychological results" (1965,
p.404). These turn out to be those which promote greater
autonomy and de-centering in the individual, and co-operative
self-government in the social structure (see especially 1976,
pp. 51, 90-91, 99, 112, and 1965, pp.363-364).
In addition, Piaget, by emphasizing the phenomena of
development over those of non-development and long-term
resistance to development, sometimes blurs the distinction
between developmental stages as "real states" and as "limiting
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forms of equilibrium", norms which have their basis in the
extension of logic as much as in the observable "world of fact"
(1965, p.386). This tendency makes it easier for Piaget to
emphasize, for example, the co-operation of 12-year-olds rather
than the brutality of peer pressure to conform at that age. Piaget
certainly does not deny the existence of regression, arrested
development, or evil, but he is even less consistent than Werner
about differentiating his normative definition of development from
the facts of change.
Piaget seems to slam the "front door" of his inquiry against
the invasion of values, only to allow them to enter through the
"back door", whereupon they mingle with the facts in an
unregulated way. Piaget’s explicit disavowal of any value
judgement being attached to "evolutive vection" (1971, p.123)
seems to be juxtaposed with the implicit idea that the "immanent
logic" of organic functioning, coupled with the concept of a "final"
state as logically "implied" by this functioning, obviates or
subsumes any need for explicit justification of the change vector
as an ethical norm. This interpretation, although speculative,
helps to explain why Piaget eschews making educational
prescriptions in theory, while making them in actual practice.

88

^Examples of Integration and niffgrpntiatinn
a. Piaget's Definition of These Terms
For both Piaget and

Werner, the "main lines of

development" are "the dual directions of differentiation and

integration

(1971, p.72). Piaget lays heavy emphasis on the idea

that the same vector which characterizes development within the
domain of intelligence also characterizes the evolution of life in
general, and particularly that of intelligence out of non-intelligent

behavior structures, such as instincts and reflexes. Therefore,
while I shall limit myself here to examples of development within
intelligence, I shall permit myself to refer to ideas which Piaget
has set forth in the context of biological phenomena in general,
since, for him, intelligence is but a specific, uniquely developed
case of such phenomena.
For both Piaget and Werner, development is a
complementary and interdependent balance or synthesis between
integration and differentiation:
"The chief characteristic of the vection which seems to be
evinced by organic evolution is a remarkable alliance
between two features that are antipathetic at first sight,
although their working together is a necessary factor in the
adaptations achieved at the higher levels. The first of these
[is]... the ever-deepening integration making the
developmental processes more and more autonomous in
relation to the environment. The second...is the increasing
'opening' of possibilities of actions upon the environment,
and consequently, insertion into wider and wider
environments" (1971, p.356).
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For Piaget, as for Werner, increasing integration and
differentiation is manifested in the following ways:
i. Structures of thought, language, and action become
increasingly STABLE yet MOBILE. Thus arithmetical concepts form
a stable framework within which numbers can be subtracted and
then re-added (reversibility = flexibility) without in the least
disturbing the overall structure.
ii. In functional terms, this means an increasing DE¬
CENTERING (or DECENTRATION) of the organism and a
corresponding AUTONOMY from
"distorting assimilations... which distort because they are
not accompanied by adequate accommodations, [so] that
the subject remains centered on his own actions and his
own viewpoint.. .successive decentrations.. .make it possible
for the subject to take the points of view of other subjects
or of objects themselves" (1970, p.710).
ill. There is an increasing set of possibilities for thought and
action with respect to the internal and external environment. In
other words, there is a general EXTENSION or OPENING of the
environment (differentiation) which implies an increasing ability
of the organism to maintain its integrity in the face of change,
and an increasing power of the organism to co-ordinate the
environment for its own ends.
iv. There is an increasing "differentiation of substructures
and their integration into totalities" (1971, p.7l).

Differentiation

and integration are here used in their sense of distinguishing with
complementary co-ordination of the distinguished elements. This
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includes the re integration of earlier structures within later ones
(e.g., perceptual within conceptual structures, or Euclid's idea of
space within Einstein’s).
In the examples that follow, I have chosen to review the
areas in which Piaget amplifies and extends Werner's ideas,
rather than those which involve virtual repetitions of concepts
already reviewed in Werner’s work. For example, I shall not
discuss the development of the symbolic function, (see 1960,
pp. 124-127, 158-159), nor magical or animistic thinking in the
child, (see 1951a, 1951b), where Piaget's ideas match Werner's in
nearly every detail. Since my aim is to show how the overall
direction of development is the same for both authors, 1 believe I
can do this while sparing the reader a mere reiteration of
previously explored ideas. Instead, I shall focus on Piaget's notion
of OPERATIONS, as well as on his ideas about the development of
morality, personality, and society, which are enrichments of
Werner's.

b, Operational Thought
The trajectory of increasing integration and differentiation is
manifested in thought by the emergence of OPERATIONS. An
operation is essentially a "grouping" of thoughts or actions which
is defined by its integrated "conservation of the whole" (1960,
p. 140), manifesting itself in logical deductions and the feeling of

logical necessity. It is the co-ordinative power of the grouping
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which allows the subject to de-center from particular perceptions
of objects by performing a mental operation which compensates
for perceptual changes within concrete actions (concrete
operations), and ultimately for the absence of any concrete
perceptions at all (formal operations):
The distinguishing characteristic of the sensori-motor
schema (perception, etc.)...is that they are always
centered on a particular state of the object and a point of
view peculiar to the subject; thus they always testify both
to an egocentric assimilation to the subject and to a
phenomenalist accommodation to the object. On the other
hand, the distinguishing characteristic of the mobile
equilibrium peculiar to the grouping is that the
decentralisation.. becomes systematic... thought is then no
longer tied to particular states of the object, but is obliged
to follow successive changes with all their possible detours
and reversals; and it no longer issues from a particular
viewpoint of the subject, but co-ordinates all the different
viewpoints in a system of objective reciprocities. The
grouping thus realizes for the first time an equilibrium
between the assimilation of objects to the subject's action
and the accommodation of subjective schemata to
modifications of objects" (i960, p.142).
Operations build upon previous integrations and
differentiations at the sensori-motor and pre-operational or
"intuitive" level. An example of this is the construction of the
"permanent object" scheme (pp. 108-109). Before this scheme is
constructed, a child behaves as if an object had ceased to exist if
it is removed from view (covered by a cloth, placed under a
sofa). Afterwards, the child initiates searching activity for the
object (removing the cloth, looking under the sofa). The object
permanence scheme represents an integrated (autonomous)
subjective idea of the object which is differentiated (de-centered)
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from perception, thereby opening the environment to include not
only the place where the object is, but also all the places in
which in might be imagined to be, and extending the child's
power over that environment.
This scheme, however, does not yet represent an operation,
since the child. 1) still depends upon physical appearance and
practical purpose in forming conclusions about the object,

2)

cannot focus upon more than one aspect of the object at a time,
nor 3) co-ordinate one aspect with another. "We might therefore
say that at this level spatio-temporal, logico-arithmetical, and
practical (means and ends) groupings form a global whole and
that, in the absence of differentiation, this complex system is
incapable of constituting an operational mechanism" (p. 152). In
one experiment which demonstrates this, a child is shown a box
of 20 wooden beads, in which most are brown, and only a few
are white. The child is asked "are there more brown beads or
wooden beads?". The child will insist that there are more brown
beads "because there are only two or three white ones", while
alternately recognizing that if all the wooden beads are removed
from the box, there will be none left, but if all the brown beads
are removed, the white ones will remain. The child is incapable
of forming the notion of the inclusion of classes, wherein "brown"
as a subset of "wooden" can be co-ordinated with "brown" as
opposed to "white". The child can understand each one
separately, but cannot group the two within a logical whole.
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Once operations are achieved, however, the idea that there
are more wooden beads than brown ones becomes a matter of
logical necessity for the subject; it n^s to be that way. A similar
example, involving the conservation of substance, is the
experiment wherein a child is given a clay "sausage" which he
proceeds to make longer and thinner. "Centering" on the increased
length, the pre-operational child will insist that there is now
more sausage, even though he admits that none has been added
(If the sausage is made longer and longer, at some point the child
will declare that there is less!). The operational child, on the
other hand, will see as a matter of unshakeable necessity that
the clay has conserved its original substance because: 1) nothing
was added or taken away (IDENTITY), 2) the sausage gets
correspondingly thinner as it lengthens (COMPENSATION), and 3)
although the sausage has been lengthened, it could just as easily
be reformed into its original shape (REVERSIBILITY).
The practical notion of reversibility, that what is done in
the objective world can be undone within the subjective mind, is
one hallmark of the operation, and the necessary precursor for
understanding basic arithmetical principles such as commutivity,
transitivity, etc. Yet operations which are dependent upon
concrete action or perception are not yet "fully reversible": "being
constantly tied to action, they give it a logical structure,
embracing also the speech accompanying it, but they by no
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means imply the possibility of constructing a logical discourse
independently of action" (p. 146).
FORMAL operations open up this possibility by performing "a
grouping operating on concrete groupings" (p 152), rather than
mere groupings of concrete objects: "with formal operations there
is even more than reality involved, since the world of the possible
becomes available for construction and since thought becomes free
from the real world. Mathematical creativity is an illustration of
this new power

(p.151). The problem of Edith, Lily, and Suzanne

mentioned earlier (Sec. A 3bi above) can be solved by forming it
into an abstract problem:
A < B; A > C, therefore B > A > C
Again, there is an opening of the environment, a co¬
ordination of possibilities under the subject's control, and an
autonomy from "reality" which is not autistic, but rather a de¬
centering from immediate givens.
Integration and differentiation are the invariable
characteristic of the direction of development: "Each of the
transitions from one of these levels to the next is therefore
characterized both by a new co-ordination and by a
differentiation of the systems constituting the unit of the
preceding level" (p. 152).
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c. Morality
Within Piaget's theory, moral and intellectual development
are interrelated. Like the development of operations, the
development of moral judgement is an adaptational search for
equilibrium between subject and object, in the case of moral
development, the

object

is other people, and the equilibrium is

sought within human relations. This equilibrium, manifested as
.justice in action and thought, entails a sequence of thought

structures aimed at the regulation of these relations. Development
in the moral realm may be characterized by the emergence of
the same logical rules as in the intellectual realm: e.g., absence
of self-contradiction (i960, p.163), and reversibility, reciprocity or
the co-ordination of viewpoints" (p.162). In a sense, then, one
might describe moral development as a subset of intellectual
development.
Yet the construction of operations themselves depends upon
the nature of the interactions between people, reason itself is
formed "at the heart of an investigative collectivity" (1976, p.5l).
Not only in Piaget's theory, but in his prescriptions for education,
therefore, moral and intellectual development are held to be both
parallel ("Logic is the morality of thought just as morality is the
logic of action"; 1965, p.398) and mutually reinforcing.
Piaget does not exclude affect from the realm of the moral,
for Piaget, the moral realm seems to be defined by its unique
subject-object relations (i.e., within this domain, the "object" =
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other -subjects') and by its aim of equilibrating those relations,
with the means employed including both affect (energy) and
cognition (structure). For example, will, which for

Piaget plays

the role of an "affective de-centering", (Kohlberg, 1984, p.556)
analogous to the cognitive role played by operations (the operation
asserts itself in the face of perceptual "centerings", while will
asserts itself in the face of affective "centerings"), is referred to
as a "moral feeling" (1960, p,5).
Moral development studied by Piaget follows a trajectory of
increasing integration and differentiation, as manifested by the
following:
i. There is a movement from moral judgement based on
EGOCENTRISM and corresponding adult CONSTRAINT to judgement
based on individual AUTONOMY and corresponding social CO¬
OPERATION. Piaget emphasizes that the child's egocentrism, far
from being in opposition to authority (wherein increased
authority would overcome egocentrism, a popular belief) in fact
enters into a mutually reinforcing relationship with it (1965,
p.61). Development consists of constructing moral rules which are
increasingly independent of external influence, especially that of
fear of punishment, and based rather on MUTUAL RESPECT, and
the ability to take another's viewpoint. The freely chosen co¬
operation of people who regard each other as equals is seen as the
ideal equilibrium to be achieved.
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ii. The rules which govern such co-operation are
increasingly those of DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE as opposed to
RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, or OBEDIENCE. Distributive justice is based
on the idea of reciprocity and equality: the idea of fault stems
from the notion that the "bond of solidarity" necessary for
mutual respect has been broken, and the purpose of punishment
is to lead the transgressor (as well as others in the community)
to realize this and to act in such a way as to restore this bond
(pp. 227-232). Such justice is increasingly free from the emotional
need for revenge, (thus it becomes increasingly tempered by love
and forgiveness, see p.323) and from the need to obey a set of
rules merely because they are decreed by a perceived
AUTHORITY. There is a shift from

"a system of rules that are

external" to "relations founded on reciprocity" (p.395). Distributive
justice sees the responsibility for the social equilibrium as
distributed equally among all members of the group; any rules
agreed to by the group derive from a conscious desire to preserve
these relations. This is seen as more developed than an unequal
relation between rule-makers and rule-obeyers, or than agreedupon obedience to a rule whose purpose goes unquestioned.
iii. As has already been discussed in the above review of
Werner's work, there is progressive differentiation of subjective
moral responsibility from the OBJECTIVE features of the
transgression (e.g., how big the ink stain was as opposed to
whether it was done on purpose), from intentions ascribed to the
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physical world (the bee stung him because he was bad), and
from the collective social group (everyone in the group should be
punished if one person was bad).
iv. There is movement from pure "equalitarianism" to an
understanding of "equity". When the focus is on pure equality,
justice consists of doing precisely to an offender what the offender
did (an eye for an eye); with increasing equity, punishment is
freed from this concrete idea, and seen as more symbolically or
analogically equivalent. Also, instead of treating everyone
according to a rigid or arbitrary "equality", a view based on
equity makes allowances for age, circumstances, "special relations
of affection" (p.283), etc. The example is given of an older boy
and a younger one who are given ice cream; the younger one
drops his by accident, should he be given more? There is an
increasing ability to empathize with an actual person in an actual
situation, and to balance the equal application of the rule with
the specialness of the circumstances.
v. There is increasing differentiation between the conception
of what is and the conception of what ought to be, in such a way
that one's ideal conceptions become more autonomous from what
is while providing a basis for critical action upon existing
conditions, whether in society or in one’s own behavior and
judgement. At the same time, the "ought" is not formed through
mere conformity to a group, nor through idiosyncratic desires,
but through the regulations provided by an increasing breadth of
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dialogue and co-operation within a society of increasingly
differentiated (varied as well as autonomous) individuals:
' ‘S thC 0nly thin8 that allows for the
distinction between what is and what ought to be.. .the
essence of social constraint and of external authority, on
“nt,ra:y; ls,t° ldentlfy what is with what ought to be,
realized" (p^f thm8S being thUS conceived 35 already

vi. There is increasing differentiation of moral content from
method, and the integration of the former by the latter, which is
the method of

experimental behavior", which "whether

scientific, technical, or moral, consists, not in a common belief,
but in rules of mutual control. Everyone is free to bring in
innovations, but only in so far as he succeeds in making himself
understood by others and in understanding them" (ibid ). To
agree on the process of dialogue and mutual efforts at
understanding as a moral method is increasingly held to be more
important than specific values or rules of behavior. Even a rule
agreed upon by everyone "can acquire no new value from the
mere fact of its generality" (p.394). Development means
increasing concern with the overarching, integrating process by
which rules are agreed upon, and decreasing concern with the
degree of conformity to or identification with a given rule. There
is a shift in allegiance from “constituted rules" to "constitutive
norms" (ibid.):
"The morality of the autonomous conscience does not tend
to subject each personality to rules that have a common
content: it simply obliges individuals to ’place1 themselves in
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I?"1™ relationship with each other without letting the
thc>ir
1Ve resultant upon this reciprocity destroy
their individual points of view" (p 397)

d. Personality
Intellectual, affective, and moral development at the higher
levels is integrated by Piaget within the concept of PERSONALITY.
Autonomy and de-centering are at once the source and the
defining characterlsitcs of personality, which is alternately
distinguished from "self", "ego”, or even the "individual".
Personality is therefore something that only begins to evolve
during late childhood and early adolescence, once operational
thought is well-established:
"...by personality we mean, not the unconscious self of
childish egocentrism, nor the anarchical self of egoism in
general, but the self that takes up its stand on the norms
of reciprocity and objective discussion, and knows how to
submit to these in order to make itself respected
Personality is thus the opposite of the ego and this explains
why the mutual respect felt by two personalities for each
other is genuine respect and not to be confused with the
mutual consent of two individual 'selves' capable of joining
forces for evil as well as for good" (1965, p.96); "...an entire
concept of personality could be defined by terming it a
reciprocal 'rapport'... it is essential to distinguish the
individual and the personality. In the degree that the
individual is self-centered, he creates an obstacle by his
moral or Intellectual egocentrism to the Inherent relations
of reciprocity that all evolved social living contains.
Whereas, on the contrary, the part of an individual that is
a 'person' freely accepts some kind of discipline, or
contributes to its creation, by voluntarily subjecting himself
to a system of mutual 'norms' that subordinate his liberty
in respect to that of others... the personality is opposite to
anarchy at the same time that it is opposite to any
restraints since it is autonomous, and two such
'autonomies' can only maintain reciprocal relations" (1976,
pp.90-91); "..personality implies a kind of de-centering of
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the self which becomes part of a co-operative plan which
subordinates itself to autonomous and freely constructed
discipline" (1967, p.66).
Autonomy and co-operation are seen as opposed to
tendencies towards ANOMY, or isolation and the absence of
internal self—guidance, and HETERONOMY, or subjection to
external control. Anomy and heteronomy go hand in hand within
the egocentric personality.
Egocentrism itself is not seen as something trasncended once
and for all by a particular stage. Rather, it is a persistent
tendency which not only takes on new forms at each stage, but
whose form depends on the developmental acquisitions of that
stage, and frames the problem to be overcome by further
development.This is in keeping with the theory of convergent
reconstruction: "each new mental ability starts off by
incorporating the world in a process of egocentric assimilation.
Only later does it attain equilibrium through a compensating
accommodation to reality" (1967, p.64). The role of egocentrism as
the core "problem" of human development in Piaget's work
cannot be too highly stressed: for Piaget, all development is in
some way development out of egocentrism.
At the level of concrete operations, therefore, the child's
very ability to construct assumptions about concrete events
makes it possible for his egocentrism to take the form of a
preference for these assumptions over the facts of a situation
(Salkind, p.208)

Faced with a situation that does not conform to
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a hypothesis, the child will alter the "facts" rather than alter his
hypothesis; the idea that there might be more than one
hypothesis is still beyond him.
With formal operations, fact and hypothesis are
differentiated, but one s own thoughts and the thoughts of others
are not at first (p.210). This sets the terms for adolescent
egocentrism, which consists of the adolescent projecting his own
concerns onto others (e.g., believing that everyone is scrutinizing
his appearance), or of elaborating fantasies (a "novel", 1968, p.68)
about the self or about society which do not accommodate
themsleves to reality (See Elkind, pp. 117-128).
Personality development is characterized by integration and
differentiation, as follows:
i. There is an equilibration between these assimilative
adolescent notions and accommodation to a more objective self¬
perception, real others, and actual social institutions. In Piaget’s
view, this is achieved through "effective and enduring work",
undertaken in concrete and well-defined situations" (1967, p.69).
Piaget stresses, however, that development does not consist of
abandoning the "vast dream of reform" in order to completely
accommodate oneself to the world, but rather to overcome the
"megalomania" associated with one's fantasy of one’s own
messianic role, while still acting to transform the world in
accordance with ideas which are increasingly informed by a de¬
center ed perspective.
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ii. There is the emergence of a "lifeplan", a "personal
system" in which there is
' ■ '
au^onomous organization of rules and values, and
the affirmation of will with respect to the regulation and
hierarchical organization of moral tendencies... these factors
are integrated with the self into a unique system to which
all the separate parts are subordinated... it is peculiar to a
given individual and implies autonomous co¬
ordination. . .[it] is both a source of discipline for the will
and an instrument of co-operation" (p. 65)
iii. There is a transformation of the experience of romantic
love and peer friendship from one which is an egocentric
projection of an ideal onto a person to one which truly takes the
other person objectively into account: "Then what we seek in the
other person is the very thing that enables the other person to
come out of himself while yet remaining most profoundly himself"
(1965, p.352). Piaget's ideas here make it quite clear that
cognition is not something to be set up in opposition to affect, for
love implies not only a "bond of affection", but a desire to "know"
the other person.
iv. There is an increasing role played by discussion in social
interaction, as opposed to the mere playing of games or other
sharing of concrete activity. Obviously, it is not Piaget's aim to
denigrate concrete activity as a form of meaningful interaction,
or to hold up empty verbiage as an ideal. His point is that prior
to a certain stage of development, individuals cannot allow the
mutual communication of ideas and feelings through dialogue to
play a meaningful role in social interaction. With this ability, the
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entire universe is open to discussion, and the individual's
potential opportunities for de-centering expand accordingly (1967,
P 68).

v. There is an increasing autonomy of reason from both
dominant social beliefs and affectively-charged egocentric
distortions. The rules of a game, for example, are seen to apply
to everyone equally (reversibility), even when this means a
disadvantage for oneself. If a rule is perceived as truly unfair, on
the other hand, apart from one's own selfish interest, then this
view is maintained in the face of authority or peer pressure to
the contrary. "The autonomy of reason has nothing to do with
individual fancy, but it stands in direct contradiction to the idea
of external authority recognized as such" (1965, p.370). Progress
in science, on the other hand, depends on autonomy from
internal distortions due to attachment to a particular theory or
hypothesis.
vi. There is an increasing autonomy from fear as a
determining motivation. Piaget maintains that there is always
some role for fear, but that it moves from being connected to the
idea of physical punishment to a more subtle aversion to "any
lowering of prestige in the eyes of the other", in the case of
mutual respect: "The quasi-physical element of fear which plays
a part in unilateral respect then gradually begins to disappear in
favor of the purely moral fear of falling in the esteem of the
respected person" (1965, p.382). Piaget does not equate this kind
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of

fear

with the fear of being ostracized by the social group

(which is an embodiment of authority). Presumably, the "other"
whose respect one would not wish to lose is one whose values and
ideals truly embody our own, fear of what this "other" would
think could be likened to a fear of falling in one's own self¬
esteem. Piaget does not explore the possibility of further
autonomy from fear or other attachments as an aspect of
personality development.
vii. It is hard to mistake Piaget's ideas about what would
constitute development, not only for the child, but for the adult
in a position of authority. Piaget implies (1965, pp. 190-194) that it
is the adult's attachment to maintaining unilateral respect that
perpetuates egocentrism in children, in himself, and in social
institutions. Adults maintain this mode of dealing with those in
their power because that is how it was done by their parents,
their boss, etc. With respect to both parenting and leadership,
therefore, personality development consists of an increasing desire
to promote systems based on co-operation and reciprocity, an
ability to act scientifically in discerning appropriate means to this
end, and overcoming internal and social barriers to the
establishment of such systems.
e. Society
For Piaget, society is neither the result of individual
initiative followed by imitation, nor is it a separate "totality"
which shapes the individual from the "outside". Rather, it is a
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system of relations between individuals. Piaget points out that
even with only two individuals, the system of their relations
forms a

gestalt which cannot be reduced to its parts. Society,

as a vastly complex system of varied interactions, can be
considered an entity in a '‘statistical" sense only, and not in a
"mythological" sense. Piaget consistently rejects the path of
projecting a mythic destiny or personality onto "society" which is
the source of individual personality, or somehow superior to the
individual (1960, p.156-157). The developing "epistemological
subject"

is simultaneously "an individual, though decentered in

relation to his private ego", and a "sector of a social group
decentered in relation to the constraining idols of the tribe" (1971,
p.360). With development, "these two kinds of decentering" are
mutually reinforcing.
Piaget is quite aware that the work of equilibration at the
level of social institutions is "unfinished": "Society cannot be
regarded as a completed whole nor as a system of fully realized
values" (1965, p.353). Society "is not just one thing", but contains
both relations of autonomously de-centered co-operation and
mutual respect as well as relations of constraint, egocentrism,
authority, and unilateral respect. Piaget is clear that it is these
latter features which "characterize most of the features of society
as it exists". Although the foundations for individual co-operation
manifest themselves in 12-year-olds, these are not taken up
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within the realm of government, economics, education, and the
like (1965, p.76).
Therefore, it is in speaking of the development of society
that Piaget differentiates most clearly between development as an
immanent

fact , and as an "equilibrial limit" embodied in a co¬

operation rarely seen at the level of social systems. Nonetheless,
Piaget declares that "the actual evolution of the relations of
constraint tends to bring these nearer to co-operation" (1965,
p.396).
To be precise, Piaget does not usually speak directly of the
"development" of the society as an entity, but rather of the
increase in more developed inter-individual relations, i.e., those
marked by autonomy and de-centering. What follows here, then,
is a gathering of Piaget's thoughts on what changes in social
institutions would bring this about. With development:
i. There is movement toward greater DEMOCRACY: equality
between the generations,

self-governance, and social

egalitarianism. Breaking down the barriers which prevent the
"infinite capacity for interaction with other people" and "complete
reciprocity" between individuals is both the source and the fruit
of not only greater moral development, but of greater intellectual
development in all areas of life.
ii. There is increasing differentiation and "density" of the
society with respect to the diversity of influences upon the
individual, and the number of roles available: "The 'denser' the
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community, the sooner will the adolescent escape from the direct
constraint of his relations and, coming under a number of fresh
influences, acquire his spiritual independence by comparing them
with one another. The more complex the society, the more
autonomous is the personality and the more important are the
relations of co-operation between equal individuals" (1965, p 336).
iii- There is a decrease in collective conformism and an
increase in the

organic solidarity" of the group, which arises

from communication and mutual respect. Organic solidarity is
sometimes evinced by the children who "stick together" in the
face of unilaterally imposed adult authority (e g., by not
"squealing", p.251). Piaget points out that when expressing
organic solidarity, a group may appear to be regressing to
collective responsibility (where the group is to blame for the
offenses of the one)

but that a crucial distinction must be made

in the fact that the more developed group is quite aware that
they are not collectively to blame, but that they are each as
individuals freely choosing to take blame, responsibility, or
punishment for the acts (or alleged acts) of one or more of their
members out of solidarity with them.
iv. In educational institutions, there is an increase in the
degree of co-operative self-government allowed students, wherein
they make and enforce their own rules, etc. Also, an increase in
the amount of work done by investigative teams of students
pursuing a matter of collective interest (but not to the exclusion
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of individual work). This would be movement away from rules
and schedules imposed by authority, and away from teaching
methods which present the same information to all students
regardless of interest or ability while simultaneously isolating
students from one another in their work (1965, p.363, 1976,
p. 108).
v. There is an initial increase in differentiation between the
morality of

duty" to society from the morality of "good" based on

mutual respect and reciprocity, with an eventual hierarchic
integration of the former under the latter, until there is a re¬
convergence of the content of the two. In this progression,
primitive society begins with all codified social norms being ones
of arbitrary constraint ("legal prohibitions or taboos"), in
opposition to the interpersonal relations of mutuality that "grow
up between individuals" in an almost extralegal way. Gradually,
these informal norms become differentiated in their own right as
a "morality of good”. With the development of society, "as ritual
obligations diminish along with conformity, the morality of good
wins against the morality of duty, and... comes to constitute the
actual content of the duties themselves". At this point, however,
the duties are no longer unilaterally imposed by the society on
the individual, nor seen as arbitrary, but are seen as logically
derived from the "good" (1965, p.352-353).
vi. There is a movement away from SOCIOCENTRISM, (or
ethnocentrism) which is the manifestation of egocentrism at the
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level of identification with the social group. Piaget observes that
while it is “relatively easy to co-ordinate the points of view of
individuals on a question of pure intelligence (for example, of
putting into relation perspectives of different observers), and still
relatively easy to co-ordinate them concerning a moral conflict,
reciprocity and objectivity seem to become an insurmountable
difficulty on the level of national feelings and in international life"
(1976, p. 131). Members of a developing society would increasingly
be able, and in increasing numbers, to co-ordinate the viewpoints
of different nations, races, groups, etc. in order to arrive at a
co-operative solution.
vii. Within the sociohistorical institution of scientific
thought, there is an increasing decentering and corresponding
autonomy from egocentrism. Piaget charts the progression of
astronomy, for example, beginning with the thought of the
ancient Chinese, where “the Son of the Heavens [emperor]
insured the seasons by his moving about". Next come the
Chaldeans and Babylonians, who understood that heavenly bodies
have a trajectory independent of human action, but who still
conceived of the earth (first as a "great plateau, then as a
hemisphere, and finally as a sphere") at the center of

the

universe. Then come the Copernican and Newtonian revolutions
("a most striking symbol of the victory of objective co-ordinations
over the spontaneous egocentrism of the human being), which
established the relation of the earth to the solar system, but

Ill

which held time and space throughout the universe to be
identical to that of earth’s. Finally, "still two more centuries
were required for Einstein to teach us the relativity of time and
space, depending on velocity, and to construct a tool of co¬
ordination much more subtle than that of classical mechanics,
waiting to be surpassed in turn" (1976, pp. 137-138).

C- Integration and Differentiation, and their Justification as a

Standard Qf Ethical Adequacy, in Lawrence Kohlberg’s Stages of
Justice Reasoning

1. Introduction
Kohlberg, adhering closely to Piaget's framework, appeals to
increasing integration and differentiation as an "internal standard
of adequacy" for defining stage changes as developmental (DAE,
p.l57).[3] Although his own theory is limited to the domain of
justice reasoning, he indicates that this standard would apply to
all development that can be described in terms of cognitive stage
advance (ibid.). Kohlberg recognizes the need for explicit ethical
justification for this standard (p.151). He thus resolves the
contradictions previously indicated in the work of Piaget and
Werner. [4]
Kohlberg's justification is limited to demonstrating the
increasing moral adequacy of successive justice reasoning
structures characterized by increasing integration and
differentiation. However, his metaethical approach within this
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specific domain has implications for my attempt to justify
orthogenesis as a definition of development in general.
My review of Kohlberg's work will be limited to those
aspects most crucial to my thesis: his further elaboration of the
content of orthogenesis and his ethical justification of it as a
definition of development. My review is organized as follows:
Sec. 2: A definition of Kohlberg's domain of developmental
study.
Sec. 3: A review of the ways in which Kohlberg's stage
sequence, as well as his notion of "substages", is characterized by
orthogenesis.
Sec. 4: A review of Kohlberg's grounds for justifying
orthogenesis as a standard of increasing "moral adequacy".

2. Kohlberg's Domain of Developmental Study
Although Kohlberg's packages his theory as one of "moral
development", he takes pains within his most recent formulation
of it (CFT, p.224) to characterize it as, more precisely, a theory
of the development of JUSTICE REASONING. In his earlier work,
Kohlberg argues for a strict definition of the word "moral" as
referring to justice reasoning only. He softens this position in his
later work, saying that justice reasoning is the "central moral
function" (p.216, Cf. the "core of the moral domain", p.236), but
also that "the theory of justice reasoning (is) necessary but not
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sufficient for defining the full domain of what is meant by moral
development" (DRC, p.338).
Kohlberg aims to differentiate the cognitive, rational, and
structural dimensions of morality from overt behavior, emotions,
and social institutions (FITO, p.214). He assigns a nearly
deterministic role to reasoning as 1) what it is that primarily
develops in moral development, and 2) what it is that has
greatest influence over thought and action in the resolution of
human conflict. His theory may be seen as a reaction against
emotivist, associationist, or other theories which attempt to
minimize the role of reason as the source of moral differences or
change, and which emphasize instead the role of unconscious
forces, sentiments, societal conditioning, etc. Morality, in these
theories, can be reduced to non-cognitive influences, even in the
case of "humanistic" theories which emphasize a "natural" or
"inner" moral knowledge (CFT, pp. 289-293; MSM, pp. 196-198).
Kohlberg's definition of what constitutes justice reasoning is
virtually identical with Piaget's. The development of justice
reasoning is the parallel, in the subject-subject domain, to
general cognitive development in the subject-object domain.
Justice reasoning has two components. 1) a SOCIAL COGNITION
component which is that of ROLE-TAKING. Role-taking is no
different from Piaget's de-centering or Werner's perspectivism
when applied to the social domain; 2) the specifically mQ.Ciil
aspect of social cognition, that of the attempt to resolve or

114

equilibrate CONFLICT between individuals and within society as a
whole (JR, p. 191, 194).
Kohlberg conceives of human conflict as having to do with
mutual expectations expressed in terms of RIGHTS and DUTIES,
i.e., what individuals have a right to expect as their due from
others, and what is an obligation of the individual toward others.
Development of justice reasoning, therefore, includes development
of one s conception of human rights and obligations as well as
one's role-taking ability. Such development leads to JUDGEMENTS
indicating resolutions of human conflict which are more
"equilibrated" (JR, p. 194; FITO, pp. 190, 193). For Kohlberg,
"the core of justice is the distribution of rights and duties
igRUlated^bv concepts of eoualitv and reciprocity. Justice
recognized as a 'balance' or equilibrium corresponds to the
structural moving equilibrium described by Piaget on logic.
Justice is the normative logic, the equilibrium, of social
actions and relations" (MSM, p.184, emphasis in original).
Kohlberg recognizes that there are other moral
"orientations" besides justice, including ones relating to normative
social rules, utilitarian welfare considerations of "the greatest
good" or "harm to others", and conceptions of the "ideal self"
(ibid.). He argues, however, that all these presuppose an implicit
notion of "fairness" or justice, and that all make an implicit
appeal to considerations of equality and reciprocity in human
relations when confronted with the need to resolve moral conflict
dilemmas (CFT, pp.310-313). He argues that only the justice
orientation renders these "distinctively and fundamentally moral"
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concerns explicit: "One can act morally and question all rules, one
may act morally and question the greater good, but one cannot
act morally and question the need for justice" (MSM, p.184). [5]
Kohlberg s appeal to justice reasoning as the "central
minimal core of morality is itself an attempt to resolve conflicts
among an assumed plurality of moral views by locating what he
sees as a factor implicit within and essential to all of them (CFT,
pp.306-307). He recognizes that there are other dimensions to the
moral realm, such as that of "charity, love, caring, brotherhood,
or community", or "benevolence" (all of which Kohlberg groups
under the general notion of AGAPE, or "responsible love"; CFT,
p.227). But he argues that there are not "two separate general
moralities", but rather that "special obligations of care
presuppose, but go beyond, the general duties of justice, which
are necessary but not sufficient for them" (p.229).
Kohlberg concedes that he focuses upon justice because it is
the aspect of the moral domain most theoretically compatible
with and empirically measurable within a cognitivedevelopmental theory of "hard structural stages" (CFT, p.238). He
allows for "the possibility of extending the idea of stages of moral
judgement to other and possibly broader conceptions of the moral
domain" through the use of "soft stage" theories (such as Erikson’s
theory of life stages or Loevinger's theory of ego-development).
Such theories capture "choices which go beyond duty and justice.
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that is, dilemmas which elicit supererogatory choice", as well as
changes in purpose or life-orientation (CFT pp. 306-307).

3.,

Orthogenesis in Kohlhgrg's

Justice

Reasoning

Stages

At the heart of Kohlberg’s theory is his description of six
invariantly sequenced and universal stages of justice reasoning.
The account of these stages offered here will consist only of the
bare bones necessary to illustrate the principal ways in which
they constitute an orthogenetic trajectory. A full account of the
stages can be found in a wide variety of Kohlberg's writings
(FITO, JR, 1981 appendix, 1984 appendix A).
Kohlberg divides his six stages into three categories of preconventional (Stages 1 and 2), conventional (Stages 3 and 4), and
post-conventional (Stages 5 and 6). At the pre-conventional
stage, reasoning about deontological (rights and obligationsoriented) problems exhibits an egocentrism which cannot
articulate social or cultural expectations as such. At Stage 1, the
individual does not even conceive of himself as having rights or
duties independently of the dictates of perceived authority or fear
of punishment. At Stage 2, the individual is able to see rights and
duties as a matter of egoistic instrumental exchange or reward.
At the conventional stages, the constituted norms of society
or religion become the overriding arbiters of moral judgement. At
Stage 3, the individual is able to put himself in the place of a
concrete other. The Golden Rule becomes meaningful in concrete
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situations, as do intentions. What is moral is defined as what is
nice , and as what is socially appropriate for people filling set
social roles (parent, friend, policeman, etc.). At Stage 4, the
formal concept of society or cosmic order emerges, and the
individual defines rights and duties in terms of what will
maintain the constituted rules of the social or religious order.
At the post-conventional stages, the understanding emerges
that the social order itself derives its moral legitimacy from
considerations which transcend or precede the mere fact of its
authority. Therefore, socially-constituted conventions can be
morally called into question. At Stage 5, individuals see society as
based on the upholding of general and individual rights. This
allows for the possibility of making changes in social rules so as to
better fulfill this function. Rational law, based on agreement
between people, becomes the arbiter of rights and duties. At
Stage 6, universal ethical principles, as differentiated from
particular laws or social arrangements, are the autonomous
arbiters of rights and duties. Such principles form a "'secondorder' use of the Golden Rule", (JR, pp.203-204, Cf. CFT, p.315) by
formally and universally applying reciprocal role-taking and
equity between all individuals as determining just relations at
both the interpersonal and societal levels.
The orthogenetic trajectory from Stage 1 to Stage 6 is
manifested in a variety of interdependent ways. First, there is an
increasing integration of moral judgement in the personal realm
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with moral judgement in the social or abstract realm. At Stages
judgement at the latter level is simply not possible. A Stage
4 individual might hold very harsh authoritarian views on
abstract social matters, or about other social groups, yet apply
the Golden Rule to his personal relations. Only at Stage 6 is there
complete success at applying a degree of reversibility in
judgement to social issues parallel to that applied in the context
of concrete relationships. [6]
Second, there is increasing distinguishing (differentiation) of
moral considerations from nonmoral or factual ones: at Stage 2,
physical size or the "importance" or power of a person is seen as
morally irrelevant; at Stage 3, hedonistic reward value and
calculated "prudence"; at Stage 4, concrete conformity and the
particular roles individuals play in society; at Stage 5, the need
to maintain the particular constituted forms of society, and at
Stage 6, all "legal" considerations and social-utility considerations.
Third, this increase in moral differentiation is
complemented by an increase in the immunity-integrity
(integration) of moral judgements in the face of environmental
changes or "unbindings". Stage 1 reasons to refrain from doing
something wrong would unbind if there were no anticipated
punishment for doing it. Stage 2 reasons would hold in the
absence of fear of punishment, but would unbind if there were no
anticipation of advantage or exchange for not doing it. Stage 3
would hold in the face of considerations of prudence or gain, but
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would unbind if other "nice" people did it. Stage 4 would hold
despite the behavior of concrete others, but would unbind if the
social order didn t care about it, or approved of it. Stage 5 would
exert a partial check upon morally wrong behavior approved or
ignored by society by leading to efforts to revise the social rules.
In the absence of a clear social contract, however, the obligation
to act rightly would be perceived as weak or absent. Also,
considerations of overall social utility would weaken the Stage 5
resolve to act justly (thus capital punishment would be
permissible if it really deterred crime). Stage 6 would hold despite
contrary or absent social rules, and despite such social utility
considerations. It would unbind only when universal ethical
principles could not resolve the issue at hand.
Fourth, there is increasing differentiation and co-ordination
of considerations of intentions and consequences in judging what
is right. Here Kohlberg articulates more fully the general pattern
set forth by Piaget and Werner. At Stage 1, there is an exclusive
"focus upon irrelevant physical form of the act (e.g., size of the
lie), or of the consequences of the act (e.g., amount of physical
damage) " (SS, p.49) . At Stage 2, intention is still ignored, but
consequences are seen in terms of their "human need-value"
(ibid.), i.e., how they serve instrumental needs or prevent pain.
At Stage 3, intentions are distinguished from consequences, and
something becomes right if a "nice" person does it, and the person
"means well", i.e., was not acting out of selfish or "mean"
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motives. At Stage 4, the need for following impartial rules is
paramount, and actions are judged bad if a rule is broken.
Meaning well is still important, but not enough to excuse
breaking a rule seen as necessary for the preservation of order.
The general consequences "if everybody did it" becomes a
meaningful consideration. At Stage 5, intention and consequence
are more fully co-ordinated; someone can be held "legally" to
blame for having broken a necessary rule, yet "morally" less to
blame if the intention was a good one. Although an individual's
intent may mitigate blame in a specific circumstance, it does not
make something that is against the rules "right". At Stage 6, the
intention to follow a universalizable moral principle is
distinguished from simply having one's heart in the right place. It
is right to obey the "self-chosen" moral principle even if it means
breaking the rule if you must. There is a recognition that "moral
principles don't allow exceptions any more than do legal rules"
(p.51).
Fifth, there is increasing differentiation and autonomy of
the "conscience" as a motivating factor in one's own moral
action. At Stage 1, "conscience" is an irrational fear of
punishment. At Stage 2, a more objective and pragmatic view of
both reward and punishment develops. At Stage 3, concrete
reward and punishment are subordinated to a concern about the
approval or disapproval of concrete others. At Stage 4, the
informal and concrete disapproval of others is subordinated to
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formal concepts of "honor" and "duty", and to "guilt over
concrete harm to others" (p.52). At Stage 5, concern over
"institutionalized blame" is subordinated to concern for
maintaining the rational respect of a community of equals and
one s own self-image as a rational person. At Stage 6, concern for
community respect and respect for oneself as "rational" is
subordinated to the concern for maintaining one's own selfrespect as an upholder of moral principles. [7]
Sixth, there is increasing de-centering with respect to one's
capacity for role-taking, with a complementary increase in the
ability to co-ordinate the various roles of others within a scheme
of REVERSIBILITY. Reversibility is the power of a moral
judgement to remain constant after taking the roles of all the
actors involved. Therefore, full reversibility results in a
judgement all parties could agree to as "fair". By representing an
autonomous de-centering from a particular view, it results in a
more stable and flexible equilibrium. Principles which imply a
reversible solution to a problem are those of "distributive equality
proportionate to circumstance and need" (equity) and "merit or
desert, reward in return for virtue, effort, or talent"
(reciprocity) (JR, p.201). By seeing reversibility as an
"equilibration in valuing" (ibid.), Piaget and Kohlberg use it as an
explanatory model for why people do tend to develop morally, it
is an aspect of the immanent need for equilibrium.
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Stages 1-6 chart a course of increasing reversibility. At
Stage 1, there is no reversibility; morality is a one-way affair
between power and obedience. At Stage 2, reversibility takes the
highly unequilibrated form of favor for favor, blow for blow,
leading potentially to "an endless cycle of retaliation" (CFT, p.316)
without resolution. At Stage 3, there is reversibility in terms of
the Golden Rule in interpersonal relationships. However, there is
no conception of institutionalized rights independent of the
motives or character of the concrete people involved. At Stage 4,
reversibility extends to the notion of impartial societal norms.
Even a mean person has the right not to be robbed, even by a
well-meaning person, and is entitled to legal redress if he is. At
Stage 5, rules themselves are hierarchically ordered according to
an implicit principle of total reversibility. The duty to protect life
becomes clearly more important than the duty to protect
property, since even the person whose property was at stake
would presumably agree with such a hierarchy if it were his life
that was at stake. At Stage 6, universal principles become "ih£
self-conscious operation of moral musical chairs in making just
choices" (CFT, pp. 315-317, emphasis in original).
Seventh, with each stage there is an increasing opening of
the moral universe to include a wider application of rights to a
wider family of individuals. At Stage 1, only those with power
have rights, at Stage 2, those who can give something in
exchange, at Stage 3, concrete well-meaning others, at Stage 4,
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those within the bounds of the constituted social order, at Stages
5 and 6, all individuals, with Stage 6 rights being more
thoroughly universal and unconditional. Also, a key feature of
development (CFT, p.251) is the opening of "social perspective":
undifferentiated and egocentric at Stage 1, including two
mutually aware actors at Stage 2, including a third-person
perspective at Stage 3, including a member-of-society perspective
at Stage 4, and finally, a "prior-to-society" perspective at Stages
5 and 6.
Eighth, there is an increasing integration of lower-stage
problems within higher stages, and the incorporation with
transformation of their salient elements. Stage 6 principles do not
ignore the Stage 4 problem of maintaining society. This problem is
co-ordinated more fully with the additional problem of
maintaining all societies in an equitable relation to one another.
Resorting to a Stage 1 "might-makes-right" ethic in dealing with
foreign societies, justifiable within a Stage 4 morality of
maintaining one's own order, would not be justifiable at Stage 6,
since it does not lead to an equilibrated solution when applied
universally. Similarly, Stages 3 and 4 do not ignore the Stage 1
and 2 problems of preserving oneself from harm or improving
one's well-being. They integrate this problem within a more
reversible scheme of taking the needs of others into account as
well.
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Ninth, there is a movement of justice considerations from
an implicit (syncretically diffused) form toward an increasingly
explicit (discretely articulated) form. At Stage 4, for example, the
idea that rules must be upheld because of the consequences "if
everyone did it implig? the fundamental consideration of equity
in the form of everyone being treated equally. Since, however,
this fundamentally moral consideration is fused with a need to
uphold authority, even laws that treat some people unfairly are
to be upheld. At Stage 5, the implicit moral reason for
maintaining the society, to ensure equal treatment of all,
becomes explicit, and there is a critique of social rules that
impede this aim (CFT, pp.310-313).
Tenth, there is a thorough integration of rights with duties
at the highest stage. At Stage 4, rights and duties are not strictly
correlative, largely because they are mediated by the focus upon
the social order. Because someone has a societal right to property
does not mean that an individual has a direct duty to protect
that right. Instead, one has a duty to maintain the society which
protects that right (even if it doesn't in the case of certain
individuals; the current case of forced Navajo resettlement being
one example). At Stage 5, "for every right, society has some duty
to protect that right. Duties to other individuals, however, are
not clearly specified in the absence of either individual contract
or social contract" (JR, p.217). Therefore, someone may have the
right to, or be acting in accordance with what is right,

if they
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steal in order to save a life. But this does not mean the person is
obligated to steal in order to save a life, especially if the person to
be saved is a stranger. At Stage 6, however, "obligations are
correlative to any right or just claim by an individual that gives
rise to a corresponding duty for another individual" (p. 216)

One

person's right is another person's duty to protect that right.
In this regard, Kohlberg addresses the problem posed by
Stage 6 of how to choose between conflicting duties, since the
rational moral agent" cannot be an "omnipotent saint",
protecting everyone's violated rights everywhere at once (p. 219).
He uses this dilemma to illustrate the differentiation between
rules which dictate " 'Don't do that' or 'Do that"', and moral
principles which are used as "guides" for either direct action, or
for generating universally justifiable rules (pp.220-221). At higher
stages, there is also increasing differentiation of such principles
from concrete moral rules.
Finally, as in Piaget's work (See Sec.B 2cvi above), there is
an increasing determination of the content of a moral decision by
the structure of reasoning employed. Kohlberg is careful to
distinguish the FORM of moral judgement, as expressed by his
stages, from the CONTENT of the judgement, as expressed by a
particular moral choice. In a dilemma posing a choice between
the right to life and the right to property, for example,
individuals give responses on both sides of the issue at every
stage. What determines their stage is the kind of reasoning they
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use to justify their choice. At Stages 5 and 6, moral reasoning
articulates a hierarchy of values based on the contribution of
those values to completely reversible solutions to moral problems.
Therefore, in dilemmas pitting life against property, stage 5
individuals are more likely to side with the right to life. In
dilemmas pitting the certainty or near-certainty of the loss of
one individual s life against the mere possibility or higher
probability of loss of life for a larger number of people, Stage 6
individuals are theoretically more likely than Stage 5 individuals
to agree to protect the single but more endangered person. Stage
6 reasoners would treat each person's claim to life equally, by,
for example, putting everyone in the place of the most
endangered person. They would then see that giving everyone a
50% chance to live would be fairer than giving a 100% chance to
most people and no chance to one person. It is in this sense that
Kohlberg claims Stage 6 to be one at which "all reasonable people
could agree" (JR, p.214).
The issue of differentiating form from content brings us to
the issue of substages, a later addition to Kohlberg's theory (CFT,
pp.250-257; 1984 appendix C). The substage theory was developed
by Kohlberg to account for the widely differing "normative
content" of subjects who were at the same formal justice
reasoning stage in terms of their "social perspective" and
structuration of duties and rights according to the "three justice
operations: equality, equity, and reciprocity" (CFT, P-251).
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Initially, Kohlberg followed Piaget in expecting that with
stage development, individuals would become more autonomously
oriented in their reasoning content as well in the formal features
of their thinking. He found, however, that there were individuals
at LOWER stages who made choices and gave reasons for them
which were intuitively" MORE developed than those of subjects at
HIGHER stages!
The content of the answers of these lower-stage subjects
was, from a Stage 6 viewpoint, morally more "correct". For
example, they would condone stealing in order to save a life, or
keeping one’s word in the face of a parental order to break it.
These subjects thus employed an intuitive hierarchization of
values similar to that held by higher-stage subjects. Their
judgements appealed to respect for the intrinsic worth of
persons. They exhibited a higher degree of prescriptivity, i.e., an
adherence to the "right" choice despite inclinations or pragmatic
considerations. They were more universal, extending the right
action to include all people, as well as more universalizable (all
people could, without contradiction, act that way). Further,
these lower-stage judgements displayed a higher degree of
autonomy (reliance on one's own reason rather than on
authority), as well as reference to relations of mutual respect
between autonomous individuals (as opposed to relations of
constraint or estrangement). They were more reversible and decentered, considering others viewpoints. Finally, they were also
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more constructive, showing an awareness that rules, and social
institutions, are autonomously invented for reasons "derived from
communication and co-operation between and among persons"
(pp. 253-256). Kohlberg refers to these distinctions as lying
"midway between form and content"; for clarity's sake, I shall
refer to them as "content" here.
The substage reflecting more heteronomous content is
labeled "A"; the more autonomous one, "B". Enough of a gap
exists between the two modes of response to lead Kohlberg to
characterize them as distinct "types" (1984, appendix C). But it is
not clear whether Kohlberg considers movement from A to B as a
continuum, or a discontinuous shift from one substage to the
other, more similar to between-stage movement.
As indicated above, form determines content to a greater
extent at the highest stages. Therefore 75% of subjects at Stage 5
give type B responses, with the percentage being theoretically
higher at Stage 6, the stage at which intuition and self-conscious
reasoning are held to converge. But in introducing the notion of
substages (or "moral types", see appendix C, p.663), Kohlberg adds
a non-structural dimension to his otherwise "hard structural"
theory. It is allowed that superior moral content can be
consistently determined by something other than a "hard"
cognitive structure.
Kohlberg's substages introduce a variety of developmental
pathways into an otherwise unilinear theory. Although Kohlberg
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contends that individuals do not regress from substage B to
substage A within the same stage, they can and do move from,
for example, 3B to 4A. At first, this prompted Kohlberg (1984,
appendix C, p.663) to hypothesize that movement from A to B
within each stage represented a consolidation of stage gains. The
facts did not bear this out, however. While some individuals did
move from 2A to 2B to 3A and so on, some individuals
maintained a type A orientation throughout their stage
progression, while others maintained a type B orientation
throughout (ibid., also CFT, p.255). Movement from A to B would
thus appear to be its own developmental pathway.
Not only is there a pathway of "intuitive" (CFT, pp.260-261)
development, but what makes movement from substage A to B
"developmental" is change according to orthogenetic criteria of
increasing autonomy, de-centering, universality, prescriptivity,
etc. Kohlberg thus in effect concedes that the orthogenetic criteria
for defining development can be used without tying them to a
formal structural framework. [8]

4. Kohlberg’s Grounds for Justifying. Orthogenesis as a Standard of
Moral ’’Adequacy"
To be precise, Kohlberg does not set out to directly justify,
orthogenesis as a "formal internal standard of adequacy" in
psychological development. What Kohlberg justifies is his claim
that judgements generated at increasingly integrated and
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differentiated stages represent a hierarchy of "moral adequacy"
(FITO, p. 213).
These judgements are phenomenal reflections of
psychological structures which are increasingly equilibrated.
Integration and differentiation are, for Kohlberg, formal criteria
which describe the level of equilibration achieved at this internal,
psychological level. Thus, by justifying the judgements at each
stage as more adequate, he is indirectly justifying increasing
integration and differentiation as valuable also.
There are two approaches that Kohlberg uses to justify
moral stages as increasingly valuable. The one that he appeals to
most explicitly is FORMALIST. Within this approach, "the formal
standard of cognitive-developmental psychological theory [i.e ,
orthogenesis] is not itself ultimate, but must be elaborated as a
set of ethical and epistemological principles" (DAE, p 158).
Orthogenesis is not such a principle, but rests upon other
principles which are "prior" to it. These principles are those of the
"formalist" school of philosophy. Kohlberg explains his choice of
formalism as follows: "We are arguing that a criterion of
adequacy must take account of the fact that morality is a
unique, sui generis realm. If it is unique, its uniqueness must be
defined by general formal criteria, so our metaethical conception
is formalistic (FITO, p.215, emphasis in original). Among the
formal criteria Kohlberg appeals to are "impersonality, ideality,
universalizability, preemptiveness" (ibid ). Within this metaethic.
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it is these

formal criteria which make judgements moral" (ibid ,

emphasis added).
Kohlberg outlines a specific "parallel" between integration
and differentiation and two of these criteria: universality and
prescriptivity (pp. 216-217). The increasing psychological
integration

maps into

increasing formal universality, while

differentiation maps into prescriptivity. Each moral stage is
justified as more moral because its judgements are more:
a. UNIVERSAL - they are applied equally to a more
inclusive class of beings, and can, by their very nature, be so
applied self-consistently (without self-contradiction; FITO, pp.184185)
b. UNIVERSALIZABLE - all actors could act according to
such a judgement without self-contradiction (in keeping with
Kant’s "categorical imperative").
c. PRESCRIPTIVE - moral reasons for acting are
differentiated from nonmoral ones, one ought to (is prescribed to)
act irrespective of considerations (fear of punishment, hope of
gain, affection, moral considerations of a lower order,
conformity, etc.) held increasingly to be irrelevant.
Increasing integration and differentiation, which creates a
more psychologically equilibrated stage, can be seen as explaining
why Judgements at that stage are more morally equilibrated,
i.e., conforming more closely to the formal ideal of perfect
universality, universalizability, and prescriptivity. But their
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Justification as more moral appeals to the formal ideal, and not
to the explanation. In keeping with this view, Kohlberg justifies
increasing moral adequacy teleologically

"a higher stage is a

better stage because its judgements more closely approximate
Stage 6 judgements , which serve as the ideal formal standard
(JR, p. 192).
Now, as Eddy (1986, p.75) has indicated, Kohlberg hints
that there is another form of justification undergirding these very
formal principles. As Eddy

implies, Kohlberg does not undertake

to integrate this other justificatory route with his formalism. This
other route 1 call GENETIC-FUNCTIONAL since it considers the
origin and purpose of moral thought as relevant to its justification
(Cf. “functional-genetic", DAE, p.128).
According to this strand of justification, moral adequacy
depends upon the increasing ability of psychological structures,
and the overt judgements rendered by them, to resolve problems
or conflicts bv producing agreement among people:
"[Martin Luther] King's morality was a more integrated and
differentiated moral system than that of most people. It
was more adequate because if all people adopted King's
morality, it would resolve for everyone moral problems and
conflicts unresolved by lower-stage moralities (DAE, p. 158);
"each higher stage. . addressed problems unrecognized by,
or unresolved by, lower stages" (FITO, p.214); "Stage 6
principles. . .structure an imaginative process in the
individual's mind which attempts to produce an ideal moral
dialogue for resolving conflicts. The adequacy of the conflict
resolution is determined by the achievement of social
consensus under dialogic conditions" (CFT, p.303).
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Within this line of justification, universality,
universalizability, and prescriptivity derive their moral authority
from their reflection of the more fundamental criterion of

Lgyersifrllity•

Our philosophic theory stresses the criterion of

reversibility as the ultimate criterion of justice" (CFT, pp.308310). Kohlberg appeals to reversibility when he "elaborates the
way in which I believe the substance of Stage 6 principles of
judgement to be better than the substantive principles of lower
stages, not just the sense in which they are formally 'more
moral'" (JR, p.193, emphasis added).
Reversibility, for Kohlberg, seems to hold a dual status. It is
on the one hand a formal criterion for assessing moral
judgements independently of any psychological statements, like
universality and prescriptivity. On the other hand, it directly
reflects the orthogenetic psychological process of autonomous de¬
centering. Reversibility is the act of each person freely placing
himself in the other person's shoes and co-ordinating the other's
viewpoint with his own to arrive at a "reversible" solution. Moral
principles, therefore, are not only better because they
approximate a formal ideal, but because this formal ideal is itself
a "map" of "substantive" orthogenesis qua reversibility.
If all people reasoned at Stage 6, the stage of self-conscious
and systematic reversibility, then, given "common agreement on
facts and probabilities", they would "eventually agree on the
'right' solution in concrete situations" (JR, p.193). Kohlberg is not
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resting this claim upon the tautology that if everyone held the
same views, they would all agree. As Piaget points out, generality
of agreement is not identical to morality; Huxley's Brave New
World is based on

universal brainwashing for universal

agreement. Stage 6 is a "structure or method" (ibid.), not a
conclusion. It is held to be parallel to the "scientific method" for
seeking truth in the nonmoral scientific realm (CFT, p.272). [9]
Kohlberg's hypothesis is that if the method of Stage 6 were
universally employed, agreement on the resolution of specific
conflicts would be more likely. Kohlberg is not always careful to
differentiate between the value of sheer agreement, as the
resolution of substantive conflict, and the ultimate value of the
method itself as reflecting and causing a psychologically-specific
kind of agreement, namely autonomously de-centered agreement.
I think it can be assumed, based on Kohlberg's liberalism, that
this is a distinction implied in all his work. [10]
In one sense, what Kohlberg seems to be saying about
agreement is this: the more people are psychologically
autonomously de-centered, the more they are hypothetically
capable and desirous of co-ordinating each other's views to arrive
at a mutually agreeable solution. However, his important addition
to this somewhat obvious point is that Stage 6, as a formal
operational representation of this process, is capable of imagining
an "ideal moral dialogue" among such individuals. It is able to use
such an abstract "dialogue" to arrive at equilibrated (reversible)
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solutions to both real and hypothetical dilemmas of a complexity
extending all the way to the just arrangement of entire societies,
following Rawls (JR, pp. 193-201).
Kohlberg thus supplements his explicit formalist metaet.hic
with a genetic-functional metaethic implicit in his views on
reversibility and conflict resolution (agreement). Within the latter
scheme, formal ethical criteria are not themselves ultimate, but
derive their authority from their "mapping" of psychological
orthogenesis qua reversibility. The value of reversibility is in turn
derived from the way in which it resolves conflict, the search for
such resolution being seen as the origin and function of the justice
domain.
This, however leaves us with a lack of integration between
these two justificatory schemes which Kohlberg never resolves. Do
universality and prescriptivity derive their justifying power from
their internal logical purity and consistency, following a Kantian
formalist view? Or do they derive their justifying power from
their description of judgements which in turn reflect a more
integrated and differentiated psychology and more equilibrated
social consequences, following a Deweyan genetic-functional view7
Kohlberg never consummates a "marriage" of these two
approaches.
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D; Tfig QrthQftgnetlC Principle in John Dewey s
Conception of

1. Introduction
Dewey does not attempt to define all manifestations of
growth[ll] within a single unifying principle. He does, however,
provide bountiful examples of what he means by growth. By
presenting a range of these examples found throughout a variety
of Dewey's works, I intend to show that they conform to, and
enrich, the notion of orthogenesis presented so far.
Like Kohlberg, Dewey sees all determinations of what
constitutes "growth" as involving an ethical evaluation

For

Dewey, however, growth in the way one makes such ethical
evaluations, i.e., "moral development", is not a fixed realm to be
held separate from other aspects of growth. Nor is there is a fixed
set of issues which are held to be uniquely "moral" ones. Rather,
any growth, even growth in, say, mathematical ability, can be
seen as "moral" growth when looked at from the point of view of
evaluating its effect upon both the subject's character, and the
objective world. In making these evaluative judgements, a
scientific, i.e., objective and thorough, assessment of inner and
outer consequences cannot be completely separated from the
"moral" aspect of the judgement, since "the system of science., is
absolutely dependent for logical worth upon a moral interest: the
sincere aim to judge truly" (1946, p.227).
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Comparison with Kohlberg's approach may make Dewey's
approach clearer. Kohlberg makes a fixed distinction between
attaining a certain stage of "cognitive" development as opposed to
attaining a comparable stage of "moral” development. Kohlberg
defines development as "moral" ONLY when it involves
judgements resolving SOCIAL conflict.

Further, increasing

principled reversibility of justice reasoning is his SOLE measure of
this

moral development". For Dewey, the "moral" point of view

enters in as soon as we consider anv kind of "better or worse"
choice between ends which is focused upon the CHARACTER or
ongoing disposition of the agent:
"What sort of agent, of a person, shall he be? This is the
question finally at stake in any genuinely moral situation:
What shall the agent be? What sort of a character shall he
assume? On its face, the question is what shall he do, shall
he act for this or that end. But the incompatibility of the
ends forces the issue back into the question of the kinds of
selfhood, of agency, involved in the respective ends. The
distinctively moral situation is then one in which elements
of value and control are bound up with the processes of
deliberation and desire, and are bound up in a peculiar
way: viz., they decide what kind of a character shall
control further desires and deliberations." (1908, p.210)
"Character" for Dewey includes affective considerations as
well as the rational-logical ones with which Kohlberg is
exclusively concerned. The "psychological" reference to effect upon
character does not take place in isolation, but is complemented
by a "sociological" reference to consequences in the environment.
These two points of reference are held in "reciprocity" within a
moral judgement (1946, pp. 247-248).
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For Dewey, all action-situations are potentially moral ones
when looked at from a standpoint of "regulated activity

(1946,

p.248), in which case the act "has reference to conscious control
of the nature of the change (i.e., deliberate change), and thereby
gets ethical significance" (p.249). Thus, ail manifestations of
growth are potentially moral when consciously assessed from this
standpoint.
Kohlberg agrees with Dewey that "moral" growth includes
"cognitive" growth, but thinks that the reverse isn't so. For
Dewey, cognitive growth, even growth in a child's ability to
perform mathematical operations, has ethical import. All we are
doing when we assess such growth "cognitively" as opposed to
"morally" is temporarily taking the ethical issues as "presupposed"
or constant. We are "holding off" questions of the child's (or
teacher's) values in pursuit of this ability, or of the psychological
and social consequences to result from it. As soon as these
questions are brought into consciousness, we are dealing with this
"cognitive" ability in an ethical light (pp.230-231).
Dewey's broader definition of the moral allows us to see
moral implications in situations that fall outside those included in
Kohlberg's definition. For example, a scientist conducting an
experiment may not be directly involved in any justice conflict,
but as soon as attention is directed to his choice of methods as
serving a particular kind of truth-seeking character, or a
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particular set of welfare producing consequences, we are looking
at the situation from a moral point of view.
If all manifestations of growth can be looked at through an
ethical lens, so to speak, the value of ethical principles
themselves are to be judged by their contribution to growth.
What this means is that when we are looking at a particular
aspect of growth ethically, what we are really doing is looking at
its larger consequences for growth in general. For Dewey, "growth
itself is the only moral *end,M (1950, p.141).
Sensitivity to CONTEXT in determining what constitutes
growth is more central in Dewey’s work than it is within the
organismic paradigm. Context, for Dewey, includes the widest
possible range of cultural and sociohistorical factors that might
enter into a determination of what is problematic in a situation.
Dewey's idea of growth, as the solution to a defined problem,
might be more likely to include changes in the society as well as
in the individual.
According to Dewey, "examination discloses three deepening
levels or three expanding spheres of context” (in Bernstein, 1960,
p. 108), which need to be considered in assessing growth. The first
is the individual's unique situation. The second is the individual's
culture, including all historical forces shaping the sociocultural
situation. The third is the "general understanding of the workings
of human nature" (p.109). This involves "the make-up of
experience itself" (ibid.). In order to make the most general
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statements about growth, one must base them upon the actual
attributes of experience at the most general level. [12] In the
following section I shall summarize Dewey’s analysis of this most
"pervasive and inclusive context of experience” (p.110).

2,-Attrifrutes of the Experiential context
a. Overview
An analysis of several of Dewey's writings reveals four
interrelated yet distinguishable characteristics which are truly
universal in the strict sense of being inevitable aspects of what it
is to be human. They are "natural" in the sense that they are
not dependent upon certain kinds of human experience or
intervention, but rather set the inescapable context, or
"groundrules", of all experience. One might say that they
constitute our experiential "biology" - our "human nature".
These four attributes do not of themselves tend towards
growth without some level of individual and social regulation.
This regulation may, under some sociohistorical or individual
conditions, become so much of a "habit" that it appears to have a
claim on being "natural". This, however, is an illusion of sorts
caused by our suppression of a context that we take for granted
in the ordinary course of affairs.
Dewey sometimes makes statements which indicate a belief
that this experiential context is "violated" (1938a, p.42) by
changes or attitudes which are not growthful. But such
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statements are rhetorical shortcuts. Their point is that pursuing
growth without taKlhft into account these fundamental principles
of experience is doomed to failure because it "violates” the
principles in the same way that an airplane that crashes does so
because its design “violates" the principles of aerodynamics.
What is inherent In nature is the experiential context
within which growth must be defined if it is to fulfill its
regulative function as a value. Growth is not a mere translation
or extrapolation of this context. It is rather an adaptive,
regulative response of the organism to what is "problematic" or
obstacle-producing about it (Gouinlock, p.xxx). Consciousness and
valuation arise out of this response; in a sense, they ARE the
response. While all responses, all acts of consciousness or
valuation, are inevitably shaped by the problems inherent in
experience, they are not all equally or inevitably growthful.
b. The Four Attributes

i. Continuity
Continuity is simply the principle that "every experience
both takes up something from those which have gone before and
modifies in some way the quality of those which come after
(1938a, p.35). Continuity conditions our definition of growth by
forcing us to consider the effect of an experience in the present
upon those to come. The dimension of time implicit in continuity
sets, in effect, a problem which can only be resolved by an
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appeal to consistency. Something cannot be considered an
adequate or consistent response if, by "resolving" a problem in
the current moment, it sets up an even worse problem for the
future. Each "present" is, in addition to being just itself, the
future" of some past moment, and the "past" of some future
moment. Since all time, in this sense, is collapsed into each
present moment, the only adequate, or "growthful" experiences
are those which can command consistency without selfcontradiction over time:
"That a man may grow in efficiency as a burglar, as a
gangster, or as a corrupt politician, cannot be doubted. But
from the standpoint of growth as education and education
as growth the question is whether growth in this direction
promotes or retards growth in general. Does this form of
growth create conditions for further growth, or does it set
up conditions that shut off the person who has grown in
this direction from the occasions, stimuli, and opportunities
for continuing growth in new directions?" (p.36)[13]
In addition to consistency in a given direction over time,
continuity also appeals to consistency across various dimensions of
growth, since change in one direction has an influence upon
change in other directions. For example, for a burglar to advance
in burglary, he must also advance in his disregard for others'
rights, which in turn narrows and renders antagonistic his
interactions with others, etc. Thus, "only when development in a
particular line conduces to continuing growth does it answer to
the criterion of education as growing. For the conception is one
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that must find universal and not specialized limited application"
(ibid., emphasis in original). [14]
Dewey is quite clear that continuity, by itself, is not a force
for growth. What matters is how we take continuity into account
in determining our values and actions. This is what Dewey means
by using it

as a criterion by which to discriminate between

experiences which are educative and those which are miseducative" (p.37):
"... there is some kind of continuity in any case since every
experience affects for better or worse the attitudes which
help decide the quality of further experiences, by setting up
certain preference and aversion, and making it easier or
harder to act for this or that end";... "while the principle of
continuity applies in some way in every case, the quality of
the present experience Influences the wav in which the
principle applies"; ..."there is no paradox in the fact that
the principle of the continuity of experience may operate so
as to leave a person arrested on a low plane of
development, in a way which limits later capacity for
growth" (pp.37-38, emphasis in original).

ii. Interaction
The principle of interaction means that every experience is
influenced simultaneously by subjective and objective conditions.
These conditions determine the quality of experience in a
mutually influential way:
"Experience does not go on simply inside a person. It does go
on there, for it influences the formation of attitudes of
desire and purpose. But this is not the whole of the story.
Every genuine experience has an active side which changes
in some degree the objective conditions under which
experiences are had. The difference between civilization and
savagery, to take an example on a large scale, is found in
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the degree in which previous experiences have changed the
objective conditions under which subsequent experiences
take place. . .we live from birth to death in a world of
persons and things which in large measure is what it is
because of what has been done and transmitted from
previous human activities. When this fact is ignored,
experience is treated as if it were something which goes on
exclusively inside an individual's body and mind" (p.39).
Just as the principle of continuity sets a problem which can
only be resolved by taking consistency of movement over time
into account, interaction sets a problem which requires us to take
the regulation of both subjective and objective conditions into
account. In Dewey's view, such a solution would have to avoid
the trap of SUBORDINATING one set of conditions to the other.
Spoiling a child by allowing him to do whatever he wants in spite
of the consequences to others would be an example of
subordinating objective conditions to the child's subjective ones.
Forcing a child to conform to a pre-determined and fixed set of
scholastic procedures and contents with no regard for his unique
interests and needs would be committing the opposite practice of
subordination. Like continuity, then, interaction operates in any
case, for better or worse, growth being "a particular kind of
interaction" , namely one which "assigns equal rights to both
factors in experience - objective and internal conditions" (p.42).
Dewey indicates that continuity and interaction “intercept and
unite" to form "the longitudinal and lateral aspects of experience"
(p-44).
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iii. Dependence
According to this principle, all individual experience is
conditioned from birth by the utter dependence of the individual
upon natural and social forces. Not only do language, thought,
and personality depend upon social influence, but physical
survival itself:
"In fact, the human young are so immature that if they
were left to themselves without the guidance and succor of
others, they could not acquire the rudimentary abilities
necessary for physical existence. The young of human
beings compare so poorly in original efficiency with the
young of many of the lower animals, that even the powers
needed for physical sustenation have to be acquired under
tuition. How much more, then, is this the case with respect
to all the technological, artistic, scientific, and moral
achievements of humanity!" (1916, p.4).
What human beings depend upon most fundamentally is
COMMUNICATION, and, as an outcome of communication, some
level of CONSENSUS (pp.4-5). At the most basic level, the infant
must be able to make its needs known, and evoke some kind of
co-operative response from another human being, or survival
itself is impossible.
The "helplessness" of the individual is not looked upon as
something merely negative, for it is precisely this need for others
that forces the child to exercise his power of communication, of
reaching out to others. Children are "gifted with an equipment of
the first order for social intercourse", and the use of this
equipment functions as a "compensating power" for the fact of
dependence (pp. 42-43).
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Dependence, then, as accompanied by the basic

power to

communicate, is an aspect of experience which sets up the
HQtgntial for growth, by setting up a problem for the individual
which can only be overcome by increasing independence:
...if helplessness were all there were in dependence, no
development could ever take place. A merely impotent
being has to be carried, forever, by others. The fact that
dependence is accompanied by growth in ability, not by an
ever increasing lapse into parasitism, suggests that it is
already something constructive. Being merely sheltered by
others would not promote growth. For it would only build a
wall around impotence" (p.43).
Here again, Dewey intimates that dependence is inherently
or immanently growthful, but at the same time, he also implies
that it is only potentially so by giving a concrete example of how
it might not tend in a growthful direction. If an individual does
respond to the fact of dependence by seeking to maintain or
increasing his dependence upon others, then this does not adapt
to the problem in a way that does away with the problem, but
in a way that simply "builds a wall" around it. Conversely,
Dewey warns that:
"there is always a danger that increased personal
Independence will decrease the social capacity of an
individual. In making him more self-reliant, it may make
him more self-sufficient; it may lead to aloofness and
indifference. It often makes an individual so insensitive in
his relations to others as to develop an illusion of being
really able to stand and act alone - an unnamed form of
insanity which is responsible for a large part of the
remediable suffering of the world" (p.44).
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Both increasing parasitism" and the increasing

"illusion" of

self-sufficiency" are regressive adaptations to the problem of
dependence; the former reinforces it, the latter denies it. The
growthful response to dependence is some form of increasing
INTERDEPENDENCE, wherein an individual increases both his
autonomy and his sensitivity, openness, and responsiveness to
others (ibid.).
Dependence and interaction seem nearly identical; both
point to the basic problem of subject and object in experience.
One subtle distinction to be made might be to say that the
principle of dependence explains, in a functional, causative
fashion, the "structure" of interaction, i.e., the need to weigh
and fuse both "internal" and "external" conditions in defining
growth.

iv. Plasticity
Plasticity is the "power to modify actions on the basis of the
results of prior experiences, the power to develop dispositions"
(p.44, emphasis in original). Just as dependence explains the
source and mechanism of interaction, plasticity explains the
source and mechanism of continuity (1938a, p.35). It relates to
what Piaget calls the "bursting of instinct" in human beings, the
fact that we are not programmed to follow a specialized pattern
of change, but rather have a vast capacity to modify ourselves in
the face of changing conditions. Plasticity involves the "power of
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acquiring variable and novel modes of control" (p.46). These
modes of control Dewey calls HABITS. Habits are not innate, nor
formed by the environment from without, but are rather formed
by the organism in interaction with the environment (like
Piagetian "schemes").
Plasticity means that habits of thought and action, even
ones which are heavily conditioned by long-enduring
sociohistorical context, are never completely fixed. There is
always some degree of "elasticity". On the other hand, a habit
represents an "active preference and choice for the conditions
involved in its exercise", so as to form an "intellectual disposition"
(p.48). The nature of plasticity as elastic habit creates the
possibility of growth by allowing the organism to not only learn
from the environment, but to acquire "the habit of learning".
Such learning is capable of undergoing further modification,
transformation, and even abandonment.
Like the other inherent aspects of experience, plasticity
frames a problem for growth to resolve, namely, the problem of
balancing the power to learn and the power to modify prior
learning. The conflict arises from the fact that the very habit¬
forming power that makes learning possible is the same power
which makes resistance to future learning possible. This forces
any definition of growth to take into account the Lind of habits
formed, and their influence upon later habit-formation and
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reconstruction. This is the sense in which the problem of
plasticity is the source of the problem of continuity.
Without the formation of regular habits, there can be no
economical and effective control of the environment", no "ability
to use natural conditions as means to ends" (p.46). But while
habits may provide "powers so well established that their
possessor always has them as resources when needed", they may
also "mean that something has a fixed hold upon us, instead of
our having a free hold upon things", they may lead to "ruts,
routine ways, with loss of freshness, openmindedness, and
originality" (p.48). Any growthful direction, then, must resolve
this conflict by allowing for the formation of habits, but also
providing for some kind of reconstructive check upon them. In
Dewey's view, reflective reason and affective impulses combine
forces to exert such a moderating influence upon habit.

3. Orthogenesis in Dewev’s Examples of Growth
a. Overview
Dewey is cautious about the possibility of organizing all
aspects of growth within one universal principle. He is concerned
that such a principle would become some sort of Kantian formal
imperative, disconnected from concrete experience. And yet, a
universal principle of growth, although not a Kantian one, is at
least partially articulated by Dewey, complete with warnings
against reliance upon such a principle:
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Progress means increase of present meaning, which
involves multiplication of sense distinctions as well as
harmony, unification. This statement may, perhaps, be
made generally, in application to the experience of
humanity. If history shows progress it can hardly be found
elsewhere than in this complication and extension of the
significance found within experience. It is clear that such
progress brings no surcease, no immunity from perplexity
and trouble. If we wished to transmute this generalization
into a categorical imperative we should say: ’So act as to
increase the meaning of present experience'. But even then
in order to get instruction about the concrete quality of
such increased meaning we should have to run away from
the law and study the needs and alternative possibilities
lying within a unique and localized situation. The
imperative, like everything absolute, is sterile. Till men give
up the search for a general formula of progress they will
not know where to look to find it” (1922, p.283).
The "multiplication of sense distinctions as well as harmony,
unification" to which Dewey refers is identical to the notion of
differentiation and complementary integration, i.e., the
orthogenetic principle. Dewey expresses this principle tentatively
because he does not wish to court the risk of limiting either its
potential multilinearity or its contextual sensitivity. Nor does he
wish to imply any ideal state which would close the door to
further growth. Nonetheless, his examples of growth consistently
demonstrate this principle at work.
b. Growth as Progressive Adaptation to Problems Within the
Universal Context of Experience
I will summarize the orthogenetic qualities of what Dewey
considers to be growth-responses to the universal experiential
conditions of continuity, interaction, dependence, and plasticity:
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i. In response to the fact of CONTINUITY (i.e., that each
experience reflects the past and affects the future), Dewey sees
growth as the increasing integrative co-ordination of diverse
experiences. Experiences are growthful to the extent that they
lead to continued and expanded growth. Taken in isolation, this is
essentially an appeal to integration qua universality and selfconsistency.
ii. In response to the fact of INTERACTION, Dewey sees
growth in the increasing equilibration of organism and
environment in a virtually Piagetian sense. This involves
increasing de-centering and opening of the individual towards an
increasingly differentiated (varied, extended, and articulated)
environment, coupled with the increasing autonomy and coordinative power of the individual with respect to the
environment.
iii. In response to the fact of DEPENDENCE (upon other
people and nature), Dewey sees growth as an increasing
interdependence wherein increasing autonomy is complemented
by increasing awareness of, and responsiveness to,

one's

connectedness to others and nature. [15]
iv. In response to the fact of PLASTICITY (i.e., that habits
possess both the power of self-modification and the power of
resistance to modification), Dewey sees growth as an increasing
co-ordination of increasingly varied and complex habits by an
autonomous power of reconstruction (or

habit of growing ).
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Growthful habits confer both an autonomy-immunity gained
from ease of execution and resistance to interference, and a de¬
centering-opening gained from a wider environment and more
flexibility in the face of new conditions. The "stable-flexible"
concept found in both Werner and Piaget comes to mind here.
c. Personality: Love, Will, and Thoughtfulness
Dewey's complex view of what constitutes growth in
personality, or CHARACTER, may be succinctly expressed in terms
of what he calls the virtues of LOVE, WILL, and
THOUGHTFULNESS, which correspond to growth in feeling, action,
and thought respectively (1908, pp. 422-423).
In the idea of thoughtfulness, also expressed as
REFLECTIVENESS, Dewey reiterates many of the qualities of
cognitive orthogenesis previously examined in Werner, Piaget, and
Kohlberg: a) consideration of an ever-larger environment of inner
and outer consequences; b) differentiation and hierarchization of
such considerations; c) de-centering from personal bias and other
egocentric, sociocentric, or egoistic distortions; d) co-ordination of
thought within general principles.

In the idea of love, also

expressed as SENSITIVENESS or SYMPATHY, Dewey expresses the
affective side of thoughtfulness. For him, the affective side of
increasing role-taking or perspectivism in growth is highly
relevant, since it is our increasing affective sensitivity to others,
and to objective considerations in general, which gives rise to our
sense of the problematic, and engages our problem-solving
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faculties. Love is an increasing opening and de-centering process,
and an increasing integration of the object as a matter of
sympathetic concern to the subject.
In the idea of will, also expressed as COURAGE or
PERSISTENCE, Dewey captures the integration of thought and
feeling within action, and the integration of the subject’s internal
state with the objective conditions through action. Will involves
the co-or dinative power of the subject to act upon the products
of his de-centered, far-ranging, and articulated thoughts and
sympathies despite the obstacles of fear or ingrained prior habits.
As with Piaget and Kohlberg, will functions as an affectivecognitive differentiation (de-centering) of the subject from those
habits of thought and feeling which would otherwise impede
action. [16]
As growth proceeds, love, will, and thoughtfulness are
increasingly "harmonized" (integrated) within the subject's
experience, but in a non-syncretic (differentiated) way,

so that

they operate harmoniously, yet exert a sort of check upon one
another. For example, growth in reflection would provide
autonomy from affective prejudice, while growth in sympathy
would make one uneasy about rationalized prejudice (causing one
to focus further reason upon it). Thought would be exercised to
examine motives for action, and thus decrease self-deception by
forming "the habit of reading 'motives’ in the light of persistent,
thorough, and minute attention to the consequences which flow
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from them

(1908, p.258). On the other hand, will would be

exercised to ensure that thoughts and feelings do in fact "regulate
the overt acts performed, since growth in character "means
intelligent forethought of ends and resolute endeavor to achieve
them

(pp. 244-246). Dewey defines the thorough integration of

love (sensitiveness) and thoughtfulness (reflectiveness) with will
as "conscientiousness" or "wisdom" (p. 418): "genuine moral
knowledge involves the affection and the resolute will as well as
the intelligence" (p.423).
Character growth, for Dewey, is growth in certain habits;
"Wide sympathy, keen sensitiveness, persistence in the face of
the disagreeable, balance of interests enabling us to undertake the
work of analysis and decision intelligently" (1950, p.133). It also
includes the growing ability to see the interactive implications of
particular habits for growth in general.
d. Habits. Skills, and Interests
However, Dewey says it is not only possible but desirable to
temporarily suppress these ethical considerations in growth, i.e.,
the relation of particular habits to the entirety of growth. We
can in this case define growth within the formation of the
particular habits, skills, and interests which manifest individual
personality. [17] These include habits of thinking and learning, of
artistic expression, of craft, of economic endeavor, and so on.
Dewey appeals to orthogenetic criteria in defining what is
growthful in such formation. With growth:
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Habits which affect behavior become more available to
explicit control by consciousness, and thus more subject to
reconstruction. This includes habits of thought and social
organization determined by individual and social context, which
may be taken for granted. Growth involves the power to examine
all habits in terms of their contribution to growth. The growthaim is to become increasingly autonomously de-centered from
unconscious habits (1916, pp.19, 29) so that habits become
increasingly INSTRUMENTAL, i.e., co-ordinated by the individual's
larger purposes. The individual thus acquires "the possibility of
release from submergence in the merely given" (1925, p.270).
* Habits (including skills and interests) increase their "active
capacities to readjust activity to meet new conditions" (1916,
p.52) while at the same time, they retain "executive skill,
definiteness of interest, and specific objects of observation and
thought". With growth, flexibility is not gained at the expense of
articulation or concentration. Rather, "habit is formed in view of
possible future changes and does not harden so readily... By a
seeming paradox, increased power of forming habits means
increased susceptibility, sensitiveness, responsiveness" (1925,
p.281).
* Habits, skills, and interests increase their mutual
"interpenetration", co-ordinated by the increasingly integrated
character of the individual. They are organized so as to support
one another, and not function at cross-purposes, or in an
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isolated compartmental" state (1922, in Gouinlock, p.101).
However, this is by no means done at the expense of the
number, variety, or uniqueness (differentiation) of habits, skills,
or interests, which also increase with growth (1925, pp. 280-281).
Increase in both variety and interrelation is what distinguishes
the growing individual from one who is becoming more
"pigeonholed” in his habits, or else subject to mere
"predetermined regularity" (1922, in Archambault, pp. 82-85).
Growth allows for "emergence of unexpected and unpredictable
combinations" (1925, p.281).
* Artistic ability increasingly reflects both the artist’s
unique individuality and perspective (originality), and his power
to communicate a vision which can be shared and appreciated
socially. There is also growth in sheer skill, an increasing power
of sensitivity to and control over the environment which would
describe growth in any ability. But orthogenesis in artistic ability
is distinguished simultaneously by its "manifestation of
individuality" (in Bernstein, p.242), and by its power to
communicate with, enlarge the experience of, and evoke the
individuality of others, to "disclose the meaning of the
individuality of others to those others" (p.243). For Dewey Art is
not the possession of the few who are recognized writers,
painters, musicians; it is the authentic expression of any and all
individuality" (ibid.).
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e. Individual and Society
Dewey’s notions about the relationship of the individual to
society, and how this relationship defines what constitutes growth
for both individual and society, are very similar to Piaget’s. Like
Piaget, Dewey does not harbor some fixed or reified notion of
society as transcending individuality; society is nothing other
than an association of communicating and interdependent
individuals. On the other hand, just as society cannot be
separated from individuality, individuality cannot be separated
from society; like Piaget, Dewey maintains that "every actual self
is a self which includes social relations and offices, both actual
and potential" (1908, p.380). Without society, there can be no
personality, no individuality.
The simultaneous existence of a person as both a unique
individual and as a member of a social organization forms a
problem in experience which it is the very function of the
growth-process to resolve in a progressively adaptational way, a
way which increasingly does away with the terms of the
problem. The growth-path Dewey charts is virtually identical to
Piaget’s "two kinds of de-centering", a path which avoids both
social conformity and egoism. Growth-paths, and the values
which direct and regulate them, are judged by the degree to
which they "release individual potentialities of desire and interest,
and [do] so in a way that contributes to MUTUAL
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REINFORCEMENT of the desires and interests of all members of a
group" (1939, p.60, emphasis added).
This release of individual potentialities of desire and
interest" is essentially what Dewey defines as FREEDOM (See also
1922, pp.304-306). The "mutual reinforcement" of freedom within
society is, however, a matter of social ORGANIZATION. Dewey
recognizes that there are "seeming" conflicts between freedom and
organization; his point is not to offer a fixed solution, but to
outline both the terms of the problem and the general growthdirection in which resolutions ought to be sought:
"I have no desire to add another to the cheap and easy
solutions which exist of the seeming conflict between
freedom and organization. It is reasonably obvious that
organization may become a hindrance to freedom; it does
not take us far to say that the trouble lies not in
organization but in over-organization. . . the relation of
individual freedom to organization is seen to be an
EXPERIMENTAL affair. It is not capable of being settled by
abstract theory" (1922, p.307, emphasis added). [18]
Dewey makes it clear that growth for each individual and
growth for society qua all individuals are mutually
interdependent:
"It is true that the aim of education is development of
individuals to the utmost of their potentialities. But this
statement in isolation leaves unanswered the question as to
what is the measure of the development.
A society of free individuals in which all, through their own
work, contribute to the liberation and enrichment of the
lives of others, is the only environment in which any
individual can really grow normally to his full stature. An
environment in which some are practically enslaved,
degraded, limited, will always react to create conditions
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that prevent the full development even of those who fancy
they enjoy complete freedom for unhindered growth" (in
Archambault, p.12).
Thus, growth is defined as that process which has the
power to ensure the "mutual reinforcement" of growth among all
individuals. Taken in the abstract, this leaves us again with the
principle of universality or consistency, this time across all
individuals rather than merely within each individual. Again, to
reveal what kind of mutual reinforcement is growthful. we must
resort to more specific examples. These examples turn out to be
manifestations of the orthogenetic principle qua autonomous de¬
centering.
This means that for each individual, growth has two faces.
Insofar as an individual grows out of egocentrism or egoism, he
increasingly "forgets" himself, and concentrates upon how he can
benefit others, both directly and terms of shaping the social
organization:
"The acquisition of skills is not an end in itself. They are
things to be put to use, and that use is their contribution to
a common and shared life. They are intended, Indeed, to
make an individual more capable of self-support and of selfrespecting independence. But unless this end is placed in the
context of services rendered to others, skills gained will be
put to an egoistic and selfish use, and may be employed as
means of a trained shrewdness in which one person gets the
better of others" (in Archambault, p.ll, Cf. pp. 427, 430;
1908, p.394).
On the other hand, however, this concern for others is also
de-centered from any fixed notion of social organization to which
they must conform. It is thus imbued with the concern for
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preserving and enhancing each person’s autonomy: "regard for
the happiness of others means regard for those conditions and
Q&.jgCtS Which Permit others freely to exercise their own powers
from their own initiative, reflection, and choice" (1908, p.302,
emphasis in original). Dewey's "ultimate and unified standard" for
educational practice is "the extent and way in which a study
brings the pupil to consciousness of his social environment, and
confers upon him the ability to interpret his own powers from
the standpoint of their possibilties in social use" (in Archambault,
p.121, emphasis added). The individual is increasingly helped to
free himself from narrow egoism by leading him to a concern for
others, but is at the same time encouraged to create his own
interpretation of how to best serve others.
Now, of course, a growing person remains concerned with
preserving his own individuality, and with seeing that others
learn to become more socially oriented. But it is precisely the
hallmark of growth in the individual-society relationship that the
individual is free to focus more upon his own de-centering
because others are increasingly looking out for his autonomy, and
he is more free to look out for others' autonomy because they are
increasingly looking to their own de-centering.
Thus, with growth, individual and social aims "merge", but
at a dialectically higher plane than the syncretic and rigid
"submergence" of the individual into society found in primitive
cultures as defined by Werner. The individual s need for
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autonomy (individuality) is increasingly adopted by society, and
the society s need for de-centering (social responsiveness) is
increasingly adopted by the individual. The social organization is
itself increasingly DEMOCRATIC, in that all individuals are expected
to play a direct role in shaping the society through active
communication and mutual agreement.
In a less developed (but still post-primitive) individualsociety relationship, more concern on the part of each individual
is directed towards safeguarding his own autonomy, and social
organization is more directed towards getting people to behave
according to a fixed social plan. Hence the conflict between
individual and society. Dewey rejects paths of either increasing
“individualism" or "statism" as solutions to this conflict. Both
solutions are regressive, not progressive adaptations to the
individual-society problem in that they reinforce, rather than
overcome, its terms (1916, pp. 91-98; 1908, pp.225-226).
With growth, by contrast, the individual, by focusing on
social aims rather than purely egoistic aims, gains autonomy
from the internal demands and insecurities of his own ego.
Simultaneously, the society, by preserving individual autonomy,
hence variation among socially equal individuals, reinforces the
individual’s efforts to overcome egoism or sociocentrism by
exposing him to a plurality of perspectives and influences. Thus
we arrive at the progressive "mutual reinforcement that Dewey
has in mind.
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Such mutual reinforcement depends upon COMMUNICATION,
CO-OPERATION, and SHARED EXPERIENCE as its medium. De¬
centering is not merely distant appreciation or tolerance for
another s perspective, but an active willingness to engage in
dialogue and mutual exploration of perspectives. Autonomy is not
merely freedom to go off by oneself to do one's thing, but
freedom from egoistic or sociocentric barriers against others, and
freedom to form the greatest possible variety of associations.
Dewey, in this regard, presents two complementary criteria
for defining growth for social groups within a society, as well as
for entire societies themselves. These criteria are related to intra¬
group and inter-group integration and differentiation,
respectively. The first criterion is the number and variety of
interests in the group which are shared in common by members
of the group. Dewey compares a band of thieves, in which the
common interest is limited to that of the loot to be shared, with
a family in which "there are material, intellectual, aesthetic
interests in which all participate and [in which] the progress of
one member has worth for the experience of other members".
Similarly, in a "despotic state", the interests shared between
ruler and ruled are few, whereas in a democratic state, they are
many and varied.
The second criterion relates to the number of "varied and
free points of contact with other modes of association , i.e., other
groups. While the band of burglars acts in necessary secrecy, the
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family is connected to all sorts of business, religious, political, etc.
groups in which it takes an active part through shared interests
with others. In a class-based society, members of one class share
few interests with those of another, whereas in a more developed
society, differences between varied ethnic or occupational groups
do not prevent them from engaging in dialogue or having a
number of interests in common (1916, pp.83-84). [19]
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Notes
1.

One may consider, however, that each new developmental
advance brings with it a new set of problems which define
the direction of the next advance. Thus the alienation of the
individual from society which exists in more advanced
cultures could be seen as a sort of "price" paid for
development out of primitivity. Healing this rift without
regression back to primitivity would become a problem to be
solved by further development.

2.

Werner does not pursue the notion of a higher level of
development, transcending the exploitative and alienated
relationship to nature which might be seen as the "price" of
development out of primitivity,

3.

Initials refer to articles by Kohlberg, most of which are
included in The Philosophy of Moral Development (1981) and
The Psychology of Moral Development (1984). In some cases
(DAE, FITO) the page references are to earlier printings of the
work, (see Bibliography) rather than those included in the
abovementioned volumes. Here is the "code":

CD:
CFT:
CP:
DAE:
DRC:
FITO:
JR.
MJMA:
MSM:
QSS:
SS:

"Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult
Development" (1984)
"Current Formulation of the Theory” (1984)
"Capital Punishment, Moral Development, and the
Constitution" (1981)
"Development as the Aim of Education" (1978)
"Synopses and Detailed Replies to Critics" (1984)
"From Is To Ought" (1971)
"Justice as Reversibility" (1981)
"The Relationship of Moral Judgement to Moral Action”
(1984)
"Moral Stages and Moralization" (1984)
"Moral Development, Religious Thinking, and the
Question of a Seventh Stage" (1981)
"Stage and Sequence" (1984)
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4.

Such recognition stems partially from Kohlberg's desire to
ranslate his psychological theory into prescriptions for
educational practice (DAE, p.129, CFT, p.275). He is eager to
differentiate his theory from maturationist and associationist
theories which purport to derive educational "oughts" from
psychological facts", thereby committing the "naturalistic
fallacy . His aim is to develop an independent philosophical
rationale for why educators should favor his psychology over
others.

5.

Kohlberg s statement that Justice as a principle at higher
developmental stages "takes precedence over law and other
considerations, INCLUDING WELFARE (FITO, p.220, emphasis
added) seems peculiar at first glance. After all, the concern
ultimately behind the quest for thorough equality and
reciprocity in human relations is not logical elegance, but
giving each person his "due", which certainly implies each
person's welfare. Kohlberg's use of the word "welfare",
however, seems to refer more specifically to the utilitarian
notion of "greatest good for the greatest number". His point is
that at lower stages, an individual's rights might be
sacrificed if this were thought to contribute to the welfare of
a larger number of people (e.g., in the case of capital
punishment). Higher (more reversible) stages of reciprocal
role-taking would entail a more principled recognition of the
individual's right to life no matter what "good" the
individual's death might be held to produce for others (CP,
pp.252-253, JR, pp.205-209).
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6.

7.

In this respect Kohlberg distinguishes his moral theory from
Piaget s. Piaget interprets the difference between co-operative
relations among adolescent peers and their more
authoritarian thinking about society as having to do with
intergenerational constraint. He assumes social
authoritarianism is an ongoing vestige of "Stage 1" thinking
explained by the difference between peer and child-adult
relations. Kohlberg, seeing such adolescent thinking as
compatible with Stage 4, distinguishes its law-maintaininR
orientation from the Stage 1 law-obeying, orientation (FITO,
p.199). Stage 4 thinking, rather than being an internalization
of societal or parental taboos, is a rational and constructive
attempt to see oneself abstractly as a "member of society".
Use of Stage 4 for resolving moral issues at the level of
society would be presumably quite compatible with continued
use of a co-operative Stage 3 ethic within concrete personal
relations. The fact that in some cultures, adolescents respond
towards their peers in one way and to adults in another is a
"dimension... sensitive to a wide variety of cultural and
subcultural influences which cannot be analyzed in rate-of development terms" (SS, p.43).
Kohlberg emphasizes the more negative emotions in this
account of motivational change within justice reasoning One
explanation for this is that Kohlberg wishes to demonstrate
that it is cognition as distinct from affect that develops in
moral development. The emotion of anxiety is thus held
constant from stage 1 to stage 6, and development is shown
to be a matter of that anxiety becoming cognitively
associated with self-disapproval as opposed to physical
punishment or social ostracism. Insofar as Kohlberg speaks of
positive affective motives such as compassion or love, he
tends to associate them with AGAPE as being elaborations
upon justice rather than central elements of it. One positive
affective motivation implied in Kohlberg’s theory might be a
love of rational order. It seems, however, that Justice
reasoning might be seen to develop with empathy rather
than fear being chosen as the affective constant. Movement
from fear-motivation to empathic-motivation, while not a
moral movement in Kohlberg’s narrow sense of the word,
might be considered a dimension of psychological development
with some bearing upon the moral domain.
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Kohlberg makes it clear that his theory of justice reasoning is
designed to be compatible with a hard structural stage model
defined in terms of hierarchic integration of one structure by
the next, invariant sequence, and structured "wholeness"
(CFT, pp. 237-238, 244-247). A sub-theory of intuitive moral
types is not easily integrated into such a model, and 1 don't
see where Kohlberg has made a systematic attempt to do
this.
He does say that 'moral action stems from responsible choice
guided by an Intuition of moral values and Is not necessarily
dependent on stage sophistication" (p.26l). Only at Stages 5
and 6 does a "full, rational, and principled justification" for
such action occur (ibid.). So one could perhaps say that
moral intuition is an extra-rational force (although perhaps
"cognitive" in the broad sense of the term) impinging upon
moral judgement as a spur to reason, as well as a domain of
development in its own right. The exact relations between
the substage (or moral type) dimension and the "stage
sophistication" dimension are not made clear. Nonetheless,
one could at the very least conclude from Kohlberg's addition
of the substage theory that moral education is not only a
matter of leading students to move stage-wise, but also a
matter of leading them from type A to type B at a
potentially earlier age than one would expect them to reach
Stages 5 or 6!
9.

In his earlier work, Kohlberg claims that increasing
agreement at higher stages is shown by his research: "The
general claim that the higher the stage, the more the
determination of content by structure, and the more
agreement among people, is elaborated empirically" (JR,
p.193). In his later work, he maintains that Stage 5 subjects
agree more than Stage 4 subjects (CFT, pp.272-273). But he
asserts, due to lack of empirical verification of Stage 6, that
"we are in no position to claim the empirical psychological
truth that there is substantive moral agreement reached at
the terminus of moral development". Rather, moral
agreement is held to be a "metaethical ideal" (ibid.).
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10.

Without crystalline differentiation of these two values, mere
agreement or conflict resolution" can be very scary as
moral alms, or as Justifications of moral adequacy. This is of
course the whole point of dystopian novelists such as Huxley,
Orwell, and Zamiatin, who portray worlds which achieve
complete agreement at the expense of autonomy and critical
doubt. Limiting putative moral discourse and agreement to
rationally moral people (JR, p.193) does not, in my opinion,
substitute for such differentiation.

11

Dewey uses the term "growth" as his descriptive term for the
constant direction of desirable change or adaptation in
human beings. In some works, Dewey uses the term
"development" interchangeably with "growth" (e g., 1916,
Ch.4). In others, however, (in Bernstein, p.237), he uses’
"development" to refer to both good and bad adaptive change,
presumably reserving "growth" to describe the progressive
form of "development". Since I have defined "development" in
this thesis as progressive (desirable) ontogenetic adaptation,
and since Dewey does not consistently use it that way, 1 will
confine myself, in this section, to the word "growth" to
describe what elsewhere in the thesis is described equally as
"growth" or "development".

12

One may ask to what degree one can make statements about
the general workings of experience without these simply
reflecting bias introduced by one or both of the first two
levels, namely personal and/or cultural bias. Dewey's answer
to this is that the only "correction of biases" to be had is
"through acquaintance with the experience of others,
contemporary and as recorded in the history of the race".
The wider the scope of one's "sympathetic
intercommunication" with people of different cultures and
times, the better chance one has of overcoming egocentrism
and sociocentrism in one’s generalizations (in Bernstein,
p.109).

13. Here, obviously, Dewey is stretching the word "growth" to
include all kinds of change, so as to allow for "bad growth" as
well as "good growth". This is a deviation from Dewey's usual
use of the word as implying the desirable direction of change.
It doesn't affect his point, and should be overlooked.
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14. Dewey implies that the criteria of universality and
consistency as a response to the fact of experiential
continuity relieves us of the need to "specify the direction in
which growth takes place" (1938a, p.36). This is a puzzling
implication, for here Dewey's apparent desire to avoid any
principled generalization of the direction of growth leaves him
in effect defining growth in terms of even more abstract
notions. Elsewhere, Dewey explicitly rejects mere universality
and self-consistency as sufficient to define an ethically
acceptable direction of change (1908, pp. 316-317).
The fact is that Dewey does repeatedly "specify the direction
in which growth takes place", through very concrete
examples. Without direct reference to these examples and
their consequences, Dewey would not entertain for a moment
the abstract idea that growth can be defined solely in terms
of its tendency to "create conditions for further growth"
(1938a, p.36), although he would deem this a necessary
criterion.
My interpretation, drawn from the wider context of his
ideas, would be that continuity is only a partial (necessary
but not sufficient) description of the context of experience.
Therefore, increasing universality and consistency, as a
response to the problem posed by continuity, is only a partial
description of growth. To render it complete, it must be
complemented by responses to the other aspects of the
experiential context: interaction, dependence, and plasticity.
15. See Colwell (1985) for an interpretation and thorough review
of Dewey's sensitivity to modern "ecological" concerns,
especially humanity's interdependence and interconnectedness
with the global environment.
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16. With respect to the role played by fear in character
development, it is important to contrast Dewey’s theory with
the Piaget-Kohlberg approach. Because Piaget and Kohlberg
focus exclusively upon the cognitive side of development,
affective factors are held constant; there is no idea of
affective growth per se. All that matters is growth in the
cognitive structures to which the affective "energies" are
attached. Thus for Piaget and Kohlberg there is no need to
overcome fear as a central motivating force. Rather, it is
sufficient for the cognitive object of the fear to change: from
fear of authority, to fear of the opinions of peers, and finally
to fear of losing one’s own self-respect.
For Dewey, as a person grows, he replaces motivation by
fear, no matter what its object, with motivation by
sympathetic appreciation of the needs of the situation: "it is
necessary that the child should gradually grow out of this
relatively external motive, into an appreciation of the social
value of what he has to do for its own sake, and because of
its relations to life as a whole" (in Archambault, p.119).
Dewey is aware that "Fear is a motive which is almost sure
to enter in - not necessarily physical fear, or of punishment,
but fear of losing the approbation of others" (ibid ). But
growth out of fear is necessary if one is to "shift the center
of ethical gravity from an absorption which is selfish to a
service which is social" (p.120). Movement from fearmotivation to empathy-motivation thus seems to be an
affective de-centering to complement the cognitive de¬
centering stressed by Piaget and Kohlberg. For Dewey, the
growth of both affect and cognition are mutually dependent
and reinforcing.
Dewey recognizes that a shift in the cognitive object to which
fear is attached makes a developmental difference: "...fear
need not be an undesirable factor in experience. Caution,
circumspection, prudence, desire to foresee future events so
as to avert what is harmful, these desirable traits are as
much a product of calling the Impulse of fear into play as is
cowardice and abject submission" (1916, p.84). But in this
case, fear is checked not only by cognition but by other
affective impulses as well, so that "the appeal to fear is [not]
isolated" (ibid., emphasis in original).
Kohlberg's "Stage 6" reasoner, motivated purely by a fear of
falling in his own opinion of himself if he were to violate his
self-chosen universal principles, would be seen by Dewey to
be suffering from a flaw in ethical character. Dewey would
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say that only sympathy as a motivation is going to lead this
person to obtain the "moral knowledge" he needs to make
adequate intellectual judgements:
Sympathy widens our interest in consequences and leads us
to take Into account such results as affect the welfare of
others, it aids us to count and weigh these consequences as
counting for as much as those which touch our own honor,
purse, or power . .Sympathy, in short, is the general
principle of moral knowledge, not because its commands take
precedence of others (which they do not necessarily), but
because it furnishes the most reliable and efficacious
intellectual standpoint" (1908, pp.334-335, emphasis in
original).
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17. The following quote explains Dewey's position on this point
more fully:
It is not necessary nor advisable to be always considering
the interaction of habits with one another, that is to say the
effect of a particular habit upon character - which is a name
for the total interaction. Such consideration distracts
attention from the problem of building up an effective habit.
A man who is learning French, or chess-playing or
engineering has his hands full with his particular occupation.
He would be confused and hampered by constant inquiry into
its effect upon character. He would resemble the centipede
who by trying to think of the movement of each leg in
relation to all the others was rendered unable to travel. At
any given time, certain habits must be taken for granted as
a matter of course. Their operation is not a matter of moral
judgement. They are treated as technical, recreational,
professional, hygienic, or economic or esthetic rather than
moral. To lug in morals, or ulterior effect on character at
every point, is to cultivate moral valetudinarianism or
priggish posing. Nevertheless any act, even that one which
passes ordinarily as trivial, may entail such consequences for
habit and character as upon occasion to require judgement
from the standpoint of the whole body of conduct. It then
comes under moral scrutiny. To know when to leave acts
without distinctive moral judgement and when to subject
them to it is itself a large factor in morality. The serious
matter is that this relative pragmatic, or intellectual,
distinction between the moral and non-moral, has been
solidified into a fixed and absolute distinction, so that some
acts are popularly regarded as forever within and others
forever without the moral domain. From this fatal error
recognition of the relations of one habit to others preserves
us. For it makes us see that character is the name given to
the working interaction of habits, and that the cumulative
effect of insensible modifications worked by a particular habit
in the body of preferences may at any moment require
attention" (1922, pp.39-40).
18.

It is an error to think, as have critics such as Callan (1982),
that Dewey harbors some fixed notion of "democracy" as an
ideal society to which individuals would conform in order to
obtain a fixed and compromised measure of "freedom". As
Callan points out, the danger in such a fixed view is that
unpredictable eccentricities of individuality which threatened
the ideal balance might be subject to a social disapproval as
inhibiting as more egregious forms of oppression. It is
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precisely in order to safeguard the continuously
reconstructive nature of individual interests that Dewey
rejects the temptation to erect such a fixed notion of
democratic society.
19.

Now obviously Dewey does not think that organized crime is
better than isolated crime because of its wider network of
connections. To the extent that this might be construed from
the paragraphs cited, it is yet another example of the
dangers of interpreting Dewey out of context. Dewey has a
habit of setting forth general criteria for growth as if they
were sufficient unto themselves. I think this is because he
takes it so fully for granted that they are not, that they
presuppose certain ideas such as, for example, those related
to growth in "character".
One cannot rely upon his criterion of growth as what
"conduces to further growth" without reference to additional
criteria which specify the direction of growthful subjectobject interaction. One cannot rely upon his criterion of
growth as what is "mutually reinforcing" between individual
and society without reference to additional criteria which
specify the direction of growthful individual-society
interaction. Similarly, one cannot rely upon his criteria of
the number and variety of interests within or between
groups without reference to additional criteria which specify
the growthful direction of such interests.

CHAPTER III
JUSTIFICATION FOR ORTHOGENESIS AS A DEFINITION OF GROWTH
OR DEVELOPMENT

A. Introduction
To re-state the definition given in Chapter 1, orthogenesis is
a direction of change in the organism with respect to its
environment. This direction is characterized by increasing
integration with complementary differentiation. Integrationdifferentiation comprises three pairs of complementary qualities.
The first is increasing DISTINGUISHING of elements with an
accompanying CO-ORDINATION of the elements distinguished. Piano
technique develops as harmonies and fingerings emerge from an
undifferentiated spread of fingers and keys. At the same time,
each fingering constitutes a pattern co-ordinated for the purpose
of getting from one place to another on the keyboard. The ability
to distinguish between two notes in a trill depends upon the
ability to co-ordinate them to produce the trill sound. Likewise,
there can be no co-ordination of the trill without a crisp
distinction between the two notes.
At the minute scale involved in the development of a trill,
it is easy to see how distinguishing and co-ordination are
interdependent. On a larger scale, such as the playing of a
composition, it may appear as though development see-saws
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between distinguishing and co-ordination. Thus we alternate drill,
which isolates elements of technique, with interpretation, which
brings the whole piece together. But on this scale as well, there
can be no growth until co-ordination and distinguishing go handin-hand. Every growthful distinction relies upon some coordinative scheme. Exercises are growthful only as they
contribute to the playing of the piece. Fingering drills are
developed with the demands of compositions in mind.
Distinguishing is thus advanced by virtue of a co-ordinating
context; lack of

co-ordination

stifles the ability to make

distinctions.
At the same time, the growth of co-ordination reflects an
increasing distinguishing of elements. Interpretation involves co¬
ordinating distinctions in rhythm, dynamics, tempo, accent, and
so on. This includes the distinction between a lifeless sequence of
techniques, however precise, and a flowing drama of phrases. To
stress interpretation is not to muddle distinctions of technique. It
is rather to make even finer and more subtle distinctions, and
co-ordinate them more carefully.

Without such distinctions,

attempts to play the piece as a "whole" will result in bad playing.
In the effort to play a piece well, we may emphasize drill when
fingering is sloppy. Or we may emphasize playing the piece
straight through, mistakes and all, if we need to get the "feel" of
it. We achieve good playing, however, only when interpretation
and technique are mutually reinforcing.
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Where growth is thwarted, failure to distinguish and failure
to co-ordinate coincide. A racist appears to distinguish between
people, blacks are different from whites. But he fails to see all
blacks and whites as individuals sharing the common right to
have their individuality respected. Because he lacks any co¬
ordinating notion of equality or individuality, he actually fails to
make essential distinctions between persons; to him, all blacks
are the same. Personality and skin color are not distinguished,
nor are they co-ordinated. They are syncretically fused,
confounded. As skin color changes, so does personality.
The paired qualities of DE-CENTERING

and AUTONOMY

distinguish development from this kind of error. To de-center is
to gain greater objectivity. It is to assess the objective world
more fully and truthfully because of a freedom gained from
subjective distortion. Such distortion may be caused by our
sensori-motor equipment, as in the case of optical illusions. Or it
may be caused by cognitive immaturity, as in the case of the
infant who cannot conceive of a toy's existence independently of
his ability to see or grasp it. It may be caused by emotional bias
and social conditioning, as in the case of the racist whose sense of
security is attached to a belief in racial superiority

Or it may

simply be the result of insufficient information, or a failure to
think things through thoroughly, as when a theory is proved
wrong through the discovery of new facts.
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With every act of de-centering, there is a corresponding
autonomy gained. One becomes free from habits, thoughts,
feelings, external forces, and beliefs which constrain choice along
fixed lines while isolating it from the objective world. One
becomes free to respond fully to the objective requirements of a
situation, whatever these may be. De-centering allows a person
to perceive what these requirements are more accurately. One is
not swayed by authority, fixed social roles, emotions, or habitual
inclinations where these are irrelevant. One partakes in a political
demonstration because one concludes that the cause is just, not
to enhance one's prestige in the eyes of friends. De-centering
confers the ability to look at matters from a variety of
viewpoints, and to co-ordinate these views instead of seizing upon
just one. When the white man takes the viewpoint of a black
person, when he understands the history of racist beliefs, when
he detaches his anger from its misplaced object, he overcomes his
racism. By virtue of his de-centering, he is free to respond to the
real individuality of black human beings.
Development is stymied when an apparent but false "de¬
centering" takes place without a corresponding gain in autonomy.
A teenager may slavishly adopt the musical tastes of his peers
without ever considering his own. Development occurs when he
can distinguish his tastes from those of his friends, remain
sensitive to both, and choose freely based upon his wider
appreciation. His choice is then uncorrupted by matters having
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nothing to do with music, such as a need to conform. Conversely,
there is no growth when an apparent but false "autonomy" is
devoid of any corresponding de-centering. By doing as one pleases
without regard for the feelings of others or long-term
consequences, one closes out the environment, and identifies with
a narrow and fleeting set of desires and habits. One is in effect
held in thrall by one's internal environment.
With development, the individual exerts increasing power
over his environment through the purposeful co-ordination of
finer and more varied elements. At the same time, the exercise
of such power is liberated from subjective attachments which
defeat the needs of the situation as objectively determined. Thus
a politician distinguishes and co-ordinates various abilities to wage
a successful campaign: he gauges the popular mood, articulates
ideas, and stirs people emotionally. His aim is not, however, to
seek egoistic glory or dominate others. It is rather to evoke
enough common sentiment among people so that their will may
be mobilized to effect positive change in the society. An artist co¬
ordinates technical skill with knowledge of the human condition
and the history of art to produce an original work. This work
achieves an independence from artistic habits of the past, yet it
speaks out clearly in a moving language beyond words. Despite its
unique and autonomous individuality, the artwork communicates
in a way that all can understand. The mountain climber,
through a co-ordination of will and muscle, attains the peak. To

179

do so, he must gain autonomy from feelings of fear and thoughts
of failure, while merging his concentration with every contour of
the rock face.
The overall effect of increasing co-ordination with
distinguishing, and autonomy with de-centering, is to bestow an
IMMUNITY from the environment (internal as well as external)
alongside an OPENING to it. Immunity and opening are the third
pair of complementary qualities. The politician is thoroughly open
to all kinds of opinions. He is sensitive to his need for adequate
food and rest. He is aware of the morale of his staff. Yet he is
able to choose and co-ordinate his responses to the environment
according to his most de-centered and far-reaching goals only. He
is immune to the catcalls of reporters; he smiles graciously. He is
immune to fatigue from repetition; he gives a speech with
genuine passion even though he is giving it for the hundredth
time. He is immune to pressure from narrow constituencies, he
keeps the general welfare in mind. His immunity is not gained by
ignoring theenvironment or walling it off. Rather, it is gained by
virtue of an openness to whatever the environment presents. Out
of this openness, he distinguishes egoistic and self-defeating goals
from goals which, if achieved, would really solve problems for all
the people. He then remains immune to the former while
autonomously choosing the latter.
Within development, immunity reinforces opening. Because
the mountaineer is not pulled around by his fear, he can expose
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himself to danger. He does not, however, ignore his fear. Rather,
he uses it to keep him alert and prudent on the climb. Because
he is not controlled by his fear, he can remain open to it.
Likewise, opening reinforces immunity. Those who study history
expand their environment to include the recorded past. They
thus become immune to the belief that dictators stay in power
for ever, and that there is no use in trying to unseat them. To
overcome ignorance is to open oneself to what is actually so,
while knowledge of the truth renders one immune to falsehood.
An apparent but false immunity gained at the expense of
opening is not growthful. To be "immune" to the suffering of
others is actually to be at the mercy of one's egocentrism,
laziness, and unwarranted beliefs: "it's not my problem", "there's
nothing I can do", "the poor will always be with us". On the
other hand, attempts at "opening" without corresponding
immunity disintegrate the organism. One may well sink rather
than swim. We do not hurry to expose young children to
knowledge of all the evils of the world when we can avoid it. We
know that this will not be growthful for them, since they have
no commensurate ability to master their anxiety or exert
influence upon the world. They may succumb to fear, losing all
power to deal with the world by co-ordinating emotion and
thought. Or they may try to protect themselves by reducing
their sensitivity to others. Growthful opening takes place without
loss of internal co-ordination or external sensitivity.
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Co ordination with distinguishing, autonomy with de¬
centering, immunity with opening: each pair is indivisible within
development. It is not as though we stress autonomy sometimes,
and de-centering at other times. Each true de-centering brings a
corresponding autonomy, and vice versa. Also, all three pairs
merge within actual development. Thus autonomous de-centering
is achieved by virtue of co-ordination and distinguishing. De¬
centering from a selfish view to take the role of another leads to
an autonomous judgement based on the claims of both persons.
Such judgement involves the ability to distinguish the two views
while co-ordinating them within a larger purpose, that of justice
or compassion. The growing person opens himself to the other
person’s claims as well as his own; at the same time, he remains
immune to the dictation of his acts by his own selfishness or by
outside authority. The term integration represents the combined
qualities of co-ordination, autonomy, and immunity; the term
differentiation represents the combined qualities of distinguishing,
de-centering, and opening. All true development is characterized
by complementary and mutually reinforcing integration and
differentiation, captured by the term orthogenesis.
The orthogenetic principle can be used to help assess
whether proposed pathways of change meet the developmental
criteria outlined above. It thus serves as a negative check upon
actions which would decrease a person's autonomy, narrow his
sphere of interactions, or reinforce his egocentrism. From the
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principle, we can also infer criteria for the kind of inquiry into
individual situations which will lead us to judge the most
growthful response to that situation. Inquiry which is itself
developmental must seek to distinguish and bring into awareness
the widest and most subtle variety of factors influencing the
situation. Thus a war between two nations may have to do with
the personalities of the leaders, mistaken beliefs, economic
conditions, religious differences, and specific acts of hostility.
Inquiry must appeal to some co-ordinating idea or purpose to
differentiate those matters which are essential from those which
are not. Thus if we seek the security and prosperity of the
nation, we can see that the lives of tens of thousands of young
people may be more essential than the possession of a few square
miles of territory. To be thorough and inclusive, inquiry must be
objective, de-centered. Otherwise one party to the war may list
all the wrongs committed by the other side, while ignoring or
justifying its own. Inquiry must throw itself open to the objective
situation while remaining immune to anything that would sway
it off course or cause it to stop short. (The criteria for growthful
inquiry aimed at judging what constitutes development in a given
situation are outlined further in Chapter IV below.)
This, however, is as far as the principle will take us. The
web of forces, interactions, probabilities, and outright unknowns
involved in human ontogenesis is virtually infinite. Thus the
orthogenetic principle can be a controlling guide to evaluative
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inquiry, but not a pre—0mDtivc> mntn i_ ;■
,
v
KinDUVe route to its conclusion. The
principle will not tell us in advance of inquiry into a particular
and unique situation what the most growthful thing to do in that
situation will be. It is a constraining framework for thorough and
objective inquiry as the basis for a judgement which reflects the
unique qualities of the situation-in-context. It can never
substitute for such judgement.
Orthogenesis describes only the most general criteria which
all developmental changes must meet. To know anything more
about what would constitute development for a particular person
demands a thorough and objective examination of the person’s
situation-in-context. To see why this is so, let us recall Dewey’s
three contexts within which all experience must be understood
(Ch.ll, Sec.Dl above). The most particular context is the unique
personal history of the individual. This history occurs within a
sociohistorical context which includes not only the influence of the
society and time to which the individual belongs, but the
influence upon these of societies and historical periods to which he
does not belong. At the most universal level, there is the
structure of human experience itself. Orthogenesis, as an abstract
principle, is on a par of generality with this most "inclusive and
pervasive context" (Dewey, 1960, p.110). It speaks to the
problems inherent in the basic structure of human experience.
Knowledge of such problems, and their most general solution, aids
us to identify the problems of particular individuals in particular

184

situations, to see them as examples of a general case. But we
cannot know in advance how these conflicts will manifest
themselves. Therefore we cannot suggest solutions in the absence
of the most exhaustive analysis of the problematic situation. Such
analysis would need to take all three contexts into account.
Since the correct application of the orthogenetic principle
depends upon thorough and objective inquiry into situations, it
depends upon the ability and willingness of the user to engage in
such inquiry. Also, the principle requires the judger to hold
simultaneously in the mind bi-polar qualities which are at first
glance opposed to one another. Thus, as with any principle, its
correct use depends upon the developmental level of the user
Kohlberg gives the example of trying to teach the Golden Rule to
Stage 2 subjects only to have them translate it as "do unto others
what they do unto you". In applying the orthogenetic principle,
pitfalls of this sort abound.
For example, one must simultaneously hold an idea of
increasing power over one's environment, and of increasing
responsiveness to the needs and views of others even in the face
of one's initial inclinations. Now, a pre-operational child has
trouble co-ordinating changes in both the length and thickness of
a stretching piece of clay. He therefore tends to "center" on one
or the other (See Ch.II, Sec.B2b above). The orthogenetic principle
likewise challenges formal operational thinkers to co-ordinate two
seemingly opposite ideas at once. Why might it not be
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development

to turn a jungle into a superhighway? Aren't we

exercising greater control over our environment, and opening up
new vistas to the Coca-Cola Company? Why might it not be
development

to unify our country totally behind a single

fearless leader, putting aside our personal desires in the service of
the higher purpose of the state? Aren't we co-ordinating our
efforts, and becoming less selfish?
The first example "centers" on the idea of expanding one's
environment. It does not co-ordinate this idea with a de-centered
sensitivity to environmental consequences, or to the effect of
changes imposed upon indigenous peoples. The second example
"centers" upon unification of purpose, detachment from selfish
wants,

and the taking up of another's views as one's own. But it

does this at the expense of autonomy from external domination,
detachment from the need for conformity, and variety
(differentiation) in the social order. To use the principle correctly,
the judger must overcome a tendency to center upon one quality
while excluding its paired complement.

B

Genetic-Functional Justification for the Orthogenetlc Principle

1, What Genetic-Functional Justification Entails
To justify something genetic-functionally is to show that it
functions to resolve a problem. This problem is the origin
(genesis) of valuing in that context. According to Dewey's theory
of valuation, the act of valuing arises out of our perception of
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some need, conflict, or problem, and our desire for means of
resolving it. Dewey argues that such desires OUGHT to be
evaluated in terms of the degree to which they IN FACT do away
with the problem qua problem. A desire which tends to eliminate
a problem at its source, which transcends or nullifies its very
substance, is held to be more desirable, i.e., more of a value,
than one which tends to reinforce, deny, reshuffle, or merely
compensate for the problem which generated it in the first place.
(1939, pp.34, 46-48).
Thus in Kohlberg's theory, the origin of the domain of
justice valuation is social conflict. Justice reasoning stages are
more "adequate" according to the degree that they resolve social
conflict by means of a universally applied system of mutual role¬
taking. When each person in a situation takes up the role or
viewpoint of another as if it were his own, this gets to the
bottom of the source of the conflict. Whatever the substance of
the conflict is about, mutual role-taking creates conditions for a
stable and satisfying resolution. To the extent that Kohlberg
implicitly justifies his stages as representing a hierarchy of
"moral" adequacy on these grounds, he employs a geneticfunctional justification.
If we see valuing as an adaptation, then systematic mutual
role-taking is a more PROGRESSIVE adaptation to social conflict
than arbitration, or sulking, or fighting it out. Arbitration adapts
to the conflict by submitting it to mutually recognized authority,
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which is more progressive (better) than sulking or fighting it out,
but which still leaves the terms of the conflict in place. Sulking
adapts to the conflict by nursing one's emotional hurt, but by
doing nothing to address the conflict. It might thus be termed a
more STATIC adaptation. Fighting it out reinforces the conflict
(except perhaps where this is a limited and mutually respected
ritual form of arbitration) and sets the stage for revenge and
escalation. It is thus the most REGRESSIVE of adaptations to social
conflict.
In this section, I will justify orthogenesis as a definition of
development using genetic-functional criteria. To do this, I will
pinpoint the most fundamental problem in the human condition
out of which the very notion of development as a value arises. I
will show that without this problem, no meaningful idea of
human development could arise.

I will then show how

orthogenesis functions as the uniquely progressive adaptation to
this core problem.

2. Requirements of the Problem
The critical step in the inquiry is the framing of the
problem. It is an easy matter to justify any solution if the true
nature of the problem is left unquestioned. If we accept Iran's
contention that the source of all conflict between Iran and Iraq is
Hussein, the Iraqi head of state, then it is easy to justify Iran’s
proposed solution: Hussein's removal from office.The best way to
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refute a solution is to show that the situation it purports to
resolve is not really the problem at all. Thus we can point to
other factors in the Iran-Iraq conflict that would not be resolved
by Hussein s removal from office: lack of tolerance for racial and
religious differences, historical enmity, dispute over control of the
Tigris and Euphrates river mouths, and so forth. Iran's framing
of the problem is inadequate because it fails to include everything
that is essential to the conflict. If we adopted the solution implied
by the problem thus framed, we would still have the conflict on
our hands.
Problems are adequately framed only when they meet the
criteria of INCLUSIVITY and ESSENTIALITY. These criteria refer to
the totality of our experience of a problem-in-context, what
Dewey calls an "unsettled situation" (1938, p.106). An
interpretation of a problem cannot be correct if it cannot include
everything that is relevant to, or generating, the actual conflict.
If my car still won't start after the battery has been replaced,
then the problem is not only the battery; it may be the starter
as well. Also, problems are not correctly framed if they cannot
exclude what is not essential to the conflict, perhaps the battery
was fine in the first place. The first step in justifying a solution is
to show that one has framed an inclusive and essential problem.
Only such a problem can generate a progressive solution, one that
really does away with the source of whatever is unsettled,
lacking, or in conflict about the situation.
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My definition of that problem to which orthogenesis is the
progressive solution is not held to be a raw empirical discovery. It
is rather a deliberate interpretation of the facts. This means that
my definition of the problem openly invites scrutiny and possible
refutation. If this is understood, then it shouldn’t matter that
the solution seems foreordained once the problem is defined. Once
I have really put my car through all possible tests, and
determined that it is the starter and only the starter that is the
problem, I can replace the starter without further ado.
Nevertheless, I must submit both problem and solution to the
final test of the open road.
In order to be inclusive and essential, a problem must
distinguish correctly between those aspects of a situation which
are CHANGEABLE (i.e., subject to regulation) and those which are
GIVEN (i.e., not subject to regulation). Any problem, to be a
problem, must present both kinds of aspects.
The GIVEN conditions are the problem's context. They are
frequently left in the background and taken for granted when a
problem is framed. In the problem "Joe's roof leaks when it
rains", one given is that Joe requires shelter from the elements.
Sometimes what we think are given conditions are in fact
changable. Joe's problem, framed as "the drip bucket is
overflowing", takes the very thing for granted, namely the leaky
roof, that can and should be fixed. But without some givens,
there is no selection of desire, attention, or effort; one aims to
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change everything at random. Instead of a problem, there is a
diffuse uneasiness, or a "complete panic", leading to "blind and
wild overt activities" (Dewey, 1938, p.105). Without givens, there
are no constraints upon the situation. A problem cannot arise,
since there is nothing for it to push against, so to speak.
The given conditions explain a problem's history insofar as
they represent adaptations to prior conflicts. In the problem of
Joe's leaky roof, the roof is such a given. At one point, Joe had
the problem of getting shelter; the solution was to move into a
house with a roof. Now, however, there is something about the
roof that is insufficent, problematic; it leaks. Two things make
the leak a genuine problem. First, it is at odds with Joe’s need to
keep dry. It thus defeats the very function of the roof. Second,
Joe can do something about the leak; he can fix it. The leak is
the changeable aspect of the situation.
To qualify as the core of a problem, a condition must be
changeable as well as lacking. If Joe couldn't do anything about
the leak, then it would behoove him to frame the problem
around something he could do something about. Once we have
interpreted every conceivable aspect of a situation as an
immutable given, we have eliminated the possibility of framing a
problem just as surely as if we had allowed for no givens at all.
It becomes impossible to envision any solution that is not simply
a fantasy. As Dewey says, "Statement of a problematic situation
in terms of a problem has no meaning save as the problem
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instituted has. in the very terms of its statement, reference to a
possible solution" (1938, p.108).
To have a problem, we must have a set of conditions which
is changeable and a set of conditions which is given. The
changeable conditions are the focus of the problem; the given
conditions are its immediate context. It is with respect to the
given conditions that the changeable conditions are unsettled,
lacking, in conflict. The leak is only meaningful as a problem
when seen within the context of the roof, and Joe's need to stay
dry. [1]
For a problem to be inclusively and essentially framed, the
changeable set of conditions must require regulation if the conflict
is to cease. If the leak fixed itself, then no problem would arise.
If Joe could conveniently stay dry without fixing the leak, then
the leak would not be the essential problem. Further, the
regulation of those conditions must be sufficient to resolve the
conflict. If Joe's whole roof is falling apart, fixing one leak won't
do much good.
Framing a problem inclusively and essentially also requires
accuracy in distinguishing what is subject to regulation from
what isn’t. Taking what is given in a situation to be changeable
leads to useless complaint and wishfulness, or misdirected effort.
By contrast, taking what may be changeable in a situation as
given, especially if this coincides with (or consists of) our own
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desires and outlook on the situation, leads to complacency or
unimaginative approaches to conflicts.
Now In everyday problem-solving, things are relatively
given or changeable. Deciding what conditions will play the role of
the fixed and which the role of the fixable is the essence of
creative judgement. Some problem-solution complexes will be
more inclusive and essential than others, and so do a better job
of doing away with conflict. Joe may accept the leak as a given,
and buy a drip bucket so large that it takes up half the room. Or
he may see the whole roof as the thing to change, and replace it
entirely at great expense. The first idea swaps one annoyance for
another equally as bad; moreover, the room will still be damp.
The second idea does more than is necessary, adding a nonessential strain on Joe's finances. As adaptations, they are not as
progressive as simply fixing the leak. Neverthless, in many
situations, there may be a variety of ways in which problemsolution complexes can be framed with comparably good results.
To frame that problem-solution which defines human
development, however, is a far more general matter, and
therefore a less flexible one. Unlike Joe’s roof, what is held to be
given must be truly irremovable. If it were potentially
changeable, no matter what the effort involved, this would mean
that the definition unduly limited the true scope of human
development. It would ask human beings to take for granted the
very things they ought to dream of transcending. It would
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exclude real possibilities for growth, while including, as essential
constraints, factors which were either changeable or irrelevant.
It would thus fail to meet the criteria of inclusivity and
essentiality.
The conditions held to be both lacking and changeable must
be just as inclusive and essential. They must be truly changeable,
or else the definition of growth will be tinged with fantasy,
including non-essential matters about which we can do nothing
It must be essential that we change those particular conditions in
order to uproot conflict, and changing them must be sufficient to
do so. Otherwise the definition will exclude possible solutions
which are equally growthful, or even necessary for growth.
Finally, in order to change, the conditions must require human
intervention. If such change is inevitable, then we have not
defined growth as a value at all.

3. The Problem of Human Development
Let us first examine the context of the problem: the given
conditions. On the broadest scale, all human beings must adapt to
two cosmic laws. One is the law of ceaseless CHANGE in
environmental conditions. From the molecular level to the
galactic, things are in a state of constant transformation. Some
things last longer than others; the life of a human being is short
compared to the life of a civilization, or a star. But even a star is
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changing from moment to moment in small ways which will
eventually add up to produce larger and more dramatic changes.
The other law is that of the organism’s DEPENDENCE upon
environmental conditions. Air enters our lungs to make breathing
possible. Language enters from our culture to make thought and
speech possible. We are bombarded by ultraviolet light and by
countless microorganisms. If these exceed certain limits, we
perish. We are also awash in a sea of images, assumptions, and
expectations held by those around us. Without these, we could
hardly fashion any frame of reference for our own ideas and
feelings. We have evolved in interactive concert with specific
conditions of gravity and climate. If we are to venture into space
for long periods, we shall depend upon an artificial environment
to simulate those conditions.
The law of change and the law of dependence are sublimely
indifferent to human endeavor or human constructions. We may
struggle to stave off change, but it comes anyway. We may
succeed to some extent in decreasing our dependence upon nature
only to increase our dependence upon technology and social
harmony. People can think or imagine what they will; the law of
change and the law of dependence operate nonetheless.
For any living organism, human or non-human, to exist, it
must adapt to these two laws. Life is possible only when it solves
the problem of how to maintain a stable, distinct, and self¬
regulating organization Riven the reality of change and
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dependence. Life cannot sustain itself if it succumbs completely to
the random alterations and penetrations of the cosmos. It must
maintain some kind of ongoing integrity. On the other hand, it
cannot sustain a state of FIXITY or ISOLATION. Isolation is
impossible given dependence upon the environment. Since this
environment changes, the organism must find some way to roll
with the punches, so to speak, without being knocked out.
The most general form of this adaptation is the same for all
life. Life adapts to change and dependence by evolving some sort
of mechanism for CONTINUITY and INTERACTION. This is the
progressively adaptive solution to what might be called "the
problem of life". Continuity allows for change. It provides,
however, a compensating power to repeat, from one moment to
the next, whatever it takes to maintain organization in the face
of change. The pupil of the eye expands and contracts according
to the amount of light present, thus ensuring a constant range of
light necessary for seeing and undamaging to the retina. Instinct
permits a bird to find its winter quarters each year despite
changing weather or the passage of time. Interaction allows for
dependence upon the environment. But it compensates by
exerting its own constructive influence upon the environment,
thus shaping the terms of that dependence. Thus the human eye
and the avian instinct have rules of their own. When light is
dim, the pupil alters its environment by expanding. When winter
comes, the robin alters its environment by flying south; when
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spring comes, it alters its environment by building a nest.
Continuity and interaction embrace change and dependence, but
within an organized system rather than a random, entropic one.
Like change and dependence, continuity and interaction are
given conditions with respect to the problem of human
development. How they manifest themselves may be subject to
change, but that they manifest themselves in some way is not. A
human being (or a frog, or a geranium) cannot even begin to
exist unless he interacts with the changing environment in such
a way as to assure continuity of his essential functions.
Continuity and interaction represent a prior adaptation to change
and dependence, one that makes life itself possible.
As organisms evolve phylogenetically, their mechanisms for
ensuring continuity and interaction become more complex.
Compared to the amoeba, the bird continues a wider variety of
functions in the face of a wider and more varied environment.
Evolution extends the organism's means for maintaining life in a
changing environment upon which it depends. At the same time,
it multiplies the frequency and variety of changes and
dependencies. Human beings have evolved distinct and highly
sophisticated ways of ensuring continuity and interaction. In a
practical sense (as opposed to an absolute or theological sense),
these qualities define what it is to be human. They are the
attributes of PLASTICITY and COMMUNICATION.
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As defined earlier (Ch.II, Sec.D2biv above), plasticity is the
power to form alterable habits. Habits of thought, feeling, or
action operate with varying degrees of conscious effort. In many
cases they function with no conscious effort at all. This leaves
consciousness free to deal with what is most in flux without
sacrificing an underlying continuity or stability. For example,
while giving a speech, one can concentrate on the reaction of the
audience without worrying about how to pronounce words.
What distinguishes human plasticity is the extent of its
power to alter, redirect, or create habits, again with varying
degrees of conscious effort. Instead of being locked in by instinct,
humans can consider the consequences of their habits, and
change them so as to produce new consequences. Humans form
habits initially in response to certain conditions. If there is a
change in any aspect of the conditions prompting and maintaining
the habit, the habit can likewise be changed to suit. We do not
pollute the earth out of some blind irrevocable urge. We do it
because we have not yet taken the consequences seriously enough
to propel us to change our ways. It might take a great effort to
change, and we might not do it, but we have the potential to do
it. Because of plasticity, LEARNING plays the dominant role in
human change.
Within human communication, sensori-motor powers are
augmented by and integrated with the power to form symbols
and images. This gives rise to thought, language, and
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imagination. It permits flexible social co-operation, unlike the
pre programmed social patterns of bees or geese. Planning
organization, and technology become possible, leading to increased
mastery over the environment. Ideas and symbols co-ordinate
both the internal environment of impulses, desires, and habits,
as well as the external social and physical environment.
Communication has an affective as well as a cognitive side. It
includes an extended power of empathy as well as an emotional
need for complex interactions with others. Communication enables
us to observe and test the environment so that our thoughts
about it can conform more closely to what is actually so. Like
plasticity, communication yields potential We may fail to listen
to others, we may fail to envision the future, or we may fail to
escape superstition. Nevertheless, we have the biological potential
to succeed.
Plasticity and communication provide each person with an
extremely wide potential environment, one that can include
other times, far-away places, and the ideas of others as well as
his own. More variety means more potential for varied change.
Plasticity and communication also render humans more
dependent upon social conditions as well as natural ones: upon
affection and role models as well as food and climate. Yet
plasticity and communication give human beings an equal
potential to adapt progressively to their dependence upon this
changing environment. If the climate changes, humans can work
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together to form new ways of living, new technologies, new
priorities. If mutual hatreds lead to mutual destruction, humans
can reflect upon the results and achieve deeper understanding.
Thus the human organism has the potential to be enriched rather
than threatened by the inescapable facts of change and
dependence.
Like the cosmic law of change and dependence, and the
biological law of continuity and interaction, the human potential
conferred by plasticity and communication is a given condition
within the problem of human development. Human beings, like it
or not, are "wired" for plasticity and communication. Even
severely autistic persons rely upon powers of learning, empathy,
and imagination that are distinct from those of other life forms.
Plasticity and communication form the most immediate
context of the problem of human development. For although the
potential to develop conferred by them is a given, their
employment to that end is not a given at all. To refer to our
earlier metaphor, plasticity and communication are like Joe's
roof. The roof has the potential to keep Joe dry. But in Joe’s
case, the roof is not quite up to the task: it leaks. It will not keep
the rain off Joe unless he takes some kind of action.
Similarly, plasticity and communication do not extend
themselves automatically in a progressive direction. That is, they
do not inherently work in the direction of eliminating conflicts
with the environmental givens of change and dependence.

200

Rather, they are just as likely to provide the basis for
adaptations which are regressive. Such adaptations reinforce
conflict with the environment by moving in the direction of
increased FIXITY and ISOLATION. Efforts at fixity are, sooner or
later, self-defeating in an environment which will change despite
those efforts. Likewise, efforts at isolation are ultimately selfdefeating in an environment upon which one is nonetheless
dependent.
These regressive tendencies are not, however, alien to
plasticity and communication. Rather, they are a flaw within
plasticity and communication, as the leak is a flaw in the roof.
Just like the leak in the roof is at odds with Joe's need to stay
dry, these tendencies within plasticity and communication are at
odds with the need to adapt to change and dependence in a way
that is not self-defeating. This problem is genuine because it is by
no means a given, but subject to human remediation. It
constitutes the problem to be solved by development.
Let us examine this problem. Plasticity, the power to form
and re-form habits, is beset by a ongoing tendency towards
ATTACHMENT. Once habits are formed, they are hard to break.
This is so even when we can see that they are damaging.
Sometimes we refuse to acknowledge the damage. Rather, we
interpret the environment so as to reinforce existing habits.
Physico-chemical addiction (to nicotine, alcohol, etc.) is the most
obvious kind of attachment. The addict may adopt all kinds of
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false beliefs ( I can stop anytime") so as protect his habit.
Attachment is the sheer need or tendency to continue or repeat a
behavior pattern, thought, feeling, attitude, belief, or image,
irrespective of other considerations. We keep eating ice cream
even if it makes us fat. We keep beating our children, even it
makes us unhappy as well as them. We continue to believe that
the sun revolves around the earth, in the face of evidence to the
contrary. We continue to waste resources and pollute the planet
despite knowledge of the current and potential consequences. We
continue to believe that people of a certain race are lazy even
when we meet people of that race who are industrious.
Communication is equally frustrated by a tendency to form
habits which constrict or collapse the environment. One way we
shrink the environment is by fusing things together, by confusing
them. An imagined personality is fused into a tree or a snake, as
in primitive cultures or early childhood (see Ch.II, Sec.A3 above).
Belief in a certain religion is confused with being a good person.
One identifies one's worth with possession of symbolic prestige
objects, such as a Porsche automobile or a Rolex watch. We also
form habits which close off some aspect of the environment,
rendering it alien to us. We identify with our own desires while
blocking out the expressed desires of others. Or we identify with
another's desires while blocking out our own. The term
EGOCENTRIC here includes all habits which wall off or collapse the
environment in a fixed way. It denotes a centering of
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environmental interaction around our subjective constructions. [2]
Just as attachment hampers plasticity, so egocentrism distorts
communication. The environment is seen only from a narrow
viewpoint, one that refers to, and must conform to, habits which
are isolated from that environment.
Attachment adapts to change by generating and thriving
upon attempts at fixity. Egocentrism adapts to dependence by
generating and thriving upon attempts at isolation. Attachment
and egocentrism, like plasticity and communication, are mutually
reinforcing. Plastic habits are formed and re-formed owing to
communication with the environment; communication occurs
only by virtue of such habits. Likewise, attachment reinforces
egocentrism: in an intimate relationship, as attachment replaces
affection, so receiving replaces giving. One is less concerned about
the other person, and more concerned about losing the familiarity
and security of the relationship. Egocentrism reinforces
attachment: if a primitive tribe is convinced that a ritual dance
brings the rain, they will strongly resist any attempts to alter or
abandon the ritual. The fixation of habits leads to, and is
reinforced by, the distortion of the environment. The term
"egocentric attachment" encompasses this idea.
Egocentric attachment manifests itself "laterally" across all
human experience. Learning any complex skill requires effort
precisely because older, more limited habits must be unlearned
and overcome. In learning to swim, one has to breath in a
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conscious and regular way, and get used to the idea of exhaling
with the face submerged in water. The thoughtless breathing of
everyday life must be abandoned; this is difficult until swimming
in turn becomes a habit. Emotional maturity requires effort
because of attachment to desires and views which are immediate,
narrow, and fixed. If one is attached to having the whole cookie,
it is tough to share it with one's younger sister. If one is attached
to one's own ideas, it is difficult to listen to the ideas of others. If
one identifies utterly with one’s ability to write, it is no easy
thing to take criticism. Ingrained habits of thought and social
tradition must be overcome in order to gain knowledge. Thus
modern science was born in a struggle against the authority of
religious dogma.
Egocentric attachment, in keeping with Piaget's view (Ch II,
Sec.B2d above) also reappears in new and more sophisticated
forms with each developmental advance. It thus extends
"longitudinally" through human ontogenesis, posing more complex
problems with each new solution to prior problems. For example,
infantile egocentrism, exemplified by an inability to see the world
as separate from immediate needs and perceptions, is overcome
by the formation of the notion of a distinct "self" as opposed to
what is "other". This creates a higher battleground upon which
egocentric attachments must be vanquished if development is to
continue. A person must learn to co-ordinate the "self's"
perspective with the perspectives of others in spite of the
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tendency to fix his worldview in terms of this constructed self
(most of us spend our lives on this battleground!). Each new level
of development thus frames its own new problem in terms of
egocentric attachment. It does not follow from this that there is
no increase in resolution of the problem. This would be like
arguing that since I wrestle with musical difficulties today as
much as I did at age nine, that consequently there has been no
development in my musical skill. Each new problem simply builds
upon, while taking for granted, problems that have already been
solved. The developmental vector of the successive solutions Is one
which progressively resolves the general organism-environment
problem within which the specific ones are framed.
Egocentric attachment presents new challenges in exact step
with the level of development achieved. The need to meet these
challenges through reflective intervention, i.e., education,
increases with development. This is so because the interactions
required for development to continue become more sophisticated,
and can be taken for granted less and less. Growth thus becomes
increasingly contingent upon education, and thus upon ethical
deliberation.
I am not arguing that egocentric attachment is, empirically
speaking, the dominant human tendency, and that all
development is an uphill struggle against it. Its status as an
ethical problem requires no such idea. The domain of ethics arises
when there is some question of regulation requiring choice (See
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Ch.II, Sec.Dl above). Egocentric attachment can be overcome,
i.e., development occurs, in the context of human interventions
that can frequently be taken for granted. Prior progressive
adaptations (development), embodied in both the child and the
social milieu in which a child grows, serve to diminish the power
of egocentric attachment. In these cases, development seems to
occur naturally", and the ethical issue is not as pressing, since
there is no problematic situation. Thus an infant may learn to
run and speak with relative ease when a certain degree and kind
of feeding, love, and stimulation can be taken for granted. Even
at early levels, however, the need for education leaps back into
focus as soon as we can no longer take necessary environmental
interactions as given. A starved and abandoned child may remain
trapped for several years in a world of crawling and incoherent
sounds. Development during childhood may appear automatic
when a minimum of conventional teaching by adults can be
taken for granted. Development during adolescence, however,
might require societal permission to question those teachings. If
such permission cannot be taken for granted, ethical issues rise to
the surface.
The function of adaptation is to resolve conflict between the
organism and a changing environment upon which it depends. All
human adaptations employ the attributes of plasticity and
communication to this end. Egocentric attachment is a barrier to
this effort. As a problem, it has no meaning outside of the
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context of possibilities presented by plasticity and communication,
any more than a leak has meaning outside of the context of a
roof.
Unlike the leak in the roof, however, egocentric attachment
is built into the human condition, it is there from the start. It
defines our humanity as fully as do plasticity and
communication. It manifests most pervasively as the problem of
IGNORANCE. Human beings are thoroughly dependent upon and
affected by their environment. We are not separate from nature,
we are an integral part of it. Yet we begin by knowing next to
nothing about this natural universe, not even about our own
bodies and minds. We perceive ourselves as isolated entities. Yet
we have the potential to know the world and ourselves as a part
of it. In the exercise of this potential, we must grope our way
through a succession of myths, superstitions, delusions, and
mistaken ideas. Knowledge does not fall into our laps. We must
earn every crumb, and still continue to doubt what we
supposedly know.
On the social plane, we are thoroughly dependent upon
each other for the very form of our thoughts and feelings. Yet
we do not know one another. We perceive ourselves as isolated
from other human beings, as having interests which run counter
to others’ interests. These conflicts are so essential to our human
character that we simply take them for granted. Yet they are
conflicts only because the potential for knowing, and thus the
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desire to know, is there. To seek love, truth, or beauty is to
exercise the capacity for the formation and re-formation of
habits for entering into observation of and communication with
the environment. Egocentric attachment presents an ongoing
obstacle to such attainment. It thus sets the problem to be
overcome by development.
The function of ethics is to choose between or regulate
adaptations to conflict. It is to sort progressive adaptations which
really get at the heart of the conflict from regressive ones which
do not. Development is the name given to that direction taken by
progressive adaptations. This is the basis for Dewey's claim that
development is the inclusive and essential ethical function, the
"only moral 'end'" (See Ch.II, Sec.Dl above). All adaptations must
take place within the context of plasticity and communication.
Egocentric attachment, the barrier to plasticity and
communication, is what generates the need to regulate such
adaptations. If there were no egocentric attachment, our habits
of interaction with the environment would form and re-form
without thought, resistance, or effort of any kind. Our
communication with the environment would be total; all barriers
between organism and environment, subject and object, would be
removed. What, then, could possibly develop? The problem of
egocentric attachment within a context of plasticity and
communication thus gives rise to both the ethical domain itself
and to development as its prime value.
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All regressive adaptations reinforce or increase egocentric
attachment. They operate in the direction of fixity and isolation.
This increases the conflict between human beings and their
environment. It leads towards the negation of those very powers
of plasticity and communication which make distinctively human
life possible. The very power of egocentric attachment to distort
interaction with the environment can cause it to be perceived as
a solution to conflict; if one could only get one's own way, the
conflict would be over, wouldn't it? But the maintenance or
enhancement of egocentric attachment ultimately contradicts
larger, more thorough adaptive efforts. It increases the very
organism-environment conflict it strives to resolve. We destroy
an enemy to gain security, only to reinforce the true source of
our insecurity; the notion that we are alone, separate, and
independent from other human beings.
All progressive adaptations work to transcend or do away
with the operation of egocentric attachment in a particular
situation. Such adaptations, described as a consistent direction of
change over time, constitute development. All such adaptations
conform to the orthogenetic principle, as set forth in the
introduction to this chapter. Orthogenesis thus serves as a
definition of development. As mentioned earlier, the problem of
egocentric attachment resurfaces at a new level with each new
developmental advance. Therefore orthogenesis must be described
as a direction, a process, and not as a single event.
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4- QrUlOftgngSiS ag ting Progressive

Adaptation to Egocentric

Attachment
Orthogenesis adapts to change by seeking an organismic
continuity which is flexible and not fixed. It seeks an intimate
connection with the environment, but one that diminishes
attachment. It adapts to dependence upon the environment by
achieving autonomous self-direction without isolation.
Attachment fuses habits, including concepts, ideas, images,
feelings, actions, and purposes. For example, one fuses a notion of
one‘s "self" with one's looks, one's race, or one's occupation.
Orthogenesis overcomes attachment by distinguishing habits while
co-ordinating them within a larger scheme of thought, feeling,
purpose, or action. The "self" is seen to be something more
inclusive than a collection of appearances, achievements, and
possessions. These things have their place, but they can be kept
in that place. They can change and be changed without calling
the "self" into question. The larger and more inclusive of
differentiated elements the scheme, the more developed it is.
Thus we can speak of the "development" of a racist or a cancer
only by failing to assess the racist in the context of a larger
society, or the cancer in the context of the entire body. Since
"racist" and "cancer" derive their very meaning from these
contexts, our view of the extension of racism or cancer must be
co-ordinated within them. Within the context of society, the
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extension of racism is regressive; likewise the extension of cancer
within the context of the body. Thus to hold a view of the
extension of either as development" is itself regressive: it is to
move away from a more co-ordinated viewpoint.

Egocentric

habits distort efforts to distinguish and co-ordinate by closing off
communication with the larger environment. The thief may have
an inclusive concept of "victims" within which various kinds of
victims are distinguished, each with a unique sort of loot to be
stolen. But this view is "centered" around, attached to, the thief’s
desire for loot. It fails to empathize with others. It sees people,
not as they are, but within the constricted stereotype of
"victim". It fails to appreciate the larger implications of a society
based on thievery. Indeed, the thief does not consider the
consequences of his actions upon the quality of society, which
affects him as well. Finally, he does not look inside himself, at his
own attachments, to question whether his freedom and power
are ultimately served by a life of thievery. In fact, he is
imprisoned by his desire for loot and his isolation from the world
of others’ feelings.
Within orthogenesis, co-ordination and distinguishing
overcome egocentrism through increasingly DE-CENTEREB
interactions with the environment. The power and AUTONOMY
gained through co-ordination is thus employed in a way that is
sensitive to larger concerns: others' rights and feelings, the
quality of the whole society, the balance of the natural
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environment, and so forth. We can build vehicles which free us
from the constraints of time and distance, while remaining
sensitive to their impact upon natural beauty and social
intercourse. In contrast to egocentrism, which fosters isolation,
de-centering leads to a widening embrace of the environment
with greater autonomy from distortion by fixed and self-enclosed
habits. Distinguishing of environmental aspects from each other
becomes more objective. Essential distinctions are preserved, nonessential ones abandoned. We can, for example, distinguish the
different skin color of two people without making any distinction
between them with respect to their rights.
Within orthogenesis, OPENNESS to the environment replaces
attachment to it. We can consider opposing political views
without feeling moved either to blind conformity or compulsive
rejection. If we take sides, it is because we have objectively
considered the potential consequences of each view. It is not
because we are afraid of rejection by our friends who think that
way, or because one view better serves our narrow and selfish
interests, or because we confuse disloyalty to the nation with
acceptance of the other view. Orthogenesis brings an autonomous
IMMUNITY to these non-essential considerations without thereby
encouraging egocentric isolation from them. A person can notice,
and not simply push out of awareness,

the fear rising within

when he is about to take an unpopular stand. Seeing this fear in
himself can render him more compassionate to others in a similar
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position, even if their views are different. Yet he can still choose
to act out of other motives, and not be run by his fear.

Within

development, independence from the environment and
connectedness to it are not only compatible, but mutually
reinforcing. The person can remain both aware of and immune to
his fear because he is equally aware of the larger needs of the
situation: unless he speaks out, an injustice may be done, or a
falsehood accepted as truth. He is able to autonomously
distinguish these considerations as being more essential to his
welfare and that of others.
Such examples may mask a point that bears repetition, the
orthogenetic principle only indicates the most general
characteristics of any developmental course. It cannot prescribe
the most growthful course to take in a particular situation in
advance of a thorough and objective examination of that
situation. Until we have examined the situation, we don't know
what is really given and what is really changeable about it.
Further, we don’t know how egocentric attachment is most
inclusively and essentially at work in that situation; in other
words, we’re not sure what the problem is. The man in the
above example may have no difficulty overcoming his fear.
Rather, he may have a tendency to shoot his mouth off too often
and at the wrong time, making him an ineffective vehicle for an
unpleasant truth. Is it more growthful for him to speak, or to
control his impulses and let others speak for him? Whatever the
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path indicated within a hypothetical example, it must be
understood that a real situation-in-context may include facts
which lead us to recommend a different path. Nonetheless, to
justify any chosen path as developmental, it must be shown how
it overcomes egocentric attachment through orthogenesis.
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c

FQrmal Justification Of Orthogenesis as an
Ethical Principle

1. Formal Justification: Dgfinition and Limits
I hold that orthogenesis prescribes the desirable, valuable
direction of human ontogenesis. It is an ethically normative
principle. One way to justify it as such is to refer to formal
metaethical criteria. 1 accept (see Ch.I, Sec.C, Sec.F above)
Kohlberg’s criteria of UN1VERSAL1ZABILITY, UNIVERSALITY, and
PRESCRIPTIVITY as definitive of such formal justification (see
Ch.II, Sec.C4 above).
Formal justification is not divorced from genetic-functional
justification. Formal criteria act rather as a kind of "shorthand"
for what kinds of solutions to problems will be most INCLUSIVE
and ESSENTIAL (see Sec.B2 above). The criteria of
universalizability, universality, and prescriptivity are valuable
because they test whether principles help us frame problems and
solutions progressively, i.e., in a way that will really do away
with the source of the problem.
A UNIVERSALIZABLE principle is one that everyone in a
society can follow without destroying the very social context
which gives meaning to the principle

"Expect government

services but evade taxes" is not universalizable, because if
everyone followed it, there would be no services and no evasion.
Acts which are not universalizable, like lying, seek some
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egocentric advantage within a social context that is taken for
granted. But in a society where everyone lied all the time,
communication itself would disintegrate. This would defeat
whatever "advantage" one hoped to gain by lying.
Universalizable principles, on the other hand, are SELFCONSISTENT and SELF-REINFORCING when EVERYONE follows
them.

Help others", unlike "steal from others", resolves the

problem of insecurity in a way that INCLUDES everybody. It also
addresses what is most ESSENTIAL about our problems: if people
know they will be helped by others, they have less need to steal.
Universalizable principles acknowledge that we depend upon each
other for security, knowledge, language, personality, life. They
adapt to this progressively, by promoting DIALOGUE. Nonuniversalizable principles promote self-defeating egocentric
isolation.
Universalizability tests whether principles require the
individual to respect DIALOGUE within society. UNIVERSALITY
complements this by testing whether principles oblige society to
respect VARIETY among individuals and situations. "To be polite,
eat with a fork" is not universal because it excludes cultures in
which it is polite to eat with the fingers. "Do not take the life of
members of your own nation" is not as universal as the principle,
"Respect the right of all individuals to life". Guides for action that
are not universal may reflect a sociocentric bias: being human
gets confused with being white, or being friendly with shaking
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hands. Bias may be idiosyncratic as well as sociocentric: “Be
productive may get confused with “Sacrifice everything to your
job . The latter statement takes too narrow a view of the
individual.

Universal principles seek to include not only varied

individuals and situations, but a wide view of what an individual
comprises. To include the widest variety of individuals and
aspects of individuals, they must hit upon what is most
ESSENTIAL to human welfare. Thus "always obey the law" leaves
unsolved the problems of individuals oppressed by the law, as in
the case of Rosa Parks. It fails to address what is essential about
law: its promotion of individual welfare.
A PRESCRIPTIVE principle is one that holds itself up as a
general "prescription" to "cure" problematic situations. It
prescribes what ought to be done to eliminate the problem. A
prescriptive principle does not "give up" in the face of a tough
problem. "Safeguard human rights" takes on more meaning, not
less, in a world plagued by violence.

It cannot merely describe

the problem: "Look, people have always been starving" is no
prescription for world hunger. Yet it must refer to the current
problem to be solved. Thus it cannot Justify Itself solely as an
extension of previous conditions, although these may shed light
upon our present situation. For example, it is not prescriptive to
justify loving others solely by referring to a prior instinctual
drive for love. Without reference to the way in which love
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operates to resolve conflict, the same "naturalistic" argument
could be used to justify aggression or lust.
A prescriptive principle must INCLUDE what is ESSENTIAL to
solving a problem, while excluding all else. It must not include
matters which are irrelevant to the problem, or neglect facts
which are. For example, Piaget’s child subjects, judging the
degree of wrongdoing, focus on the size of the stain and ignore
the intentions of the stainer.

The rule "make smaller stains" is

not a prescriptive principle in the way that "take care to avoid
damaging things" is.. It misses the point, so to speak. "Express
your ideas unless nobody else does" includes an injunction to
conform which sabotages the fight against intellectual sterility
Prescriptive principles, like "defend the right of free speech",
maintain their force even when one disagrees with the speaker,
or when such defense is unpopular. "Maintain order by punishing
demonstrators" misses what is truly essential to maintaining
long-term order: wholehearted popular consent to a just
government. I aim to show that the orthogenetic principle
defines, in an ethically universalizable, universal, and
prescriptive way,

what it means to grow or develop. This means

only that orthogenesis captures the most general traits to which
all problem-solutions must conform if they are to be called
developmental or growthful. It states that all growth involves
greater distinguishing of environmental elements from each other
alongside a greater co-ordination of those elements, increasing
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autonomy of choice alongside a greater de-centering of the
perspective from which choices are made; and increasing
immunity from the vicissitudes of the environment alongside a
greater opening of interaction with the environment.
Such a principle can aid educational inquiry (i.e., inquiry
aimed at promoting development) in several ways. First, we can
deduce from it general standards for the development of inquiry
itself. To develop, inquiry must become more THOROUGH and
OBJECTIVE (Cf. Dewey, 1922, p.246, "broad" and "impartial").
Thoroughness engenders the widest, most OPEN view of causes
and consequences, and seeks to CO-ORDINATE these within
judgement. Objectivity aims at IMMUNITY or AUTONOMY from
egocentric or sociocentric bias. It strives to DISTINGUISH matters
which are essential to a problem from those which are not, and
to DE-CENTER from cultural conditioning, and fixed or
unwarranted beliefs. (In Chapter IV, I shall explore guidelines for
thorough and objective inquiry in education).
Second, the principle can help us recognize and criticize
changes which run counter to development. We can be more
alert to influences which reinforce egocentrism or sociocentrism,
which fuse essential distinctions, which constrain autonomy or
awareness, and so forth. Third, it provides a principled basis on
which to justify, debate, or reflect upon the growthfulness of
specific changes we are planning, or which have already
occurred. How will the change render the student more immune
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to environmental changes while opening him up to the
environment? How will it increase his autonomy while giving him
a more de-centered perspective? Fourth, it can stimulate us to
see connections and analogies between different avenues of
growth. In Piaget s work, the mental reversal of mathematical
operations and the mental reversal of roles in social conflicts are
linked by the idea of de-centering (Ch. II, Sec. B2b-c above).
What might growth in artistic ability have in common with
growth in scientific ability? The orthogenetic principle gives us an
ethical language for exploring such questions.
In no case, however, does the orthogenetic principle allow
us to predict what will be most growthful in a particular
situation. Only thorough and objective inquiry into that situation
can achieve this. Within each unique situation, each effort to
promote growth will be guided not only by principles, but by the
educator's global frame of reference, including intuitions and
concrete perceptions. Each actual problem-solution will be unique
to that situation. The orthogenetic principle acts as a check upon
isolated judgement by providing universalizable, universal, and
prescriptive guidelines. But it cannot substitute for judgement
based on the totality of experience.

220

,

2

Orthogenesis as Universalize?
Orthogenesis, qua increasing AUTONOMY with DE¬

CENTERING, is universalizable because it works to transcend
conflict between individuals as unique on the one hand and
members of society on the other. As they develop, individuals
become responsive to the needs of others, and society as a whole.
They de-center from a narrow, isolated view of themselves.
Society, for its part, becomes responsive to the autonomy of
individuals. Further, the growing individual learns to promote his
own autonomy, whereas the growing society learns to promote
the de-centered social sensibilities of its members. Thus the aims
of individual and society merge without one simply being
submerged by the other.
When autonomous de-centering is valued by everyone, the
conflict between our unique and communal natures is
progressively resolved. Increasing autonomy of differing
individuals to make original choices leads to greater VARIETY
among people. People are less constrained by the state, or by
fixed beliefs, to become peasants or doctors or Christians. At the
same time, however, increasing de-centering prevents variety
from disintegrating society. Increasingly de-centered individuals
seek out DIALOGUE with others, even with those of other
religions, Jobs, or races. Increasing empathy, and the taking of
others' viewpoints,

lead people to autonomously seek agreements
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which keep their habits and desires from harming others. I may
want to play music at 11pm on the first floor; you may want to
sleep on the second floor. Autonomous de-centering leads both of
us to weigh each claim equally, and seek a creative solution we
can both accept.
De-centering from the need for conformity or fixed routine
breeds tolerance, thus creating more room, so to speak, for the
varied choices of others. Heterosexuals can learn to respect
homosexuals; anti-abortion activists can learn to use reason
rather than invective in their discussions with Planned
Parenthood workers. Dialogue does not stop at tolerance,
however. De-centering (in concert with OPENING, another aspect
of orthogenesis) involves an active effort to know others, to find
some common ground with them. Variety in turn prevents
dialogue from lapsing into static conformity. If I live in a
community of people from many cultures, I can learn new
languages, break prejudices, and reflect on what is most essential
about being human. My powers of de-centering expand, as well
as my power to make varied choices.
With de-centering, people perceive and respond to the
common needs of society. People see that their own growth is
bound up with the growth of others. They want to ensure that
society is doing its best to promote growth for everyone.
Autonomy implies a person's power to influence the organization
of society, and to choose his own way of contributing to society.
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When universalized, autonomous de-centering is valued within
our social organizations. Systems of government, economics,
education, and so forth, encourage autonomy and de-centering
among people. They assist every person to autonomously advance
his unique interests and abilities. At the same time, they
promote dialogue among individuals regarding how their powers
might be best used to benefit others.
As Dewey points out (Ch.II, Sec.D3e above), there are bound
to be conflicts between the individual's freedom to pursue original
interests and the social need for organization. A talented engineer
may wish to become a hermit or an eccentric clown just when a
there is a critical need for a dam to be repaired. Orthogenesis
does not prescribe a fixed solution to such conflicts. It prescribes
the direction of change which will tend to overcome such
conflicts. As society grows, it comes to value the engineer's
autonomy, and respect the original process of judgement by
which he has decided to abandon engineering. Others become
willing to persuade the engineer to change his mind, but only
through reasoned and compassionate dialogue. They aim to avoid
coercion, including ostracism. Society also seeks to promote such
variety and wealth of talent that it can fill the engineer s place
with little strain (In this sense, it becomes more immune to the
varied choices of its members). As the engineer grows, he takes
social needs into account. He may conclude that he can
contribute most to others through meditation, laughter, or a
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sheer demonstration of non-conformity. He will be open to the
relevant arguments of others, while remaining immune to
considerations of mere popularity. When the values of autonomy
with de-centering, immunity with opening are universalized,
conflicts are not forestalled, nor are their solutions foreordained.
But a context is created wherein conflicts are more likely to find
progressive resolution.

3. Orthogenesis as Universal
a. Across Individuals and Cultures
Orthogenesis describes the universal direction that
adaptations must take to do away with a problem common to all
human beings. Dewey (Ch.ll, Sec.Dl above) describes human
experience as occurring within three contexts. First, there is a
unique context varying from individual to individual. To know
precisely what is most growthful for a particular individual at a
particular time requires thorough and objective inquiry into this
context. Second, there is a context which the individual shares
with members of his own culture and his own historical time. To
know what would be most growthful for Japanese society, or
Nigerian society, would require us to make essential distinction^
between cultures.
Third, there is a general structure of experience which all
people share. All people shape and re-shape habits in order to
interact with changing conditions. All people depend upon others
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for their emergence as a personality, and are endowed with
powers of empathy and language to communicate with others.
Plasticity of habit allows people to learn new ways of
perceiving and acting as they confront new realities. Children
learn that objects remain in existence even when they cannot be
seen. Scientists learn that the earth goes around the sun, even
when the Catholic Church says it doesn’t. White people learn that
black people can make compatible co-workers, even when their
parents taught them otherwise. Yet for all people, this plasticity
is impeded by ATTACHMENT. We cling to habits even when they
reinforce conflict with the environment. We shut out interaction
with the environment that threatens those habits. For example,
politicians allow deficits to mount rather than break the habit of
procuring government projects for their own districts. People
continue to invest power in corrupt politicians rather than take a
chance on new sources of leadership.
Our powers of communication enable us to co-operate with
each other to form civilization. Language, science, music, and so
forth, are all products of co-operation. Families and social groups
presuppose some degree of mutual respect and understanding. Yet
communication is distorted by EGOCENTRISM. One way we
manifest this is to see ourselves as isolated from one another. We
turn differences of race, nationality, or religion into reasons to
attack each other. We constrict the scope of our empathy and
deny the interdependence inherent in human relations.
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Orthogenesis is universal because it is an antidote to this
most fundamental problem in human experience. With growth,
people open themselves up to a wider view of the environment.
They put themselves in other people's shoes. They seek ways to
co-ordinate opposing views within a more essential set of values.
Differing interpretations of the Koran, for example, get co¬
ordinated within the notion that being bombed and gassed is not
good for anybody. People distinguish habits which reinforce
conflict with the objective world from those which don't. They
gain immunity from egocentric, superstitious, and biased beliefs.
They also gain autonomy to choose more de-centered habits. A
real-estate developer gives up reaping excessive profits from lowincome housing at the expense of the people who need that
housing. Compassion replaces his attachment to money. A
scientist gives up distorting the results of an experiment so that
they will conform to a pet theory. The quest for truth replaces
his attachment to proving himself right.
Orthogenesis prescribes an immunity from fused, egocentric,
and narrow habit-attachments. It prescribes an ongoing search
for more distinguished (differentiated), de-centered habits which
permit more open and objective interaction with the
environment. It prescribes the co-ordination (integration) of these
habits by an increasingly autonomous individual. Yet it cannot
prescribe, in advance of inquiry, precisely what egocentric
attachments most require changing for a unique individual m a
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particular culture. In fact, it prescribes that inquiry into these
particulars must be thorough and objective so as to avoid
egocentric or ethnocentric bias. It encourages us to consider, for
example, that growth in America might begin by educating
individuals to pledge more allegiance to social welfare, whereas in
China, stress might be placed on educating government to respect
individual freedom. Orthogenesis can present universal ethical
guidelines and still be culturally relative. We can safely say that
it would be growthful for men in India to abandon the traditional
practice of burning wives who cannot pay a sufficient dowry. Yet
an educational program with this aim would need to take into
account an entire range of cultural factors unique to India.
We may worry that any ethical principle's claim to
universality across individuals and cultures harbors an egocentric
or ethnocentric blindness. We may worry that such a principle
will fail to respect an autonomous process whereby each
individual or culture chooses values out of their unique
experiences. These concerns are themselves orthogenetic in
nature. Orthogenesis enjoins us to de-center from unquestioned
cultural conditioning, or from a need to compel others to conform
without autonomous reflection on their part. It safeguards
variety by prescribing thorough and objective inquiry into
individual and sociocultural contexts before designing any
educational plans.
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b. Within Individuals

The value of orthogenesis includes all aspects of human
growth. I shall make a case for this simply by reviewing
examples of orthogenesis across a variety of such aspects. The
reader should refer also to examples given from the work of
Werner, Piaget, Kohlberg, and Dewey (Ch II: Sec. A3-4, Sec.B2,
Sec.C3; Sec.D3 above).
With growth, skills co-ordinate (integrate) an increasing
array of distinguished elements. A figure skater not only learns a
complex series of leaps and turns, but can mesh these within a
larger routine. Autonomy comes from the power to focus upon
the refinement of some habits within a global act while allowing
others to proceed without attention. An actor can concentrate
fully on his expressions of the moment, confident that his next
line will "come to him" when needed. His power of concentration
also brings immunity from irrelevant distractions like the crying
of a baby in the audience. The openness to reconstruction of each
distinguished habit prevents skill from becoming rigid. The actor
retains the power to improvise, and to deepen his sense of the
character during a run of performances. The co-ordination of
habits allows for a greater opening to the environment. A
carpenter's autonomous power to create a building goes hand in
hand with his sensitivity to his tools, his materials, and the
objective requirements of the project.
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Emotional growth brings an ability to de-center from and
reshape emotional impulses and patterns, while co-ordinating
them with wider social and personal considerations. A child ceases
to throw a tantrum when asked to share his toys. He drops his
attachment to controlling all the toys, and constructs new
enjoyment out of playing with another child. Growth entails
sensitivity and accessibility to one's emotional experience, which
becomes more varied and finely shaded. Mike is angry at Fred for
being slightly late. Upon probing his feelings, he uncovers an
underlying fear that Fred does not care about him. Instead of
screaming at Fred, or sulking through the evening, Mike expresses
his underlying fear to Fred. He does so in a calm way while
retaining access to his unsettled feelings. Growth brings immunity
from being at the mercy of one's emotions without closing
emotions off. It brings de-centered sensitivity to the emotions of
others, and an enhanced power to express emotions truthfully.
Cognitive growth frees the individual from egocentric
distortions and confers the ability to co-ordinate a wide range of
environmental changes through ideas. A child gains the ability to
classify objects into a variety of sets and subsets. For example, in
a box of brown and white wooden beads, he can see that there
are more wooden beads than brown beads even when there are
more brown ones than white ones (See Ch.II, Sec.B2b). Cognitive
growth permits symbolic thinking which avoids magically fusing
symbols and their referents. A voodoo doll is not seen as an
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actual part of the person it represents. Cognitive and emotional
growth are integrated as one seeks an objective perception of the
world, even if this means reshaping emotionally-charged
prejudices. Black human beings are seen as they are, and not as
something between an animal and a person.
Orthogenesis includes overcoming habit-attachments which
are chemical as well as psychological. Autonomy and immunity
from addiction to alcohol, nicotine, or drugs, for example, opens
the individual’s environment. He need not center his activities
around obtaining his "fix".
Extended knowledge of science, history, anthropology,
mathematics, and so on, creates a more open and less
sociocentric worldview. Growth brings the ability to see accurate
connections between events: we can learn from the past two
World Wars to seek new ways of resolving conflicts in Europe
today. Growth always involves autonomous control merged with
de-centered responsiveness. In science, growth must bring not
only the seeds of technology to control the environment, but
understanding of the human effect upon a delicate planetary
ecology.
With development, moral ideas and feelings become
increasingly de-centered and autonomous. Unfettered empathy,
mutual role-taking, and universalizable principles guide
judgement and action. Egocentrism holds less sway in ethical
decisions. One becomes more immune from considerations which
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do not do away with underlying conflict, be they ethnic
prejudice, narrow personal advantage, fear of others' opinions, or
fixed social conventions. Social attitudes become more tolerant of
diversity. At the same time, people seek an essential social
consensus through democratic dialogue among equals.
Aesthetic or artistic growth brings the power to connect
one s sensory experience to ideas, memories, and analogies. An
author conveys the smells of the beach in his writing by calling
up images of seaweed and suntan lotion. A mime conveys the
texture of an imaginary rope. Growth involves an autonomy
from fixed aesthetic notions, and an openness to original and
more immediate experiences. At the same time, a tap dancer can
improvise and create fresh steps within an established form.

The

ability to distinguish yet co-ordinate harmonic, chromatic,
linguistic, or other nuances increases with growth. Thus the
artist extends the intimacy and complexity of his communion
with the environment.

As discussed earlier (Ch II, Sec.D3d

above), artistic growth involves a simultaneous increase in
originality, stressing the unique vision of the artist, alongside a
communicability stressing an expression of shared human
experience.
Religious and philosophical questioning, with growth,
becomes more autonomous. It becomes distinguished from
authority, social conventions, dogma, and even fears about death
or judgement. The desire to "know God", or oneself, out of one s
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own experience, becomes more essential, focused, and free from
egocentric distortions. The removal of doubt becomes a more
sufficient reason for faith, faith ceases to hinge on the promise of
other rewards, e g., being reunited with loved ones after death.
Questioning comes to include all existence, and a wider sphere of
one s own experiences, even those of an everyday nature. Thus
one s Questioning about the "larger" things becomes more
integrated with one's daily experience of the "smaller" things. The
experiences and teachings of others become increasingly
appreciated at the same time that one becomes less dependent
upon them, and more directly attuned to one's own actual
experience. [3]
Variety and dialogue express the idea of differentiation and
integration within the person, just as they do in social relations
(see Sec.2. above).

Growth does not fix upon a single

adaptational mode; it fosters a variety of experiential pathways.
At the same time, growth extends one's power to have these
paths discourse with one another, and become co-ordinated in a
mutually enriching way. Scientific theory can thus enhance
aesthetic insight, and vice versa, without one being confounded
with the other.

4

Orthogenesis as Prescriptive
Orthogenesis prescribes a progressive solution to the problem

of egocentric attachment: this is its function as a value. All
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growth is growth out of egocentric attachment; when beset by
egocentric attachment, what we ought to do in all cases is grow
out of it. Three facts are essential to orthogenesis’ justification as
a value.

First, egocentric attachment is a problem. It generates

conflict between human beings and their environment. Second,
this problem is susceptible to progressive regulation by
orthogenesis, which tends to do away with these conflicts. Third,
orthogenesis cannot be counted on, like gravity, to occur without
some conscious human intervention.
Orthogenesis is prescriptive because its justification does not
rely upon facts which are not essential to its function. Thus,
orthogenesis is not justified as an "alignment” with the forces of
"evolution", "nature", or "life", which exist prior to human
consciousness. Certainly, we may draw poetic inspiration from
prior evolutionary struggles, especially those resulting in the
evolution of humanity. Further, the very concept of
"development" owes much to the Darwinian idea of evolution, and
the analogies drawn from phylogenesis to human ontogenesis by
authors such as Piaget.
Yet life, nature, and evolution are not ethically selective,
they include bubonic plague as well as butterflies. Nature acts
according to its own rules when viral infections or human over
population cause misery. To justify growth through a mere
appeal to "life" is to abdicate our ethical responsibility to choose
among life's possibilities. When we appeal to

"respect for life

or
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respect for the planet

as ethical principles, we implicitly mean

respect for an ecological balance which sustains variety, takes the
welfare of other life forms into account, and supports human
development.
The point is that action to maintain a vast variety of living
things, and to extend our sympathies to include non-human as
well as human life, is a progressive adaptation to the bare fact of
human interdependence with all life. It takes on ethical
significance because it is an adaptation which requires regulative
effort in the face of human tendencies towards egocentric
isolation and attachment to desires (e.g., for unlimited
consumption) which are objectively self-defeating in an ecological
context. When we extol "life" or "nature" as an ethical source of
justification, what we are implicitly appealing to is a vision of life
as intelligently and compassionately regulated. There is no
ethically sound way to abdicate the responsibility for choosing
how to use the

human power to regulate, which, after all, is

just as "natural" a phenomenon as any other.
Orthogenesis cannot be justified by appealing to nature
because nature includes too much: what isn't growthful as well
as what is. Likewise, it cannot be justified or refuted by an
appeal to scientific descriptions which exclude too much,
especially untapped efforts of education. A study may show that
only 2% of a given population show no evidence of racial
prejudice. This would not justify abandoning growth out of racism
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as a value. Science has not proven, once and for all, that racial
prejudice is an ineradicable part of human nature, and that we
might as well not bother valuing its abolition. Such a judgement
would fail to include all unexplored educational possibilities and
sociohistorical arrangements which might overcome racism. Of
course, any educational program would do well to heed such a
study, so as to properly gauge the measure of its task.
Similarly, scientific proof that people develop at a particular
rate, or in a particular sequence, or under particular conditions,
has important implications for assessing the value of specific
educational practices. Educational practices which do not take
existing facts into account will not promote growth. Requiring my
5th graders to read Mobv Dick is not likely to open their
environment to include great American literature. But such
evidence does not throw doubt upon orthogenesis as a definition of
the desirable direction of change.
In fact, the very desirability of orthogenesis should lead us
to accept "scientific" statements about human limitations with
respect to its pursuit in a temporary and relative way only. This
is because the educational means at our disposal, and thus the
variables affecting these limitations, are themselves subject to
sociohistorical developments which cannot be completely
accounted for within a scientific inquiry. Even the outlook of the
scientists designing the inquiry and drawing conclusions from it is
bound to be conditioned by such development. What may be a
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’*given" today, in other words, may become subject to regulation
tomorrow. Only through constant pressure of inquiry upon
supposed "givens" can we combat that tendency toward narrowed
vision imposed upon us by our particular time, culture, and
individuality.
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Notes
1.

I restrict my definition of "given" conditions to those which
provide the context for a problem, without which the
problem (e.g., the leak) would have no meaning. These
include unchangeable conditions which stand in opposition to
the problem (e g., Joe's need to avoid the rain) as well as
conditions which represent prior adaptations to the former,
and thus are required in order to explain the problem-athand (e.g., the roof).
Obviously, there may be many other unchangeable or
unproblematic aspects of a situation which are not necessary
to lend significance to what is changeable and lacking. Joe
may prefer red shirts to blue ones; this is simply irrelevant.
Maybe Joe lives In the desert; this would certainly be
relevant to whether the leak is a problem at all. But it is not
needed in order to explain why the leak is a problem; it
would be more relevant to explaining why it is not a
problem. If Joe's consumptive mother were coming to visit,
however, this would add urgency to Joe's need to do
something about that leak. It would contribute to the context
of the problem qua problem, and would be considered a given
condition within the framing of the problem. In order to
frame a problem inclusively and essentially, we must
distinguish conditions which meet these criteria from those
which do not, Just as we must distinguish between the given
conditions and the changeable ones.
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2.

My definition of egocentrism is to be distinguished from the
more specific concept of infantile egocentrism found in
Werner s work, and in much of Piaget’s worK (although his
looser usage of the term is close to my own). Within
Werner's psychology, the term egocentrism (See Ch.Il,
Sec. A3bvi above) is limited to those isolating distortions which
characterize very early childhood. The inability to take
another s point of view, even that of a loved one, is due to
cognitive-structural factors, and even maturational factors,
which operate relatively independently of
affective/motivational ones. A child’s egocentric behavior,
thus defined, is therefore no indication of his overall
character. Further, since such behavior is relatively
independent of the nature of the child's social context, it is
no indication of the "character" of the society. In other
words, even a loving and well-meaning 2-year-old with
highly developed parents in a highly developed society cannot
help but exhibit "infantile egocentrism".
The distinction between infantile egocentrism and adult
egocentrism (called egoism by Werner) has been of great
practical educational importance. It has discouraged the adult
egocentric act of considering infantile egocentric behavior as
an indication of general character. Such a distinction leads us
to define the specific problem of infantile egocentrism
properly so as to lead to its inclusive and essential solution.
Thus cognitive and social stimulation in a controlled
environment, combined with the meeting of basic affective
and physical needs, might be deemed a more effective and
appropriate "cure” for infantile egocentrism than moral
reprobation aimed at a structure of understanding that isn’t
there.
My use of the term egocentrism is meant to include M
distortions which render the organism more isolated from the
environment, and thus represent a "closing”, rather than an
"opening", of the organism-environment system. Cognitive
egocentrism, regressive habits, affective egoism, cultural
sociocentrism and prejudice, and all other "centering
tendencies fall within the same inclusive concept.
This does not blur distinctions between different kinds of
egocentrism. The progressive solution to a 2-year-old s
cognitive egocentrism will be different from the progressive
solution to the egocentrism of an adult bigot. Yet both
egocentrisms are remediable, and in both cases such
remediation depends upon human intervention. Thus they

238

are both subject to ethical evaluation: how are they
problematic, and how ought they to change? In the case of
the infant, the onus for promoting growth falls upon the
parent or the society, not upon the infant. Therefore to
examine the infant's egocentrism through an ethical lens is
by no means to hold the infant ethically responsible for it,
whereas we would hold the adult responsible for his bigotry
(See Ch.IV, Sec.D6 below).
3.

As I stated at the outset (Ch.I, Sec.F above), I make no
claims for orthogenesis as a definition of "spiritual
development as a sui generis notion. My purpose is not to
disparage or deny the existence or value of spirituality. It is
to avoid reducing questions of faith and direct experience by
attempting to capture them within a conceptual scheme of
any kind.
To the extent that "spiritual development" is defined as the
global whole of all development which is greater than the
sum of its parts, then it is served somewhat by a discussion
of those parts and their interpenetration and mutual
reinforcement of one another. "Spiritual development" is thus
addressed by a reference to development in all those realms
(cognitive, affective, etc.) in which it is seen to be
immanent. Spiritual matters can also be defined in terms of
a unique set of questions, such as the meaning of life and
death or the existence of God. In this case, the notion of
spiritual development is captured by applying orthogenetic
criteria to the development of reflections, feelings, and
cultural-historical assumptions regarding such questions.
Fowler's "faith stages" (1981) essentially reflect such
development, as do the examples I have indicated in the
paragraph preceding this footnote.
But to the extent that spirituality deals with direct
apprehension of that which is both ETERNAL and
UBIQUITOUS, it denotes that which transcends-yet-includes
the context of change and interpenetration which is the
fundamental frame of reference for our notion of
development. Spirituality in this regard is a matter of nonsymbolic faith and immediate experience. I make no pretense
of "including" this matter within a conceptual framework
such as this.

CHAPTER IV
THINGS TO CONSIDER WHEN APPLYING THE ORTHOGENETIC
PRINCIPLE

A. Introduction
The orthogenetic principle prescribes thorough and objective
inquiry to determine what will be most growthful for a particular
person or group in a unique situation (See Ch.Ill, Sec. A above).
In this chapter, I use the orthogenetic principle to deduce
guidelines for what constitutes thorough and objective inquiry.
Such guidelines can help educators devise plans that effectively
promote growth. Thus they are both ethically and practically
significant. [1]
The guidelines offered in this chapter fall into two
categories. The first addresses how educators can make ethical
use of psychological theories and concepts as tools for inquiry. The
second explores general requirements of thorough and objective
inquiry into educational problems.

r

Thp orthogenetic Principle Regulates the Use of Psychological
Assumptions about Development.
The orthogenetic principle enjoins educators to differentiate

between the widest variety of growth-pathways for a person, co-
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ordinating these wherever possible. The educator is therefore
encouraged to make an eclectic use of psychological models of
development. One model may describe development as the
attainment of a cognitive stage. Another may describe it as the
extinguishing of undesirable behaviors and the reinforcement of
desirable ones. Yet another may describe growth as re¬
experiencing, then being able to choose between, previously
unconscious feelings and ideas learned in early childhood.
A given model of developmental psychology usually
incorporates assumptions about what growth means that set it
apart from other models. One model may define growth solely in
terms of a discontinuous leap to a new stage. Another may define
it solely in terms of a continuous accumulation of behaviors.
Psychologists use guiding metaphors to orient their inquiry into
development. For Piaget, the metaphor is biological evolution. For
Kohlberg, it is philosophical argument. For information-processing
theorists, it is the computer program. Such paradigms are useful,
perhaps even necessary, for the scientist. They mark off his
territory of inquiry, and make precise experimentation possible.
Yet if there is any useful metaphor for the educator to
describe the growing person, it is the elephant in the ancient Sufi
tale of the blind men (Shah, p.25). In this tale, a group of blind
men hear of a new beast possessed by a royal entourage passing
through their city. They seek to learn of its nature by placing
their hands upon it. One, feeling the elephant's leg, concludes
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that the elephant is like a pillar. Another, feeling its ear,
concludes that it is like a rug. Yet another, feeling its trunk,
concludes that it is like a hollow pipe. Each one is partly right,
yet no one is able to grasp the whole.
Educators are responsible for the growth of a real and
complete elephant". So if they use psychological theory to "see"
the elephant better, they should be ready to grab on to more
than one place. Educators can use even conflicting theories
because it is usually possible to “borrow” practical tools from a
theory without confining oneself permanently to a theory's
worldview. Thus we can refer to stage sequences or
reinforcement schedules without being obliged to define growth
exclusively in terms of either stage advance or outward
behaviors.
When applying psychology in educational practice, we
should consider the different aims of scientists and educators.
Scientists seek truth through generalizations and probabilities. In
the psychological sciences, if 90% of the responses in an
experiment conform to a theory, that may be considered fairly
strong confirmation of that theory. For scientific purposes, the
errant 10% may not detract from the general value of the
theory. Educators, on the other hand, must ethically be
concerned with each individual. They must be as prepared to
educate the individual who stumps the theory as they are to
educate the individual who confirms it. Flexibility to choose
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among even seemingly conflicting theories may be essential to
describing what is most growthful for a unique individual. So,
from an ethical standpoint, educators must avoid the "blindness"
that accrues from over-reliance on a single model. As Schwab
comments, in his discussion of education as a "practical art":
The particularities of the practical, merely by existing,
constitute one difficult problem for the practical arts. The
problem is to see them - to take note that each is there
and to honor it as possibly relevant to our concerns. This is
difficult because we normally see only what we are
instructed to look for and we are instructed by theory"
(1971, p.496); "if education is to be good for
students. . . educators must attend to the problems posed by
the inadequacy of borrowed theory: the incompleteness of
their subjects and the incomplete view which each takes of
its incomplete subject" (p.50l).
Schwab seeks to solve this problem through the use of
multiple theories. He also encourages the educator’s use of an
"immediate perception" outside theory, and the enhancement of
his accessibility to such perception (p.497). This is like Werner
and Dewey’s idea that development in our outlook may rely on
our ability to return to a more concrete level of perception, one
less dominated by a set of formal structures. Schwab also points
out that education is mot informed by psychology alone, but also
by epistemology, sociology, anthropology, economics, and political
science (p.50l).
The orthogenetlc principle gives educators an ethical basis
for borrowing practical ideas from a variety of theories without
taking on assumptions within the theory which might inhibit
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growth. It does this by prescribing metatheoretical assumptions
which do not inhibit growth. Or it rejects, metatheoretically,
assumptions which might inhibit growth. The orthogenetic
principle prescribes that it is ethically prudent to make certain
assumptions, and to reject others. For example, it is prudent to
reject the assumption that growth is an inherent tendency,
because this may cause us to gloss over the outer conditions
required for growth to occur.
Of course, empirical research might support an assumption
that, for ethical reasons, we would rather reject. It might
indicate, for example, that violence between people is biologically
inevitable. But the desirability of a non-violent society compels
educators to place a "burden of proof" (Toulmin, 1981, p.257)
upon the scientist. For educators to accept violence as inevitable,
science would have to show that all possible conditions of
education and society under which non-violence might be possible
had been accounted for. Such a burden of proof would be
virtually impossible to meet. Educators’ plans would still be
influenced by the obvious preponderance of violence in existing
society. But violence would still be seen as subject to educational
and ethical regulation. It would not be placed, out of adherence
to psychological theory, in the untouchable realm of the "given”.
The point is that orthogenesis can prescribe what it is
ethically prudent to assume, or refuse to assume, about
development, in the absence of truly incontrovertible evidence to
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the contrary. Ethical examination of psychological assumptions is
key because of the danger that such assumptions may themselves
work against growth. Wartofsky argues:
...psychological theories of learning, of growth, of
development themselves contribute to shape the modes of
learning, growth, development which they are about
and. . .therefore, the psychological theorist bears the burden
of constituting, in part at least, how child development, or
human development, as an actual phenomenon or practice
will take place. . .human beings themselves create and
transform the norms of development and. . .such norms
effectively influence (though they do not fully determine)
how infants, children, and the rest of us will, in fact,
develop" (1986, p.114, emphases in original).
Wartofsky's claim is not hard to support if we consider how
such "influence” is exercised. Our assumptions determine what is
relevant, what is given and what is subject to regulation when
we undertake our problem-framing inquiry. Considerations which
we assume to be irrelevant or given will be included neither in
our inquiry, nor in the framing of the developmental problem to
be solved.

How we frame the problem in turn, as 1 have shown

(Ch. Ill, Sec.B2 above), determines its proposed solution, which in
turn guides educational practice. For example, if we assume that
genetic make-up fixes set limits on a student s mathematics
ability, we may not bother with educational plans which aim
beyond those limits. We will assume the limits to be given, and
inquiry into teaching methods to be irrelevant.
Within education, the ethical prescriptions of orthogenesis
take precedence over the emphases introduced by theories within
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other disciplines. They regulate such theories to ensure that
orthogenesis is not violated by their application. In this way, for
example, educators may use behavior modification technique as
long as they remain committed to the student's eventual
autonomy from a particular set of extrinsic reinforcers.
Education that adheres to any one psychological model
might thwart development by emphasizing emotions only, or
cognitive structures only, or extrinsic "reinforcements" only, or
"information-processing" programs only. Educators have an
ethical interest in refusing to limit themselves to any narrowly
deterministic view of development, no matter how convincingly
modeled and supported by empirical study. Psychological
experiments do not usually offer conclusive proof of the exclusive
value of a model. When such a burden of proof is placed upon the
psychologist, we find that his evidence usually presumes
acceptance of the particular lens through which he looks at
people.
The categories of assumptions about development examined
in the next section are of this type: they are "lenses" through
which the psychologist looks at development. They are not easily
susceptible to conclusive empirical confirmation or refutation. As
Werner points out, for example (1957), whether we see growth as
a continuous line or as discontinuous spurts depends somewhat on
what we look for. For each category (e.g., continuity vs,
discontinuity), I will use the orthogentic principle to prescribe the
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assumptions which would be ethically prudent for the educator to
make or reject.

C.. What Assumptions about Development are Consistent with the
QrthOttenetic

Principle?

1. Time
The following guidelines can help the educator distinguish
assumptions about time which promote growth from those which
don't:
* Don't assume that time causes growth.
Sometimes we refer to the passage of time as if it were the
agent of growth: "time heals all wounds". We must not forget
that such a reference to time is figurative only. It is not time
that causes change, but what happens over time. Time is the
medium of growth, not its cause. If we assume otherwise, we are
liable to forgo thorough and objective inquiry into precisely what
it is that happens during a period of time to produce growth.
Following such inquiry, we may conclude that a "hands off"
approach is best. The unplanned encounters we take for granted
in our culture may do more for an adolescent's emotional growth
than a series of parental lectures. But without such inquiry, we
impute vague powers to time which dull our sensitivity to human
variety. One person's "year" is not another's when it comes to
growth. Orthogenesis asks us to de-center from a fused, mythic
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notion of time toward a more differentiated view of what
happens over time for each individual.
* Don t assume that growth is irreversible just because time
is. Athletic skills wither from disuse. Cognitive skills may be
impaired by disease. A writer who is inspired in his 30's may lose
his spark in his 50's. If we take growth to be irreversible, we will
be less alert to how subsequent influences may undo it.
* Don't assume that the past influences the present in a
fixed way.
To have a meaningful notion of habit or continuity in
development, we must assume that the past influences the
present. Yet this "past" may influence an individual differently
over time. As Lewin points out:
"the psychological field which exists at a given time contains
also the views of that individual about his future and past.
The individual sees not only his present situation, he has
certain expectations, wishes, fears, daydreams, for his
future. His views about his own past and that of the rest of
the physical and social world are often incorrect, but
nevertheless constitute, in his life space, the 'reality-level'
of the past" (1943, p.303).
Orthogenesis prescribes that we differentiate between a
person's "life-spaces" at different times. We should not assume
that the past exerts a fixed "hold" upon a person that we can
take granted: "the method of determining the properties of a
situation by testing them at that time avoids the uncertainties of
historical conclusions" (Lewin, p.304). A child may be terrified of
dogs, as a result of a past experience, but also as a result of his
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ideas about that experience, and about himself. Yet he may then
have a positive experience with a dog that not only changes his
attitude about dogs in the present, but his view of his past
experience. If all the adults around him avoid testing whether his
phobia is still in force, and assume that it is, this may weaken
the child’s developmental gains.
* Don't assume that normative chronologies of growth can
replace individualized inquiry into each unique situation.
To safeguard the autonomy of the individual, and variety
within the society, we must consider variations in growth-time
between individuals. We must inquire thoroughly and objectively
into the particularities of each individual in each new situation.
Educators may make use of normative chronologies for the sake
of convenience, or to take cultural norms into account. We
might, after reflection, decide it was better to let a child begin
organized sports at age 7 with all his friends even if, cultural
norms aside, he would be better off waiting until age 8. Yet
undue devotion to theoretical chronologies may stifle the direct
and many-faceted observation of particular people in particular
situations.
* Assume that consistency over time serves as one test for
development.
Orthogenesis entails the autonomous power to shape and re¬
shape habits which do away with conflict with the environment.
To constitute development, an adaptation must attain the status

249

of a habit: it must be consistent over time. (Although not all
habits are developmental!) To quote Bronfenbrenner:
development involves a change in the characteristics of a person
that is neither ephemeral nor situation-bound; it implies a
reorganization that has some continuity over both time and
space" (1979, p.28). Time measures continuity; it is thus a useful,
though insufficient, indication of the autonomy conferred by a
habit. For example, if a child can refrain from hitting someone
for a year, this shows more growth than if he can only refrain
for a week.
* Assume that rhythm and timing play a role in growth.
Growth may be affected by the length of time previous
habits have been in place. The amount of time available for
education, the amount of time changes take, or the timing of
some changes in concert with others may all influence
educational choices. Even the student's perception of the flow of
time can be taken into consideration. Our view of the role of time
in development should sensitize us to such variables. In all cases,
time is looked at as a flexible medium to be "worked with" in the
pursuit of development, not as something exerting an inherently
good or bad force in all situations.
* Don't make fixed assumptions about how limits on

time

place limits on growth.
Anderson (1957) sees time as an "inhibiting" force in
development. Our limited lifespans force us to choose among
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developmental pathways. We don’t have time to develop every
skill there is. Also, the development of some habits may work
against the development of others. If I spend the first fifty of
years of my life becoming a great chess player, this may cramp
my ability to become a great weight-lifter during the next
thirty. This introduces the element of selection into development
(see Sec. D7 below).- Anderson perceives time as exerting a
narrowing

force upon development, due to "consecutive binary

choices" that must be made.
The need to select among growth pathways may be
inevitable. Yet if the educator sees time limitations as exerting
too "narrowing" an influence, he is liable to forestall creative
adaptations to these limitations. We don't always know what the
limits of what people can do in a given time span are. Our very
life expectancies are changing with time. With sociocultural
development, and development of the art and science of
education, future generations may come to learn in an
exponentially more rapid and flexible way. We may radically
alter our current notions of "career", "lifespan", or time itself.
Further, being obliged to choose between growth-paths due
to time limits is not merely "narrowing" or inhibitory. The need
to be selective can enhance growth by leading a person to make
wise choices. It drives a person to ask: "What is most growthful
for me at this time? With limited time to grow, what kind of
growth is most inclusive of and essential to my welfare and that
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of others?

One may not have the time to learn many skills. One

may still grow, along perhaps more essential lines, by seeking the
originality of expression and losing-of-self through profound
concentration that comes with mastery of any single skill. Part of
the educator s job is to use time constraints to encourage not
merely narrower goals, but deeper ones.

2. Form and Content; Inner and Outer Change
Both Werner (1937) and Dewey (1946) stress that
development should be measured simultaneously and equally with
respect to inner and outer results. Inward "forms" (thought
structures, habits, stable emotional attitudes) are held to arise
only through transactions with the world and adaptations to the
"content” of outer consequences. So inner form and outer content
are seen as interdependent. Werner, Piaget, and Kohlberg
emphasize the differentiation of form from content. They do this
to combat the idea that development can be assessed by merely
observing outward behaviors without reference to what these
mean to the subject. Dewey places more emphasis on an
integrated view of inner and outer results when assessing growth.
What assumptions about the relations between inner habits
(including rational "forms" or structures) and their larger socialenvironmental consequences are most conducive to promoting
orthogenesis?
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Orthogenesis is progressive change in the transactions
between an individual and his environment. Changes are assessed
according to whether they confer increasing power to co-ordinate
yet remain open to that environment. How can this be done
without referring to how the individual affects his environment,
including his social environment? Yet orthogenesis is also assessed
by whether changes confer increasing autonomy from the
environment, coupled with an ability to make essential
differentiations within it. How can we do this without reference
to a set of inner abilities (habits, ideas, thought structures, skills,
"programs", etc.) evidenced through discussion, emotional
expression, reason, and other "subjective" information? The very
ability of the individual to provide such information about his
own experience is something which, if it were missing, would call
the subject's autonomously de-centered personality into profound
question.
Orthogenesis aims at harmonizing the subjective and
objective worlds without syncretically fusing them. So we must
see both inner and outer changes as essentially relevant in
assessing growth. Reference to inner habits prevents a
preoccupation with outer behavior that devalues the autonomous
reflection of the individual and his subjective power to co¬
ordinate environmental distinctions. Reference to outer
consequences prevents a preoccupation with rationalization, and
deductions about development based on speech, which devalues
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the person's power to open up to and act upon his environment
to objectively render it more conducive to his own and others*
welfare.
As Werner, Piaget, and Kohlberg stress, similar outer
consequences might be the result of different underlying habits. If
we pay attention to reasons given for actions, we are less likely
to draw erroneous conclusions about inner abilities from a look at
situation-bound behavior alone. On the other hand, it is precisely
the inconsistent, inadequate, and irrelevant nature of behavior
that tips us off to a lower level of inner development than speech
would indicate. We may believe a teenager obeys a rule because
of the principle behind it. He may even understand the principle,
and be able to explain it. It is only when his parents go away for
the weekend, and the rule is broken, that we discover how much
his adherence to the rule really depended on heteronomous
factors.
The educator should be prepared to test both inner and
outer signs of growth. As long as educators pay attention to both
inner and outer consequences, they can draw upon inneroriented theories like Piaget's and Kohlberg's as well as outeroriented ones such as behaviorism. The different problems posed
by individuals may make the tests or tools provided by one
preferable to those of the other. For a student who 'behaves
well", but whose autonomy from extrinsic reinforcement is in
doubt, a Kohlbergian approach may be more useful. For a
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student who "knows" the good but cannot "do" it consistently,
psychotherapy or behavior modification aimed at the extinction of
unconscious or reason-resistant habits might be indicated.
An approach to development consistent with the ethical
prescription of orthogenesis differentiates inner habits, or
deductions about them made from rational speech, from outer
results. This way we do not automatically predict outer
consequences from subjective accounts, nor subjective experience
from outward behavior. At the same time, we seek development
in the integration of inner habits and their outer consequences.
We assume that over time and across situations, development of
the one is bound up with the development of the other. Therefore
the educator must employ a "binocular" vision in this respect.

5. Adaptation
I define adaptation as behavior (including thought, feeling,
and other internal action) aimed at resolving problems in
organism-environment interaction. Orthogenesis is adaptation
which is progressive, which tends to do away with the root of the
problem. The organism is not defined as an envelope of biological
organs or a list of mental events. Nor is the environment defined
as a fixed set of physical objects or social practices outside the
epidermis. Organism and environment are seen as opposite yet
interdependent poles within an ever-changing universe. That
which is the organism, or individual, is that which regulates the
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environment. The environment is anything being regulated by
the organism.

We need not isolate, once and for all. a fixed

entity which is ultimately "in charge" of the organizing and
regulating.
Human organisms have the power to regulate the
environment intelligently, using special capacities for learning and
communication.

Following Dewey's metaethics, the domain of

ethics arises from this power. To be consistent with orthogenesis,
our idea of adaptation should open up the scope of what we
consider to be environment, of what can be potentially regulated.
It should not rule out in advance, for example, the idea that we
may regulate the functioning of our own organs, or the activities
of the mind itself.
Looked at this way, the question of whether the organism
should accommodate to the environment or whether it should
attempt to assimilate or alter the environment to fit "itself" is off
the mark. The pertinent question is: Which aspects of the
environment are the essential and inclusive source of the
problem, and therefore require regulation? Should we build a
road through the mountain, or should we stop being in such a
hurry to get to the other side? Should I get an easier job so 1 can
sleep more? Or should I keep the job, and take up a meditation
practice which will train my body to sleep less? Relatively
"internal" environmental factors and relatively "external" ones
affect and, over time, mirror each other. My exhaustion mirrors
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the sloppy work, getting done on the job. Thus we can assume
that it will be a rare problem that can be inclusively and
essentially framed without reference to both kinds of factors.
Now the trick, of course, is that how we frame problems
depends on our judgement about what is subject to change in a
situation as opposed to what is not. It also depends on our
judgement, to be borne out or not by subsequent events, as to
what changes will really eliminate conflict. We may decide that
our desires, if executed, will create growth, and that we ought to
regulate outer conditions which obstruct them. Or we may decide
that our desires themselves require regulation if growth is to
occur. But if we consider everything as potentially an aspect of
the environment to be regulated, without egocentric attachment
to a particular set of thoughts, desires, social arrangements, etc.,
then we will be less hindered from an inquiry which considers
and weighs all factors without bias. Such a view of adaptation
itself contributes to a de-centered autonomy from the
environment, whether internal or external.

4. Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
Both equilibrium and disequilibrium have a place within
development. For Piaget, "equilibration" is a dynamic cycle which
includes the child's puzzlement when faced with the
contradictions in his own thought, as well as his satisfaction upon
arriving at an unshakeable logical conclusion. For Dewey, growth
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involves a rhythm" between "loss of integration with
environment and recovery of union" (Ch.l, Sec.D above).
The educator should not assign any inherent value to either
equilibrium or disequilibrium. The question is how the balance
between stability and mobility in habits, security and
uncertainty, acceptance of things as they are and desire to
change them, etc., affect and reflect the individual’s overall
relationship with the environment. In some cases growth may
suffer from an excess of equilibrium, and in some cases it may
suffer from an excess of disequilibrium.
With orthogenesis, the co-ordination of distinguished habits
allows for both equilibrium and disequilibrium. Growthful
disruption of some habits can occur within a context of other
habits which don't need to be disturbed. For example, emotional
composure allows one to embrace intellectual uncertainty or
social change. Well-organized work routines can run smoothly in
the face of necessary emotional turmoil. The measure of
development is the degree of integration and differentiation, and
not the degree of equilibrium per se. [2]

5

Constructivism and Interactionism
We may not know exactly how construction of habits

through interaction with the environment takes place. But for
orthogenesis to mean anything, the educator must assume that it
can take place. Unless the student can learn to construct habits,
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choose how he will respond to environmental happenings, and
choose which happenings he will respond to at all, the idea of
autonomy or immunity from the environment is voided. If, on
the other hand, we assume that change is pure construction, and
that interaction" is mere fuel for a pre-programmed unfolding,
then de-centering and opening are likewise emptied of
significance.
The educator may consider a variety of theories as to how
interaction occurs between a student's habits and the habits of
others, not to mention cultural or geophysical realities. But in
order to respect both autonomy and de-centering, the educator
must consider the student's own constructive powers, as well as
the interactive influence of new environmental forces.

6. Stages and Structures
The orthogenetic principle requires the assumption that
people can construct habits which integrate activity. Though not
all habits are developmental, all development involves habit The
only way educators can know that growth is happening, not
random change or reflex, is to note whether behavior falls into
some kind of a habit-pattern. To quote Bronfenbrenner:
"To demonstrate that human development has occurred, it
is necessary to establish that a change produced in the
person's conceptions and/or activities carries over to other
settings and other times. Such demonstration is referred to
as developmental validity" (1979, p.35).
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When we assume that many habits change more or less
together with time, that they fall into a pattern with a common
and essential core, and that this core determines a broad swath
of conceptions and/or activities", we have the makings of a
theory of developmental STAGES. Psychological theories vary as to
the claims they make for such stages. Piaget and Kohlberg
maintain that stages are more than mere typologies; they reflect
holistic underlying thought-STRUCTURES which exert a powerful
regulatory influence upon global thought and action. On the one
hand, a structure sets definite limits to what can be thought or
achieved at a given stage. On the other, the highest structure
attained acts to bring all thought and action into conformity with
it.
What assumptions about stages and structures support
orthogenesis, and which do not? Let us first examine how
thinking in terms of holistic stages and underlying structures can
promote growth.
Stage and structure theories heighten awareness of patterns
in behavior. They emphasize the possibility of integrating habits,
of transferring gains in one area to another. If a student can
imagine what a grouping of blocks will look like from a different
angle, maybe he is ready to imagine how an argument looks
from his friend's point of view. They provide a point of departure
for hypotheses about what a student, given his ability in one
area, will be able to do or not do in another. They alert us to the
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value of higher-order integrative abilities as a counterweight to
the mere accumulation of isolated task competencies or bits of
information. They encourage us to check "outer” manifestations of
development against the student's "inner" conceptions (See Sec.
B2 above).
Structural theories like Piaget's enable us to look for
systemic rules governing growth. One proposed rule is that all
possibilities for adaptation within an existing structure are
exhausted before a new structure is elaborated. Another rule is
that structures within a system are specialized to deal with
certain kinds of problems. Each structure buffers others against
problems outside their "fields". Thus autonomic nervous
structures handle problems every second without disturbing
conscious thought. One can compose an original tune while taking
a cultural structure of tones and rhythms for granted. Another
rule is that structures extend themselves, forming new habits
which conform to and confirm them. Once we know how to
industrialize one nation, we seek to industrialize others. Through
this very process of extension, the environment is changed,
posing new problems like pollution and over-population. Thus
structures, through their own action, contribute to the
exhaustion of their adaptive possibilities, encouraging the
elaboration of new structures.
Stage and structural theories sensitize us to discontinuous
leaps in development. They prepare us for the possibility that
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new habits may be constructed rapidly once a stage-threshold
has been crossed. Thus they deter assumptions about the future
pace of growth based on past or present behavior. They also
promote the educator’s de-centering by leading him to consider
how people at different stages see the world differently.
Stage and structural theories, however, can be easily
misused by educators. Exclusive focus upon a single stage
typology may stunt awareness and valuing of orthogenetic
changes not included within that typology. Educators should not
use stage hierarchies for a convenient but undifferentiated
ranking of individuals or societies as "more developed" or "less
developed". The hierarchies used by psychologists, for scientific
purposes, are not meant to reflect the full range of ways in
which people may develop. Misused by educators, they may
distort dialogue between individuals by encouraging the idea that
the "more developed" have little to learn from the "less
developed". Further, as Toulmin (1971) points out, stage
hierarchies may embody unquestioned sociocultural norms, and
thus contribute to sociocentrism when applied to education. As he
argues elsewhere (1981), stage sequences imply a "unique
destination" for development. Educators must be prepared to
revise their long-term goals for growth in the light of individual
variety and new environmental challenges, including new
psychological discoveries.
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Educators must not use the "stage acquisition" idea to
assume, prior to inquiry, that a student’s actions will match his
words, or that his actions will match across different situations.
Also, structural theories such as Piaget’s and Kohlberg's assume
that stage acquisition is irreversible. The educator should not
assume that certain abilities cannot wither from disuse or
destructive influences. He should be ready to inquire whether
students are retaining gains over time.
Finally, educators should assume that changes can be
growthful without being defined in stage or structural terms.
Stage changes, assuming these exist, may confer a higher degree
of co-ordination to a set of habits. But improved skill in
basketball may be ethically justified as growth just as much as
acquisition of Kohlberg’s Stage 3. Further, growth must
ultimately be measured by the full sweep of a person’s
experiences and actions in a social context. It cannot be defined
by a "score" on a formal and artificial test of stage acquisition

7. Psvchodvnamics
A PSYCHODYNAMIC theory is one that allows for internal
conflict between a variety of habits and habit-structures. It also
allows for the possibility of interaction and mutual influence of
these varied habits and habit-structures.
Stage theories emphasize the integration of habits by a
person's highest acquired rational thought-structure.
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Psychodynamic theories, on the other hand, emphasize the
ongoing influence of habits not dominated by such a structure.
Some of these habits may work against development. Emotional
traumata, sociocultural conditioning, fixed beliefs, or addictions
involve habits which are irrational, unconscious, unquestioned, or
even actively repressed. They control behavior without being
ethically regulated themselves.
On the positive side, a coexisting variety of habits and
habit-structures may mean that there are several modes of
intelligence which can be used to solve problems. This view,
suggested by Werner (1957, p.138, 145) has been more recently
emphasized by Gollin (1981) in his argument for a "multimodal"
view of development. It includes the possibility that aesthetic,
spatial, sensory-kinesthetic, empathic, poetic, or other forms of
intelligence may be co-ordinated with more rationally reflective
forms within creative problem-solving activity. It provides a
check against egocentrism within formal thinking by balancing
such thinking against other modes of experience.
Many developmental theories allow for a psychodynamic
view. Psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic models assume that
cognitive-emotional beliefs and habits formed in childhood can
cause irrational distortions within otherwise rational adults.
Mechanistic and behaviorist models assume that non-reflective
conditioning or neuro-sensory-linguistic "information processing
predispositions influence reasoning abilities. Contextualist and
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dialectical models assume that reason and worldview are shaped,
frequently in an unconscious way, by historical and cultural
factors.
Cognitive stage theories like Piaget's and Kohlberg's put
reason itself back in the developmental driver's seat. The
educator s job, however, is to promote reason's co-ordinating role
without taking it for granted. He must assume that reason can
fall prey to rigid habits, emotions, or social taboos. He must be
ready to take account of irrational (or pre-rational) influences
within ostensibly "rational" behavior and speech. Further, he
must be alert to the possibilty of enriching co-ordinative reason
through access to non-verbal and non-formal modes of
intelligence.

8. Continuity and Discontinuity
Educators should be sensitive to both continuity and
discontinuity in development. Continuity means that each present
moment has roots in the past and in turn influences the future.
Reflection upon continuity prevents the educator from looking at
adulthood as magically cut off from youth. For example, a
passive childhood is not assumed to be adequate preparation for
an active adulthood. Sensitivity to continuity encourages the
educator to search the past for explanations of antidevelopmental habits. We have a better chance of curing a
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teenager s violence if we understand its roots in childhood
deprivation .
If we stress continuity too much, however, we may
constrict our vision of what is possible. We may ignore
properties.. .which cannot be described in terms of earlier
behavior, irrespective of whether it takes a few days or a few
years for the transformation to take place" (Anderson, 1957,
p.4l). We may, as Kagan (1986) argues, harbor a "liberal" bias
for gradual social and personal change as opposed to more radical
alterations (p.77). Or, he says, we may overemphasize the
control of the past upon the present and future, and fail to
distinguish new qualities (pp. 69-71). If we ignore the possibility of
radical developmental transformation for a person, we may
diminish the chance that it will occur Or, by ignoring
discontinuous shifts which have already occurred, we may engage
in irrelevant and even detrimental practices.
Cirillo and Wapner conclude a discussion on value
presuppositions in developmental psychology (1986) by pointing up
the tensions between theories stressing continuity and those
stressing discontinuity:
"Kagan objected to the emphasis on continuity to the
exclusion of discontinuity and categorical distinctions in
common developmental conceptions, Gilligan to the notion
that certain ’advances' replace prior modes of functioning.
It seems to us that such criticisms cancel one another out
when we try to combine them or that their proponents,
despite the tone of agreement, are in conflict with one
another" (p.162).
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Yet the educator is not obliged to resolve this conflict by
choosing sides. Indeed, if he is to do even partial justice to the
whole elephant", he must be ready to use theories which
contradict one another. Certainly if something as elemental as
light can be considered now a wave, now a particle, how much
more complicated a view must we be prepared to take of the
human being!
The educator must consider both the possibility that prior
habits or habit-structures can continue to operate despite the
creation of new structures, and the possibility that the new
structures represent a qualitative, even radical, transformation
of a person’s capacities. This permits us to ask what kinds of
relations between old and new habits are growthful. New habits
are more growthful if they permit access to experience of old
habits. The ability to re-experience even a destructive habit
opens the student's environment, and lets him take the role of
others who are at the mercy of that habit. On the other hand,
new habits are more growthful if they co-ordinate old ones. Even
positive prior habits will benefit from integration with the
student’s most global purposes in a social context. Thus the
childlike sense of wonder can be enhanced, not throttled, by the
technical and reflective capacities of the mature artist or
scientist.
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9. Multilinearitv

A multilinear outlook on development assumes that there
are many different pathways of growth. Such an outlook
promotes growth by encouraging variety among and within
individuals. Growth in artistic ability, formal reasoning,
empathy, practical skill, and many other paths are recognized
within a multilinear view. Dialogue between people who have
emphasized varying paths contributes to the de-centering of each
person. A multilinear view frees us from sociocentric values.
Americans should grow in social awareness as well as in freedom
of personal choice.
On the other hand, emphasis on multilinearity should be
complemented by an effort to see how all the various lines of
desirable and consistent change conform to the orthogenetic
principle. Multilinearity is in vogue at present among
developmental theorists. Psychologists such as Kagan (1983, 1986),
Gilligan (1986), and Gollin (1981), have taken aim at the unilinear
theories of Piaget and Kohlberg. Attempts to posit a universal
basis for dialogue amidst variety are not as popular. Psychologists
fear committing the sin of sociocentrism (See Kagan, 1986, pp.7677). The point of de-centering, however, is to allow
communication between people that have taken divergent
adaptational pathways. The idea that people should learn from
and respect growth-paths which are not stressed in their own
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culture is itself based upon the universal value of autonomous de¬
centering.

lil-Immanence
Immanence is the assumption that there is some kind of

self-re&UlatQrv tendency of the organism to develop While
environmental interaction may be necessary to "fuel"
development, the organism inherently tends to interact with the
environment in such a way as to produce development.
This is not an ethical assumption for the educator to make.
Development has no meaning as an ethical solution to the
problem of egocentric attachment if we assume that this problem
will be solved without any kind of conscious regulation (See
Ch III, Sec.B2 above) To hold development to be immanent
vitiates its function as a value.
The educator need not assume that planned intervention
(i.e., education) is always required for development to take
place. But his role Is to inquire, in particular cases, into wM
kinds of interactions with the environment will promote
development and which ones will not. He should not assume, in
advance of inquiry, that education won't be necessary. Following
inquiry, he may opt for a "hands off" rather than a "hands on"
approach. But he should assume that education may be required
The educator should not assume the inevitability of either
Droaressive or regressive change. He should hold firm to the
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possibility of growth without taking it for granted. He should
assume that thorough and objective inquiry is necessary to
determine the kinds of interactions that will be developmental in
a particular case, and to determine his own appropriate role.

11. Final State
A final state is a state past which no further development
is possible or desirable. Once we posit a final state, development
becomes a matter of decreasing the "distance" from such a state.
Here I agree with Dewey:
"There is something pitifully juvenile in the idea that
'evolution', progress, means a definite sum of
accomplishment which will forever stay done, and which
by an exact amount lessens the amount to be done,
disposing once and for all of just so many perplexities and
advancing us just so far on our road to a final stable and
unperplexed goal" (in Gouinlock, p.94).
General and long-term goals in education serve an
important function. They orient and create a context for our
more specific and immediate goals. Holding democratic society as
a general and long-term goal orients the short-term goal of
teaching children to express their opinions in a school meeting.
Borrowing a term from Dewey, I refer to all goals, across the
spectrum of short-term to long-term, and specific to general, as
ENDS-IN-VIEW.
To foster orthogenesis, the educator must remain aware
that our larger ends-in-view, although they constitute an image
of the future, are rooted in our perceptions of the present These
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perceptions are themselves subject to growth. Our visions of the
future must be ethically judged according to how they shape the
present, since it is only in the present that growth can occur In
this way, what we usually consider to be "ultimate ends"
actually function as means or plans for promoting growth in the
present (Cf. Dewey, 1939, p.53).
On the other hand, larger ends-in-view will only be
approached by our more immediate activities. Instead of seeing
the more immediate activities as "means", we can see them as
miniature ends-in-view, to be co-ordinated at each step with
larger ends-in-view. Thus, what we usually think of as "means
and ends" can be seen as a PROBLEM-SOLUTION SYSTEM in which
larger and more immediate ends-in-view are mutually co¬
ordinated. A vision of how math is used by an autonomous yet
socially responsible adult in modern society might be co-ordinated
with the kinds of math experiences that give 10-year-olds more
autonomy and awareness in their environment. Education is thus
guided by an imagined trajectory of problems and solutions
between the present and the future. This trajectory is not fixed,
but itself subject to development as a result of new experiences,
reflections, and insights.
To assume a final state is to assume that students grow,
but not educators. Educators assess development in terms of how
close students come to the particular state attained or desired by
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the educator. But this state is not open to ongoing revision in the
face of interactive experience with the student.
To rely upon a fixed idea of a final state of development is
to be attached to one's existing perceptions. It shuts out the
possibility that new visions may emerge out of a changing
present. It freezes not only the future, but the present as well

It

also discourages a multilinear view of growth (see Sec.9 above).
For example, we might see industrialized society as a fixed
terminus of development for "less developed" nations, which are
seen as "less developed" by measure of their distance from this
terminus. But such a view ignores other pathways of progressive
change which might solve problems for non-industrialized
nations, but which do not lead to them becoming identical to
industrialized ones. It discounts the enormous social and ecological
problems created by industrialization. It prevents us from seeing
industrialized nations as "less developed" compared to some endin-view which would progressively solve these problems. It
obscures the possibility that such nations might learn lessons
from alternative pathways taken by their non-industrialized
cousins.
The educator should allow for the possibility that which
each new solution, each new plateau of development, new vision
is opened up so that more inclusive and essential problems may
be framed:
"Indeed every genuine accomplishment instead of winding
up an affair and enclosing it as a jewel in a casket for
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future contemplation, complicates the practical situation. It
effects a new distribution of energies which have henceforth
to be employed in ways for which past experience gives no
exact instruction. Every important satisfaction of an old
want creates a new one; and this new one has to enter
upon an experimental adventure to find its satisfaction
From the side of what has gone before achievement settles
something. From the side of what comes after, it
complicates, introducing new problems, unsettling factors”
(Dewey, in Gouinlock, p.94).

12. Analogies and Comparisons
Analogies and comparisons are two-edged swords from an
ethical point of view. Where they alert us to essential
considerations, they are beneficial. Where they constrict or
rigidify our inquiry, exclude essential distinctions, or include nonessential similarities, they are harmful.
A functional analogy between the painting activity of a
small child and that of a master artist may lead us to value the
child's creative efforts more completely. It suggests that the
child's efforts are as important to the child's development as the
master's efforts are to the master's. Although we might then
choose to spend more on the paintings of the master, we might
be inclined to spend equal amounts to ensure that both child and
master obtained the opportunity to paint. On the other hand, an
analogy between the rebellious behavior of the small child and
that of the adolescent might obscure crucial qualitative
differences between the two. If the imposition of external
restrictions proves growthful for the small child, we might be
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tempted to limit ourselves to the same approach for the
adolescent. The value of Piaget’s theory for educators in this
regard is precisely that it points out the functional similarities in
the two rebellions while emphasizing their structural differences.
Even more than analogies, comparisons between people at
supposedly different "levels” of development present a subtle and
difficult set of ethical issues for educators. The hierarchical
ranking of people along some developmental ladder has the
potential for both good and bad consequences for development
itself.
Comparisons can remind us that development does not
happen for each individual in isolation, but within a social
context. Our very ideas about possible ends-in-view derive from
our observations and comparisons of many people. With no
framework of comparison between people, it is hard to imagine
how we could generate these ideas. Comparison with Helen Keller,
for example, expands our notions about what is possible for others
with multiple sensory disabilities, thereby transforming our
guidelines for what is ethically desirable.
That which is NORMAL, purely as a statistical expression of
existing conditions, stripped of any eulogistic meaning, is bound to
have an effect on an educators' assessment of how the social
context influences problems and possibilities. Different
considerations may arise in the education of a child who cannot
read in a group of children who can than in the education of a
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child who cannot read in a group of children who likewise cannot.
In our ethical effort to prevent norms which are "context
dependent" from becoming "value laden truisms" (Gollin, 1981,
p.249), educators run the risk of ignoring the very real influence
that being "normal" or "abnormal" may have upon development.
Comparisons can be used to explore this influence without thereby
locking it into place. The educator's goal is then to put differences
between people to work in the service of development, and to
promote de-centered autonomy from the normal when it can be
differentiated from the desirable.
The bad consequences arise when we become over-reliant
upon a limited or fixed set of comparisons. The egocentric
tendency is to use one's own limited personal and cultural
experience as a basis for such comparisons. Within a closed
comparative framework, itself not subject to ongoing
development, possibilities that exceed the limits of the framework
may be ignored. It may be assumed that the problems to be
solved by those on the "low" end of the scale are identical to
those that have already been solved by those on the "high" end,
who are usually the ones setting up the comparison to begin
with. This cuts off development not only for the student, but also
for the educator, who loses the benefit of discovering new
trajectories of growth for himself. Gilligan provides an example of
the dangers of over-reliance upon limited comparisons within
stage theories:
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The minute I say there is a sequence of stages, an
invariant order, and a hierarchical transformation, the
presumption is I will never learn anything from anyone at
a lower stage than myself because I've already been there;
1 ve^ transformed it, I've learned it. They know nothing I
don t know. At best, the relationship between a higher
stage and lower stage person is benevolent, noblesse oblige”
(in Cirillo and Wapner, 1986, p.154).

Over-reliance upon comparisons between people diverts
inquiry from the question of what is the best developmental
"next step” for a particular individual at a particular time. This
is the essential question for education (See Sec.Dl below). Our
assessment of development must always return to an assessment
of the "quality of becoming" within the student’s experience (Cf.
Dewey, 1916, p.7; 1922, in Gouinlock, p.98; 1938a, p.34; 1950,
p.141).
Comparisons to others can orient us to possible ends-in-view
(without these becoming fixed), and sensitize us to normative
aspects of the social context (also seen as subject to growth)
which influence the framing of developmental problems. But such
assessments are never sufficiently inclusive, since our aim is to
frame problems and solutions that render a specific individual
more developed in comparison to where hs. is at present. The
importance attached to EXTERNAL comparison is derived from its
implications for the mutual reinforcement of development among
the members of the group (See Ch.II, Sec.D3e), including the
student in question at the moment. Comparisons between people
are useful to the educator in assessing the nature and degree of
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such contextual reinforcement. But this in turn, must be judged
according to an INTERNAL comparison between present and past
behavior and capacities, unique to each person.
External comparisons may exert a pernicious influence upon
development when they encourage a view of isolated individuals
in competition. They are dangerous when they shift the
educator’s or the student's attention away from the internal
comparison which is the fundamental measure of development.
Thus competition, when used for educational purposes, needs to
be ethically assessed in terms of its contribution to the total
reinforcement context, which in turn must refer back to internal
comparison for each individual.
Comparisons, like all tools of inquiry, are most useful when
they are essential and inclusive. We should assume that
development includes a virtual infinitude of pathways.
Comparisons gain in educational meaning and value in proportion
to their precision regarding what is being compared. Even within
a particular pathway, e.g., learning how to write, calling one
person a "better" writer than another does not, from an
educational point of view, help out as much as saying that one
person evokes emotion from the reader better than another, or
makes better use of rhythm in his prose, and so on. More precise
comparisons give the student something clearer to shoot for, and
avoid including elements in the comparison which are irrelevant.
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In this regard, the worst possible comparisons, from an
educational point of view, are those which simply label some
people as "more developed" than others. Unless we can express
particular rgspgcts in which one person is more developed,
educational practice has very little to grab onto. Such
comparisons assume that there is some unilinear continuum of
development, with some single dominating characteristic, with
respect to which individuals and even entire societies can be
ranked! Worse still, the nature of this continuum or its salient
feature is not spelled out so that it may be refuted. It is rather
syncretically collapsed into an undifferentiated judgement upon
the hierarchical "place" of each person or culture. [3]
It might seem obvious to label adults as "more developed"
*

than children, or industrial societies as "more developed" than
"primitive" ones. Yet such labels are themselves insufficiently
developed for the demands of the educator’s job, They also
jettison, in advance of inquiry, all possibility that there might be
some respects in which the child might be more developed than
the adult, or the Bushman more developed than the American.
BI-POLAR comparisons, such as the "primitive-advanced”
comparative framework used by Werner, may have value for
psychological inquiry. But their use by the educator, working
with particular individuals within particular societies, is of
rudimentary value at best, and is fraught with ethical dangers.
This is so even when, as in Werner's model, the comparisons are
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Quite precise.

Bi-polar frameworks assume that the only

developmental trajectory for the "less developed" pole is to
become identical to the "more developed" pole. They also provide
no framework within which the "more developed" pole can be
seen as "less developed" compared to some "still more developed"
end-in-view In other words, bi-polar frameworks divert
attention away from the essential internal comparisons
mentioned above. Thus the statement "the United States is more
ethically developed than the Soviet Union" ignores the key
educational questions: In what direction is the United States
moving ethically? The Soviet Union7 In what specific respects7
What would be the most developmental step for each nation at
this time? How do the respective pathways of the two nations
mutually reinforce or disrupt further developmental movement
for both? What can each country learn from the adaptations of
the other to foster its own development? These are the kinds of
questions, applicable to individuals as well as societies, which
form the basis for a fruitful and ethically tenable use of
comparisons in education.

279

IL-Considerations for Thorough and Objective
Educational Inquiry

1. The Educator's Question
All educational inquiry aims at promoting growth

It seeks

to overcome egocentric attachment through change in the
direction of co-ordination of distinguished elements in the
environment; autonomous choice from a de-centered perspective,
and an opening of the environment alongside immunity to its
changes. It does this in unique situations by framing problems
within them that growth can solve

Thorough and objective

inquiry aims at framing problems which are inclusive and
essential. Such problems include everything that is essential to do
away with if we are to remove the source of conflict in that
situation. Likewise they exclude everything that is not essential
As a simplified example, it makes a difference whether we
frame a problem as "my teaching methods must enlist the
interest of this student", or "this student must learn to obey
instructions". Each problem implies its solution

in the first case,

change the teacher's habits, in the second case, the student's. We
don't want to frame our problem in terms of the habits of the
one if the changing the habits of the other is really what s called
for. In the context of a reading program, with a student who
knows perfectly well how to obey instructions when the material
interest him, the first problem-frame might be more inclusive

v
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and essential. In the context of a rock climb, where a student
whose habit of doing things his own way endangers his life, the
second might cover the ground just fine. In any event, we can't
know until we have inquired into the ins and outs of the whole
situation.
This inquiry may take an infinite number of turns The
orthogenetic principle cannot substitute for an educator's global
judgement-in-context in framing problems. But we can deduce
guidelines for thorough and objective inquiry from it which give
us a better chance of arriving at problem-frames which are
inclusive and essential.
The first guideline is to frame problems with this question
in mind: What would be the most developmental change for this
individual at this time, and how can mv actions and perceptions
contribute to this change? This question respects the cautions set
forth in Section III above. It includes the possibility that the
answer will be different for different individuals in different
cultures at different times. It places the ultimate measure of
growth within an actual person, and not in some abstraction
such as "society”. It makes no prior assumptions about fixed
external comparisons or final states. The search for the most
developmental change implies a recognition of many
developmental possibilities, to be selected within a holistic
overview. It recognizes the educator's role as an ethical one, not
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merely a scientific one. Finally, it points to the educator’s
capacity for growth as well as the student's.
The asking of this question defines the educator's role;
therefore I call it "the educator’s question".

One acts as an

educator to the extent that this question is at the center of one's
concerns.
Since all development is development out of egocentric
attachment, the educator's question has a corollary. It is to
ask:In What wav is egocentric attachment most at the root of

connict-Ior this individual at this time, and how can mv actions
and perceptions remove it7 To answer this question is to frame
an inclusive and essential problem.
The educator's question, with its corollary, provide the
context for educational Inquiry. The next six topics constitute a
list of considerations for the content of educational inquiry that
aims to be thorough and objective.

2. Sociocultural Context
Educational inquiry is thorough and objective to the extent
that it considers the student's sociocultural context both as
influencing his development, and as potentially subject to
regulation in the service of development.
The sociocultural context might be seen as the concrete
manifestation of interdependence between human beings. This
interdependence requires, as a matter of bare survival, let alone
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development, some form of consensus or agreement, whether
conscious or unconscious (See Ch.II, Sec.D2biii above). Even the
most bitter enemies conduct their conflicts against a background
of consensus which is frequently left unquestioned. This may
include basic matters of living such as the time of day, use of
numbers, or mutual respect of the rules of the other's language
Or it may include agreement on a wide range of social customs,
roles, and values which serve to highlight the point of conflict.
From birth to death, human beings are enmeshed in a web of
consensual agreements ranging from the unconsciously habitual to
the laboriously constructed.
Bronfenbrenner (1979) sought to construct a model for
scientific inquiry capable of exploring the effects of sociocultural
"ecology" upon development.

He elaborated a way of analyzing

contexts into a series of "nested" systems. Educators can use his
model to examine how different aspects of the sociocultural
context affect growth.
The system most immediate to the individual
Bronfenbrenner calls the MICROSYSTEM: "the pattern of activities,
roles, and interpersonal relations experienced by the developing
person in a given setting with particular physical and material
characteristics" (p.22). Relations between a mother and child at
home, or a boss and employee at work, are examples of a
person's microsystem. Next comes the MESOSYSTEM: "the
interrelations among two or more settings in which the
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developing person actively participates (such as, for a child, the
relations among home, school, and neighborhood peer group; for
an adult, among family, work, and social life). . a mesosystem is
thus a system of microsystems" (p.25).
Both microsystems and mesosystems deal with contexts in
which the student is an active and present participant. The
EXOSYSTEM, however, "refers to one or more settings that do not
involve the developing person as an active participant, but in
which events occur that affect, or are affected by, what happens
in the setting containing the developing person" (p.25). Thus a
local school committee makes decisions which affect a child’s
development even though the child is never present at its
meetings. Finally, the MACROSYSTEM "refers to consistencies, in
the form and content of lower-order systems (micro-, meso-,
and exo-), that exist, or could exist, at the level of the
subculture or the culture as whole, along with any belief systems
or ideology underlying such consistencies" (p.26). One thing that
defines the existence of a coherent sub-culture or culture,
according to Bronfenbrenner, is the extent to which the settings,
roles, interpersonal expectations, relations between settings, and
so on. seem to derive from the same set of "blueprints

Thus

schools, or behavior between store clerks and customers, are
more consistently similar within the United btates than they ai e
between the United States and France.
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Now a thorough examination of these four systems may
lead the educator to conclude, as a matter of practical strategy,
that one or more of these systems should be considered as a given
when framing a problem.

He may reach this conclusion even

while recognizing the negative influence exerted by a contextual
system upon development. He may teach a student to take a
college entrance exam even though he objects to the practice of
giving them. Such a strategic judgement, which may be re¬
examined in the light of actual consequences, is at least more
thorough than one which does not question whether the exams
are a good thing, or whether the practice of giving them might
be changed.
The practice of (and belief in) allocating educational and
economic opportunities by exams is part of the macrosystem.
When we see the macrosystem as subject to ethical regulation,
we increase the likelihood that various lower-order systems,
which conform to its basic "blueprint", will also be exposed to
doubt. Questioning basic beliefs about the female role in American
society, a macrosystemic matter, has affected the nature of
systems ranging from employment decisions (exosystem) all the
way to the relations between spouses (microsystem).
Change within the microsystem, mesosystem, and
exosystem may be constrained by the macrosystemic

blueprint

It is difficult for a father to spend more time with his children if
fathers are rewarded in a competitive culture for spending more
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time at the office. So the educator should not question elements
of the lower systems while leaving the higher systems immune
from scrutiny.
On the other hand, development must be ultimately
assessed at the mesosystemic and microsystemic levels, where
the individual whose growth is in question is actually present
Thus the educator's criticism of broader systems should spell out
how changes in them will lead to changes in more immediate
systems.
As Dewey maintains, we should frame developmental
problems with reference to sociological as well as psychological
consequences, since the two views are "reciprocal" (1946, p.233).
Each person has his own developmental path, but he is also part
of the environment of others; he affects their development as
well. Education should promote the mutual reinforcement of
growth among individuals outlined by Dewey (Ch II, Sec.D3e
above). Inquiry to this end is thorough and objective to the
extent that it examines each element of the social environment
in terms of its contribution to such mutual reinforcement.

3. The Educator-Student Relationship

An educator is anyone who has a concern for an
individual's global development and seeks to orient his actions and
perceptions so as to promote it. A student is anyone who is an
object of the educator's concern. The educator-student

286

relationship is not defined in terms of age, schooling, or social
status. This definition of an educator allows for different levels of
growth as an educator. It recognizes, however, that the explicit
desire to foster global development does itself mark a certain
threshold of growth.
One s ability to function and grow as an educator would
seem to depend on having close, multi-faceted relations with a
student or students. This in turn might depend on the social roles
occupied by educator and student, and the student's acceptance
of the educator as such. Yet one might seek to educate thousands
of students one never sees by writing a book

The mother of an

adolescent might continue to function as an educator even when
her child has ostensibly rejected her as such. We should make no
fixed assumptions about educator-student roles prior to inquiry
into particular individuals and situations.
In inquiring into the effect of the social context upon
development, the educator should be careful to include himself as
part of that context. To be thorough and objective, inquiry must
assess the educator's own current developmental problems and
history of solutions to prior problems. The educator should
consider that he as well as the student is engaged in an ongoing
series of both progressive and regressive adaptations to his
environment.
To promote the student's growth, the educator must look to
his own, he must be his own educator. The educator grows as he
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de-centers to take the role of the student and understand his
actions and views. This enables him to perceive what is most
growthful for the student, and to determine whether or not
growth is taking place. The educator grows as he opens up to and
co-ordinates his external and internal environment. This enables
him to influence the "objective conditions" (Dewey, 1938, p 45) for
the student’s growth. Whether he provides a science kit or an
encouraging tone of voice, the educator’s conscious efforts are a
key aspect of such conditions. Thus he must ask "how do my
developmental achievements enable me and qualify me to guide
this student’s growth?" while also asking how do my
egocentricities, sociocentricities, attachments, lacks, inabilities,
etc. render me less able to guide this student's growth?" Such
self-knowledge is also growthful for the educator.
Like the scientist, the educator must be alert to the
influence of his biases upon his results. Toulmin (1981) chides
Piaget for ignoring how his investigator’s expectations might affect
the responses of child subjects, which might be seen as attempts
at "catching on" to the investigator’s own Euclidean notions.
Toulmin's point is that in a different society or epoch, children
might come to ’’catch on" to a different set of rules (p.264). He
argues that false notions of invariant developmental sequence
may arise out of the experimenter’s sociocentrism. He gives the
example of Kohlberg’s claim that all children first realize the
fantasy nature of dreams, and only afterwards realize that they
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are purely personal. He cites research showing that Nigerian
children reverse this sequence. The researchers’ speculated that
communal sleeping arrangements in Nigeria (as opposed to
isolated arrangements in middle-class America) led the children
to realize earlier that their dreams were not shared by others
(p.265). Toulmin asks psychologists to take a "three-dimensional
matrix" approach, seeing the subject, the researcher, and the
situation as variable factors in determining research outcomes.
This advice also applies to education, where the consequences of
ignoring any of the three variables will be more immediate.
Now the orthogenetic principle prescribes that development,
if it continues, must eventually involve seeing one's "own" growth
as bound up with the effect one has upon the growth of others.
Whether we are conscious of it or not, adaptation occurs within a
social context. Many growth-paths may emerge from individual
and cultural differences. Yet the egocentric attachment which
blinds us to the socially interdependent nature of growth poses a
universal problem for development to solve. Therefore, no matter
what other roles one plays in society, everyone should grow to
adopt the educator’s role in some form, and take up a concern
for the growth of others. To emerge as an educator could thus be
seen as a universal "end-in-view", despite the individually and
culturally varied series of more immediate ends-in-view which
might frame problems along the way.
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This is not to pose a fixed "educator” state as some final
achievement. To take up the educator's role is the beginning of a
developmental process as well as a culmination. For example, an
educator may begin with a concern for his household only
(microsystem). He may later extend his concern to how the
entire sociocultural context impedes or reinforces growth
(macrosystem). Further growth would integrate his concern for
particular students with his concern for the reinforcement of
growth within the society that includes those students.
The educator takes responsibility for the student's global
development: not just growth in skateboarding or chess, but in
the ethical co-ordination of all the student's growth-paths. His
ability to do this relies upon his growth along three general lines:
1) his degree of conscious concern for his own global development,
reciprocally shaped by a concern for the growth of others and the
mutual reinforcement of growth in society; 2) his degree of power
to conduct thorough and objective inquiry aimed at the framing
of inclusive and essential developmental problems; 3) his degree of
power to bring about progressive solutions to those problems.
These criteria let us articulate the nature of the educatorstudent relationship with less fear of introducing sociocentric or
other non-essential distinctions. The relationship between
educator and student is developmental^ unequal, is a
relationship between "greater" and "lesser" levels of development,
to the extent that there is a difference between individuals in
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those three criteria. I may have a great deal to learn from a
certain 10-year-old when it comes to skateboarding or even
playing chess, yet this does not equip him to be my educator. On
the other hand, it means that my greater age, or my possession
of math skills he doesn't have, are not sufficient to define or
justify my capacity as his educator. [4]
The educator must not use the excuse of superiority
according to the three criteria mentioned to take a permanent "1
know better than you" attitude, or to permanently commandeer
the student's course of activity. To adhere to the orthogenetic
principle, the educator must rather seek to diminish, abolish, or
even reverse the inequality that exists between educator and
student along these lines. It is not the educator's aim to see that
the student adapts along a fixed and specific course set by the
educator. It is rather to see that the student learns to set his
own developmental course, based on his own concern for the
growth of others in reciprocity with his own, his own power to
conduct thorough and objective inquiry to this end, and his own
power to execute that course even in the face of obstacles. In
short, it should be his aim that the student eventually become
the educator. The educator's efforts to direct or influence the
student's activities must be justified not only by an objective
assessment of the educator's superiority along the three essential
criteria, but also by his intention to decrease this superiority
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through education. Various means to this end-in-view must then
be assessed according to whether they do in fact realize it.
The outcome actually achieved is bound to reflect the
means used to attain it. So the autonomy of the student, in
conjunction with a mutual de-centered dialogue between educator
and student, must be encouraged throughout the education
process. Yet the student may not begin with much concern for
his own growth, or for that of others, or with much ability to
inquire thoroughly and objectively, or to pursue a growthful
course. Growth for such students, in a given situation, may
require interventions which contradict a spirit of autonomy and
dialogue. It may not be best to negotiate nightly with a threeyear-old about his bedtime; it may be better to decree that
three-year-olds go to bed at 8pm. But we still must justify our
autocracy by its effects upon growth in both the present and the
future. We may note that the child cannot act out of an
understanding of his parents' need for an evening break, or for
his own need for rest (and perhaps the security of routine) So
parents, rather than allow these needs to be at the mercy of the
child's egocentrism, take temporary responsibility for ensuring
them. We may note that the child's autonomy in daytime play is
not dented in the slightest by having an ordained bedtime, and
that he comes to enjoy the regular bedtime ritual. As for the
future, we may note that children who obey at age three are not
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at all hampered in their ability to negotiate at age nine, taking
their parents needs and their own larger needs into account.

4. The "Reaction Norm”
The sociocultural context and the educator-student
relationship are environmental conditions influencing
development. Educational inquiry must also take the organismic
side of development into account. The same objective conditions
which promote growth for one person may not do so for another:
"one man's meat is another man's poison". If the organism has
not constructed habits which enable it to adapt progressively to
the environment, then such adaptation will not occur.
Development occurs only when the organism can experience a
problem, and can regulate its environment in a direction which
tends to do away with the problem's source
Conditions may simply not present a problem to a given
person. In this case, there is no call to adapt in any direction. Or
conditions may present a problem, but the organism may not
have the capacity to adapt progressively to it. In this case,
regressive adaptation would occur. Thus one person with political
awareness and skills may adapt to noise in his neighborhood by
organizing community action, while another person without those
skills might adapt by wearing ear plugs. In the most extreme
case, lack of ability to adapt would result in death to the
organism.
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Piaget (1971, p.286) uses the concept of the "reaction norm"
(Cf., ibid.,

adaptive norm") to describe the range of phenotypes

that may be generated by a given genotype. The genotype has a
range of possibilities within which it can produce responses to
varied environmental conditions. We can use the analogy of a
reaction norm to describe a person's ability to respond
developmental^ to given environmental conditions. Changes in
environmental conditions which fall outside the reaction norm
will not promote development. Parental attempts at mutual role¬
taking at bedtime may fall outside their three-year-old’s reaction
norm. Thus the educator, in asking the "educator's question" (See
Sec. A above), must also ask: "Do these changes fall within the
student's reaction norm at this time?" Developmental problems
are not inclusively and essentially framed if they assume an
ability to adapt progressively which is not there.
On the other hand, it is precisely this reaction norm which
is itself assumed to be subject to development. Thus the educator
must inquire carefully into each student’s reaction norm. He
must be prepared to test hypotheses and revise conclusions about
it. The reaction norm is the boundary between what is taken as
given and what is taken as subject to regulation in the framing of
a problem. If the educator assumes the reaction norm to be
static ("you can't change human nature"), this will have the
same pernicious effect as the assumption of a fixed sociocultural
context. The most problematic habits will be considered immune
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to educational influence. Conversely, to overestimate the reaction
norm is to assume the student has already learned the very
thing which needs to be taught. We might assume that children,
if given more external liberty, will use their time more
productively. This might be so for some children, but others
might need to learn, with active guidance, how to use time
productively in the face of greater external liberty. Without such
guidance, regressive rather than progressive adaptation might
take place.
Students with different reaction norms may all respond
developmentally to a situation, but in different ways Gilligan (in
Cirillo and Wapner, 1986, p.32) gives the example of a film about
the Holocaust seen by eighth-graders. Some of the students
thought more concretely, others more formally The concrete
thinkers had greater immediate empathy with the victims in the
film, but little understanding of its historical context (”It is so
sad. Why doesn’t someone stop them?"). The formal thinkers
grasped the historical ideas, yet were less emotionally moved. We
might frame a different growth-problem for each group to solve.
Yet a simulation activity might awaken the formal thinkers to
greater empathy, whereas the concrete thinkers might fail to
relate a history lesson to the people they saw on film. Each
problem must account for both the desired direction of change in
the reaction norm, and the limits to education set by it.
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The educator aims to aid in the construction of new habits
while acknowledging the initial limits of the old ones. The problem
of how to accomplish this can only be solved through ongoing
experimentation in concrete situations. Theories which predict
stages or chronologies of continuous or discontinuous reaction
norm changes should be used only as points of departure for the
educator's hypotheses, which in turn should be tested by
experience. The educator must communicate with and observe
the student to know when the student is on that fruitful
boundary marking the edge of his power to respond
developmentally. Repeated experience with many students, or
with a particular student, leads us to recognize when education
has gone far enough outside the reaction norm to jeopardize
short-term development by provoking a regressive response It
also alerts us to the signs of education which threatens long-term
development by failing to challenge the student.
Development extends the reaction norm, and the range of
situations to which the individual can adapt progressively. Thus
one person thrown in jail might become mentally ill, while
another might become more serene, focused, and determined. To
secure objective conditions which promote growth, therefore, is
by no means to "coddle" the individual, and render him less able
to adapt progressively under less ideal conditions. It is rather to
arrange a series of conditions which repeatedly stretch reaction
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norm boundaries. This develops the global habit of engaging in
this kind of stretching (and leaping) on an autonomous basis.
Destructive influences in the social or physical environment
can provide challenges which are not sought out, but imposed.
An extended reaction norm will better enable the individual to
turn disaster into opportunity. But development itself engenders a
wider and more refined set of problems. So we need not worry
that a more growthful social order will produce "weaker"
individuals. People in the habit of growing will expand their own
environment so as to stretch their limits. We can also count on
unplanned environmental changes to present challenges equal to
(or one or more steps beyond) our power to confront them.

5. Ends-in-View
In Section Cll above, I defined the PROBLEM-SOLUTION
SYSTEM as a series of developmental problems and their solutions
ranging from the most specific and short-term ones to the most
long-term and general ones. Within such a system, larger
problems co-ordinate smaller ones, providing context, visionary
purpose, and unifying standards. A plan for a non-violent social
order, for example, might discourage violent steps to obtain it.
At the same time, new discoveries through immediate
activity lead us to extend, flesh out, and redefine our long-term
ends-in-view. Responding to horseplay in my classroom, I might,
without any purpose other than maintaining order, begin open
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discussions about such problems with my students. I may find a
value in those discussions which goes beyond simply improving
physical conduct. Out of this experience, I may develop a whole
philosophy and curriculum of democratic problem-solving. The
larger goal of having a more democratic classroom will in turn
shape how I organize those discussions next year. The whole
experience recasts my idea of "order" from one of physical
obedience to one of solidarity with the group and a commitment
to working things out.
Within a problem-solution system, bigger and smaller
problem-solutions exert dynamic influence on one another
Thorough and objective educational inquiry takes into account the
entire problem-solution system, and examines the mutually
reinforcing Influence of ends-in-vlew at M levels of generality
and time-scope.
Any visions of an "educated person" or "educated society",
to promote growth in the present, must spell out their
consequences for the framing of more immediate problemsolutions. They should attempt to articulate some sequence
whereby particular problem-solutions will lead to more general
ones. Further, they must be revised in light of actual outcomes,
both in the short-term and the long-term.
This standard reveals inadequacies in the popularly
conceived goals of "culture", defined as a fixed set of concepts and
literary-historical references, and of the "educated person*.
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defined as one who can participate in discourse which takes that
"culture"

for granted. The requisite body of knowledge for an

educated person is established in advance; education is a matter
of absorbing this body of knowledge. The agenda may also include
reasoning skills which enable the student to attach meaning to
the knowledge, and use it to take part in future discourse But
the end-in-view is framed in terms of the information. It
excludes the more essential consideration of spontaneous and
enlivening conversation based on shared activity, with
commitment and collective creation as well as information
stemming from that activity. As a result, approaches based on
this end-in-view try to imbue culture through isolated study.
The key student interactions are held to be with a single teacher
(or a computer!) in a setting divorced from anything the student
considers pertinent to his own social life The result is that many
students not only fail to approximate the ideal, but lose interest
in school altogether. The adherents of this end-in-view then
decry our social and individual shortcomings. But they do not
question the inclusivity or essentiality of their end-in-view, or
see it as a possible cause of educational failure.
The educator should by all means construct the most largescale and long-term goals imaginable, ones that include the most
profound dreams and resolve the most fundamental difficulties.
He must, however, be prepared to check such ends-in-view
against their actual influence upon immediate practice, and to
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render them still more inclusive and essential in the light of
experience. Ideas about where ongoing personal and social
development can and should lead play a regulative role similar to
that of ethical principles. They provide definite plans in which
those principles are expressed. Thus the orthogenetic principle
finds concrete expression in designs for social institutions which
promote non-violence, respect for ecology, political and economic
democracy, individual autonomy, and mutual support. Such
blueprints are not immutable deductions or fixed teloi. They are
working constructions which create a context for present
educational activity, conditioning its scope and sensitivity.
The educator should not underestimate the benefit of the
conditioning influence of our most advanced ends-in-view upon
the whole problem-solution system. If one's aim for a deprived
group of students is that they become educators, scientists, and
artists, this is bound to influence practice in a different direction
than if one’s aim is to "at least enable these kids to function in
society”. The more growthful aim includes the lesser one, so the
latter is by no sacrificed to the former. The strategy for getting
from the immediate situation to the more growthful vision will,
however, encourage activities and perceptions not included within
the smaller aim.
To be able to formulate more growthful ends-in-view, the
educator himself must keep on growing. The end-in-view which
creates the context for the entire problem-solution system will
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only be as advanced as the educator’s ability to envision it. The
more the educator has some idea of a society in which growth is
mutually reinforced, and in which people make a great variety of
contributions, the better equipped he will be to organize
educational activity which reflects that dream in embryo At the
same time, however, the more the educator can use larger endsin-view as tools rather than dogma to which he is attached, the
more able he will be to guard against rigid thinking on the part of
students. [5]

6. Responsibility
So far, I have outlined those domains which the educator
must take into account as potentially subject to regulation. From
the "lateral" point of view, these include the sociocultural
context, the educator himself, and the student's "internal"
reaction norm. From the "longitudinal" standpoint, this includes
the interaction between problem-solutions ranging from the more
immediate and particular to the more long-term and general,
from the "next step" to the "ideal".
The educator should be wary of fixed assumptions about
how all these lateral and longitudinal factors influence each
other. Theories can alert him to possibilities, things to look for.
Systematic experiment may sharpen possibilities into probabilities
Still, the particular nature of education requires an open-minded
educator engaging in renewed experiment with each individual
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student. Thus it should be deemed possible to influence the
student's reaction norm by altering some aspect of the
microsystem. Yet it should also be considered possible that each
system retains a resistance to change which "buffers" the effects
of changes in other systems. A lifetime of growth for an educator
may exert only minimal influence upon the makeup of a
macrosystem. Perhaps development will proceed as a continuous
and gradual emergence of ideals out of small steps. Yet sudden or
sweeping transformations may erupt out of a shift in context
created by a new and larger ideal, or by the discovery of a new
and more effective immediate approach
Now, to take this entire universe of factors into account is
no easy task. Even so, this is but the groundwork for the heart
of inquiry to resolve the "educators' question". To frame problemsolutions which prescribe educational activity, the educator must
select, singly or In combination, which factors are strategically
most essential at a given time. He must ask, "At this moment,
should my problem be framed in terms of the macrosystem, the
exosystem, the mesosystem, the microsystem, my long-term
goals, my immediate goals, my own powers or deficiencies, or the
student's psychological 'reaction-field'7 Further, which specific
aspects of each of these factors require regulation7"
To answer this question is to determine which factors we
are going to hold RESPONSIBLE in the framing of our problem.
"...as the practical problems of education and
administration of justice clearly indicate, an intelligent
imputation of responsibility involves the question of where
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the factors are located that are simultaneously controlling,
in human action, and also controllable by human
intervention" (Nagel, 1957, p.24, emphasis in original).”
The educator's role is to hold factors responsible, as
objectively controlling the situation, while holding, himself
responsible, or taking responsibility, for controlling those factors.
Thus if I hold a child s selfish habits responsible for his fighting
with a friend over toys, it is within the context of holding myself
responsible for doing something about those habits. The educator’s
stance refers back to his own responsibility, literally, his ability
to respond. This ability is itself not fixed, but subject to
development. There are no inherent, permanent limits placed
upon his responsibility. This taking of responsibility is at the core
of the ethical point of view (See Ch. II, Sec.Dl above).
We have here a dual notion of responsibility. The objective
side of responsibility is the effort to hold certain factors
responsible (in the sense defined by Nagel above) when framing a
developmental problem: a corrupt institution, an unconscious
phobia, an inarticulate end-in-view. The subjective side is the
ethical context within which the educator takes responsibility for
the regulation of those factors. The educator holds factors
objectively responsible within the subjective context of taking
responsibility for them.
The educator's question always refers to actual human
beings as students. So even when the educator holds

society

responsible for some problematic situation, he relates his efforts
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to alter the macrosystem to desirable changes in the shared
perceptions and actions of real people.
Now the educator seeks to promote the de-centered
autonomy of his students. This development cannot be sustained
if the educator takes responsibility in a way that considers
students to be passive recipients of his regulative efforts. It can
only proceed if the educator "holds" his responsibility for
regulating factors in the individual or society as a point of
departure for the taking of responsibility for those factors by
those being held responsible by the educator The educator thus
"holds"

for the student (in a compassionately de-centered way)

that which belongs to the student, and which, if development
proceeds, the student will progressively "take" up on his own.
How to transfer responsibility from that held by the educator to
that taken by the student may well be the central mystery of
education.
As the educator develops, he differentiates allocation of
objective responsibility from blame, disapproval, fault, or
punishment. Within the educational context, problems are not
evils to be reviled, but challenges to be met. The educator may
feel anger, fear, frustration, and the weight of cultural sanction
in dealing with certain situations: he may feel them to be bad
and wrong. But if these are to be framed as developmental
problems, the educator must take his emotional and cultural
responses into account as factors influencing the developmental
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outcome. It may be that blame or punishment are necessary or
expedient techniques for promoting growth in a certain case: this
question deserves careful empirical inquiry But without such
inquiry, the disapproval and desire for retribution implied in
laying blame or finding fault distort efforts to locate
responsibility. They hinder growth by including elements which
are not essential to doing away with those factors objectively held
to be problematic.
An example of the regressive effect upon inquiry of failure
to differentiate blame from educative responsibility is the debate
over whether solutions to poverty are to be found by "blaming
the victim" or "blaming society". To hold victims of poverty
(their reaction norms, attitudes, habits, etc.) responsible for
their plight is simply to say that there are psychological factors
which are both controlling the problem, and which are
controllable. In an educational context, the educator holds the
student responsible within a context of taking responsibility for
engaging in practice which will lead to the student's own power
to take responsibility for growth. All this has nothing to do with
blaming or accusing. It need not arouse the fear of adding insult
to injury, nor the fear of ignoring social factors responsible for
poverty. On the social side, to hold society responsible means that
shared social habits (racial prejudice, economic practice, ethical
priorities), also control the problem of poverty. These are in turn
controllable, and the educator holds society responsible within a
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context of taking responsibility himself for educating others until
they take responsibility for executing necessary growth changes
Again, this is different from locating guilt or fault, which may or
may not help to rouse society in an educational direction.
What distinguishes the progressive taking of responsibility
from guilt, blame, or fault is its orthogenetic emphasis upon
mutual reinforcement and interdependence as opposed to
egocentric isolation. We try to find others guilty so that we or
those we favor can be held blameless. At best, fault can be
shared, with each offender receiving a fraction of a fixed whole.
What one person gets, the other doesn't get. By contrast, the
taking of responsibility, like the growth of which it is a
manifestation, is unlimited and mutually reinforcing in a social
context. One person can take as much as he wants without there
being any less for anyone else. The more people take
responsibility, the more they function as educators, since only
the growth of others as well as their own can progressively solve
those factors held responsible for problems. The more people
function as educators, and develop as educators, the more effort
is directed to leading others to autonomously take responsibility.
Since no one can be heteronomously compelled to take up
autonomous responsibility, education must seek to replace
unilateral control with dialogic communication.
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7, Choices
The considerations outlined in Sections 2-6 above must be
taken into account if we are to have a thorough and objective
sense of what the possibilities for growth are in any situation. But
they do not tell us how to choose among several genuine
possibilities for growth.
Some guidance in this can be derived from the educator's
question and its corollary (Sec.l above). In choosing among
growth-paths, we should prefer those which are "most"
growthful, i.e., those which uproot the most pervasive and
pivotal manifestations of egocentric attachment. By addressing
these, we release the greatest possibilities for further growth.
Where situations are overwhelmingly oppressive or problematic,
it is easier to distinguish these more inclusive and essential paths.
It is better to help a slave gain freedom than it is to teach him to
play the violin or even run a plantation
Yet as conditions become more favorable to growth,
possibilities multiply. Educator and student are faced with the
"luxury" of having to choose from among pathways which may
seem comparably problematic or promising. In making these
choices, the orthogenetic principle can in no way replace
individual judgement in the context of a unique situation. The
best use we can make of it is to deduce from it a taxonomy of
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considerations to be taken into account when choosing among
comparably worthwhile paths;
How can I deepen my experience by building upon
current strengths? Solving progressively more refined and
challenging problems within anv endeavor will evoke a profound
autonomy and de-centering that could not be gained by solving
problems at a more superficial level across a variety of domains
* "How can I expand my experience by striking out into
unexplored territory, and correcting obvious weaknesses?" Any
life-path, by emphasizing some things over others, will sketch
out, in relief, as it were, other areas which have been avoided
No matter what the path, exploring these uncharted waters will
promote a de-centering from attachments that cannot be had in
any other way.
* "What is the present and foreseeable obstacle to continued
growth which is most general, and which, if overcome by some
present adaptation, would release the most generally beneficial
consequences for present and future growth?" Focusing on the
comparable generality of growth-paths can be an effective way of
choosing between them. Thus we seek paths which will release
greater new growth possibilities, as in the above example of the
slave. Such a consideration may lead one to seek out the most
enduring and recalcitrant obstacles to growth, whether these be
in the macrosystem, the microsystem, or one's own deepest
fears.
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* What obstacles are more realistically subject to
progressive adaptation? What steps are most possible for me right
now? As mentioned above (Sec. 4), one’s own reaction norm and
that of others must be considered when framing growthproblems. This is also a useful consideration in choosing between
growth-paths. One may perceive a far-reaching problem in
society or within oneself which, if confronted and solved, would
create vast new realms of growth. Yet although the danger of
shrinking from the ideal may be most pressing in one case, so the
danger of biting off more than one can growthfully chew may be
paramount in another. Sometimes, having posited the most
general, difficult, and long-term challenge, one must then
approach it in smaller increments. To do otherwise would be to
find oneself in over one's head, faced with no choice other than
to adapt regressively, thus defeating one's initial purpose. Some
paths may make this less likely than others.
* "Which growth-path would most benefit others, and
society as a whole? Which of my abilities, areas of knowledge,
and sensitivities are most in demand, or most objectively needed7
What is it that 1 can contribute that someone else might not be
able to contribute?" This consideration calls upon one's
"selflessness", and one's ability to see one's own growth as
interdependently linked to others within a mutually reinforcing
social context.
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Which of my desires and interests are strongest, most
inclusive of other desires and interests, and most essential to my
sense of well-being and enjoyment of living?" One may consider
one s internal environment no less than one’s external
environment in choosing growth-paths.

There may be variations

in our feelings which can help us choose among growth-paths
which are all responsive to social considerations. By considering
such unique shadings of desire, we contribute to society by
promoting variety within it.
It is obvious that such considerations do not do the final
work of judgement for us. When ought we to build upon
strengths instead of rectifying weaknesses? When ought we to
take the battle to the most pervasive constraints in society and
ourselves? When ought we to settle strategically for a lesser
victory, taking our own limits and those of others into account?
When ought we to put aside our more personal desires in order to
serve our fellow human beings, and ourselves less immediately?
When, on the other hand, ought we to follow our hearts, judging
that others as well as ourselves will be best served by the quality
of love that we can bring only to that endeavor which we enjoy
most especially?
Choices are clearest when internal or external factors are so
forceful as to weight principled judgement clearly on one side or
the other. But in the absence of such forces, choice requires a
subtle appraisal of one’s own strengths and weaknesses, one's own
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interests and developmental limits, the needs and developmental
limits of others, and the influence of the present upon the future.
To transcend egocentric attachment, we may need to be sensitive
to where our "growth-edges'* are at a given moment. These
edges reflect the most long-term and general way in which we
are most likely to succumb to egocentric attachment, and become
less open, less interconnected, less free, less in charge. Are we
most in danger of failing to pursue our powers in a given domain
to their deepest level? Or are we most in danger of using our
strengths to build a wall around ourselves, outside which we will
never venture7 Are we in danger of taking existing social
conditions as inalterable, or giving in to our attachments and
assumptions about our own limits? Or are we more in danger of
expecting too much too quickly from ourselves and others? Are
we prone to social insensitivity, to ignoring the way in which the
pursuit of our desires and interests influences others7 Or are we
out of touch with our own needs, pursuing a course out of a
sense of "duty" which masks guilt, insecurity, or ignorance? Just
as we add hot water to a bath which is too cold, and cold water
to a bath which is too hot, so our growth choices may tend in
apparently opposite directions depending upon our overview of the
situation. [6]
These considerations can only focus judgement-in-context,
not replace it. A person's power to judge ethically, however, will
depend on his growth along those universal lines which define his
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emergence as an educator (see Sec.3 above). These are: 1) his
ability to see his "own" growth as bound up with the growth of
others, and with the quality of growth-reinforcement within
society; 2) his ability to inquire thoroughly and objectively into
his situation; 3) his power to choose based on the results of that
inquiry. Choices which sacrifice any of these qualities will, over
time,

prove regressive, since they will not, in the end, work to

transcend that problem of egocentric attachment at the core of
the human condition.
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Notes
1.

I define "education" as practice aimed at intentionally and
reflectively promoting the global development of the
individual. An "educator” is anyone who practices education
The terms "education" and "educator" are not wedded to a
fixed set of institutions or social roles found in a particular
culture or time. Anyone can be an educator (See Ch I, Sec C
above).

2.

Piaget uses the term "equilibration" to denote the
equilibrium-disequilibrium cycle, as a whole, moving in an
orthogenetic direction. Equilibration is thus a near-synonym
for orthogenesis, but one that refers to the particular
explanatory mechanics of Piaget's theory.

3.

Now within professional educational settings, terms like
"more developed" or "higher functioning" may be ethically
used as "shorthand" for an implicit reference to a particular
set of respects according to which comparison is being made.
Deliberate ranking of students according to global "level" may
even serve as a conscious educational tool, designed to
heighten awareness of and commitment to achieving aspects
of growth deemed most essential. The use of such professional
language and such educational methods is ethically sound to
the extent that it saves time without dulling inquiry, and
enhances student effort without restricting growth
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4.

The following remarks by Dewey are sufficiently relevant to
warrant their entire inclusion here.

Every experience is a moving force. It3 value can be judged
only on the ground of what it moves toward and into. The
maturity °f experience which should belong to the
adult as educator puts him in a position to evaluate each
experience of the young in a way in which the one having
the less mature experience cannot do. It is then the business
of the educator to see in what direction an experience is
heading. There is no point in his being more mature if,
instead of using his greater insight to help organize the
conditions of the experience of the immature, he throws
away his insight. Failure to take the moving force of an
experience into account so as to judge and direct it on the
ground of what it is moving into means disloyalty to the
principle of experience itself. The disloyalty operates in two
directions. The educator is false to the understanding that he
should have obtained from his own past experience He is also
unfaithful to the fact that all human experience is ultimately
social: that it involves contact and communication. The
mature person, to put it in moral terms, has no right to
withhold from the young on given occasions whatever
capacity for sympathetic understanding his own experience
has given him.
No sooner, however, are such things said than there is a
tendency to react to the other extreme and take what has
been said as a plea for some sort of disguised imposition from
outside. It is worthwhile, accordingly, to say something
about the way in which the adult can exercise the wisdom
his own wider experience gives him without imposing a
merely external control. On one side, it is his business to be
on the alert to see what attitudes and habitual tendencies
are being created. In this direction he must, if he is an
educator, be able to judge what attitudes are actually
conducive to continued growth and what are detrimental. He
must, in addition, have that sympathetic understanding of
individuals as individuals which gives him an idea of what is
actually going on in the minds of those who are learning. It
is, among other things, the need for these abilities on the
part of the parent and teacher which makes a system of
education based upon living experience a more difficult affair
to conduct successfully than it is to follow the patterns of
traditional education" (1938, pp. 38-39).
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5.

Educators should also consider that the level of development
(with respect to those factors most pertinent) of the peTson
m a leadership role can have a decisive effect upon the
iT,hf JeCtt0HriC3* 0< 3tudent5 A superb basketball coach
may enable students to skip over difficulties that they might
wir,enHTntCred
Under may
a 10SSenable
sKllledtheir child
Exceptionally
wise and loving parents
to avoid
much of the normal upheaval of adolescence College students
learning physics do not have to proceed through a Ptolemaic,
then a Coper mean, then a Newtonian notion of the universe
before proceeding to a quantum-relativistic view, the
understanding of their teachers conditions their learning
trajectory. Similarly, nations struggling to attain democracy
do so differently in a world populated with other democracies
than the United States did in a world populated by
monarchies.

6.

Aron (1980) provides an example:
The extent to which students were dependent or
independent, co-operative or competitive, is another variable
which would Influence the way In which deliberation would
be taught. In situations in which students were generally
highly competitive, the teacher would do well to emphasize
the corporate nature of deliberation, and to encourage group
deliberations. The aim of co-operation, however, must be
balanced against the aim of developing independent
judgement. In situations in which students were more docile
and tended to accept uncritically the opinions of others, the
teacher would do well to encourage the students to exercise
and evaluate their own judgements" (p.419).

CHAPTER V
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER INQUIRY
I have attempted to relay a grasp of orthogenesis as change
m the direction of: l) increasing co-ordination of increasingly
distinguished elements in the environment, 2) increasing
autonomy of choice coupled with increasing de-centenng of
perspective, and 3) increasing opening of and openness to the
environment alongside increasing immunity from its vicissitudes.
(The idea of integration comprises the qualities of co-ordination,
autonomy, and immunity. The idea of differentiation comprises
the qualities of distinguishing, de-centering, and opening. Thus
orthogenesis is defined as complementary integration and
differentiation.)
1 have attempted to justify using orthogenesis as an ethical
definition of what it means to grow or develop. I have also
attempted to deduce some implications of the orthogenetic
principle for educational inquiry. With respect to further work to
make the principle more useful to educators, two
recommendations come to mind.
First, in Chapter IV, Section C, 1 examined various
categories of ideas about the nature of development found in
psychological theories. 1 attempted to demonstrate an ethical
"screening" process for various assumptions. For example, 1
argued that psychological theories which assume a final state of
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human development, to be helpful in education, must be co¬
ordinated within a view of how such an assumption might
influence growth.

Additional inquiry should apply this screening

process to other assumptions within psychological theories which I
have failed to mention. The same process should be applied to
theories within other disciplines relevant to education:
anthropology, sociology, and the like. Are there "givens" within a
theory which remove from the domain of ethical regulation
matters which might conceivably control growth, and which
might themselves be controllable7
Second, 1 have stopped short of presenting narrative "cases"
showing how 1 might use the principle to aid me in framing an
educational problem in a global, complex situation. One reason for
this omission was my unwillingness to add to an already overly
ambitious project. Another was my concern that such
simulations would inevitably fail to cover all the variables and
considerations present in a real situation. Or they would fail to
convey the role played by individual talent and intuition in any
actual judgement.

Nonetheless, a "case study" approach might

provide a growthful integration of the considerations distinguished
in Chapter IV, Section D. Only by employing the principle in a
cross-cultural series of real and hypothetical situations will we
get at the "meat" of the orthogenetic framework. Only in this
way can we discover if it really "works", provoking a broader and
more effective framing of problem-solutions in all situations.
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My final observations concern the relationship between
American developmental science and American education.
American educators, be they professionals, parents, or others,
should differentiate between heuristically useful assumptions for
psychological science and ethically sound ones for education. The
orthogenetic framework can help educators filter out ethically
untenable assumptions about development. But this cuts both
ways. It means that psychologists can make assumptions they
find useful for pursuing inquiry into the facts of how and why
people change, without being charged with adversely affecting
education.
Sometimes the most fruitful stimuli to psychological
experimentation and dialogue are one-sided assumptions which
would be disastrous if uniformly "applied" in an educational
context. Assumptions that people act like machines, or that they
re-organize all their habits under the influence of their highest
acquired thought structure, or that their adult lives are largely
determined by unconscious influences from their earliest years,
all have scientific merit. We find out as much by attempting to
refute them as we do by attempting to sustain them. If research
based on these or other assumptions highlights undesirable forces
operating against growth, so much the better. In order to frame
inclusive and essential problems, educators need to be alerted to
the worst about human beings as well as the best. A critical
psychological theory can be a spur to education just as critical
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social theory can be a tool for social reform. If psychologists wish
to claim that their findings place eternal limits upon human
possibilities, this need not rivet the attention of educators with
clear ethical priorities.
Differentiating between the scientist's function and the
educator's empowers educators to take the primary role in the
formation of educational policy, instead of leaving this matter to
more specialized scientific experts. Kaplan (1983, 1986) argues that
it is the job of developmental psychology to define the nature of
what is desirable for human beings, and then prescribe this as a
matter of social policy. Kaplan's willingness to take responsibility
for this task is laudable. In keeping with my previous remarks on
responsibility, there is an unlimited amount to go around.
Psychologists should form opinions about education. They should
speculate on implications for education which they believe are
indicated by their research findings. Certainly they should
participate in public debate on educational policy.
Yet I can't help but feel that Kaplan's assignment of
prominence to the scientist’s role in prescribing policy, as nobly
motivated as it is, reflects the gulf in status and authority in
America between the university professor and the schoolteacher
or parent. To be fair, it also reflects the vacuum left by
educators who have not themselves been educated in ways
commensurate with their responsibilities, and who form policy
based upon inquiry which is far below the level of thoroughness
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and objectivity one finds in science. It is no wonder that
developmental psychologists concerned about the future of
humanity feel moved to fill this vacuum. One purpose of this
thesis is to explore means for educators to upgrade their own
inquiry to a level of development more in keeping with the
demands of their task. Educators need not rely on policy
prescribed by psychologists if they have the tools to sort out the
views of a plurality of psychologies, and make their own policy
based on more particular assessments of actual situations.
As it develops, developmental psychology will have an
increasingly important and constructive role to play in education.
Its job will be to refine the mind-boggling welter of possible
adaptations due to interactions between inner and outer factors
into systems of probabilities. How likely is it that

certain kinds of

interactions in certain kinds of cultures between certain kinds of
educators and certain kinds of students in certain kinds of
situations will promote certain kinds of progressive or regressive
adaptations? The educator can assume that theories based on
probabilities may break down in the face of individual
interactions, but at least good theory gives him a place to start.
If psychologists want to aid education, they can let educators
contribute to the direction of research by asking them what kinds
of questions they want answered. Then they can use whatever
heuristic means are at their disposal to come up with probable
answers and ways of thinking about them.
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Everyone has a role to play In taking responsibility for
human development. Yet using psychological research to tailor
educational policy is more properly the educators function than
the psychologist's, although the psychologist's advice may be
invaluable. It is, after all, the educator who takes responsibility
for the global development of particular individuals, and for the
direct consequences of the way problems and policies are framed.
There is, of course, no reason to prevent any given individual
from playing both roles over time. In fact, it would be useful for
more professional educators to have a chance to conduct
psychological research, and for research psychologists to take time
to work and think as educators. That way there would be not
only differentiation between the educator's and scientist's
functions, but integration as well.
Unfortunately, the gap in status, training, and expectations
between research psychologists, and, for example, elementary
school teachers, cuts the educator out of his proper role. We do
not expect elementary school teachers to indicate research
priorities, create policy, evaluate and adapt psychological
research, or define long-term growth-pathways. In our culture,
educators only accede to such roles as their connections to
students become more distant, as they inhabit the student's
exosystem rather than his microsystem, becoming
superintendents and college professors rather than parents,
counselors and schoolteachers. Our culture works against the
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possibility of policy being made by those in the most direct
position to implement it and be affected by it. Thus it is no
surprise that psychologists are ready to exert their accustomed
authority, and fulfill the educator’s role for him
Science seeks general laws within specific aspects of the
world. Education, by contrast, seeks the most particular laws
which apply to that most general of things, the actual human
being. If research psychologists really want to empower
educators, and respect the limits of science as applied to
education, they would do well to heed the advice given by George
Shultz during the

Iran-Contra" scandal. His view was that if

those gathering the information (in his case the CIA) begin to
appropriate the task of making or prescribing policy, problems
result. On the one hand, the intelligence tends to be biased to
reflect the policies favored by those assembling it. On the other
hand, policy recommendations are influenced by a view of the
situation biased and limited by the preoccupation with gathering
certain kinds of information. It is simply not as broad an outlook
as that of the politician who must weigh a greater variety of
situational factors. Finally, it is the politician and not the
intelligence agency who is ultimately accountable for the results
of policy.
Insofar as research psychologists make policy
recommendations based on their philosophical reflections, their
concern for human welfare, and their larger experience, they are
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acting as educators. Insofar as they seek to generate
authoritative pronouncements based upon their research,
however, and upon their social prestige as scientists, they risk
disempowering the educator, and usurping his proper function
Since this is surely not their intent, it is my hope that
orthogenetic ethical theory can be one tool for establishing a more
balanced relationship between education and developmental
psychology.
For such a relationship to flourish, those whose direct
interactions within families or institutions suit them for the
educator s role must take on this role. They must become
educators as well as teachers, managers, parents, counselors,
nurses, and so on. Once the concern for the student's global
development is raised, the ability to conduct thorough and
objective inquiry should be developed. With this in progress,
educators should reorganize the settings in which they practice to
enhance their impact upon growth. Schools, workplaces,
hospitals, prisons, homes: all have the potential to become truly
educational contexts.
Within such contexts, the partnership between the educator
and the scientist (and not only the psychologist, but the
sociologist, economist, political scientist, anthropologist, etc.) can
come to fruition. The scientist can provide a controlled, focused,
and systematic kind of inquiry which is bound to escape the
educator dealing with the global array of human possibilities and
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conflicts. The educator’s inquiry can provide a frame of reference
which is both more holistic and more sensitive to individual and
situational peculiarities. He can thus suggest essential directions
for scientific inquiry, and co-ordinate a plurality of scientific
findings within larger ends-in-view. Periodic role changes
between educators and scientists would be growthful for each,
allowing for a more de-centered and co-ordinated perspective
A more integrated yet differentiated scientist-educator
relationship would mean increasingly intimate dialogue and
mutual influence with retained respect for essential and useful
role distinctions. Scientists could consider the educational effect of
their very experimentations-and-observations-in-context. Just as
educational contexts could provide real-life laboratories for
scientific advance, so scientific research could incorporate
educational aims. Bronfenbrenner advances the notion of the
"transforming experiment" which "involves the systematic
alteration and restructuring"

of the sociocultural ecology "in

ways that challenge the forms of social organization, belief
systems, and lifestyles prevailing in a particular culture or
subculture" (1976, p.41).
The transforming experiment provides a vehicle for
educators and scientists to act as partners in the organization of
social institutions which consciously promote growth. The
orthogenetic principle can provide educators with a powerful tool
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to orient effort in the direction of creating such institutions This
is the challenge that was set forth by Dewey:
or^rowth^ ^Cn,t4t^ °f the moral Process with the processes
j^
lsf realiz^d, the more conscious and formal
education of childhood will be seen to be the most

economical and efficient means of social advance and
reorgari^ation and it will also be evident that the test of
I
? 0i adult llfe 15 their effect
furthering
continued education. Government, business, art, religion,
all social institutions have a meaning, a purpose. That
t0 Set freC and devel°P the capacities of human
ndividuals without respect to race, sex, class or economic
status. And this is all one with saying that the test of their
V+U+JS
ex^en^
which they educate every individual
into the full stature of his possibility. Democracy has many
meanings, but if it has a moral meaning, it is found in
resolving that the supreme test of all political institutions
and industrial arrangements shall be the contribution they
make to the all-around growth of every member of society"
(1950, p.147).
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